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Abstract
In this thesis centralized, decentralized, Bluetooth, and GPS based applications of digital
contact tracing were reviewed and assessed. Using privacy principles created by a contingent
of security and privacy experts from across Canada, a metric of assessing an application’s
privacy was created. An attack tree was built to assess the security of the contact tracing
applications. Eighteen attacks were theorized against contact tracing applications currently
in use. An application’s vulnerability to the attacks was measured using a scoring system
developed for this purpose. The results of the security scores were used to create a metric for
assessing the security of contact tracing systems.
Five contact tracing applications were assessed using developed privacy and security met-
rics. The results of this assessment are that for privacy and security a centralized Bluetooth
model with added location functionality scored low. While in privacy a decentralized Blue-
tooth model scored high. In security, the centralized GPS model scored high, while having
only a fair level of privacy.
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Summary for Lay Audience
The digital world is growing larger every day. Everything we do that involves a computer
or the internet generates data points. These data points are collected and stored. Together all
of this data forms a picture of your life. With it models that can predict your behaviour can be
created. There is a lot of power sitting and waiting to be used.
The power of this data can be used for good. To create models that can diagnose illness
or determine the best treatment plan for an individual. It could also be used to harm people.
The same medical record that together with others could create a treatment breakthrough for a
mental disorder could be used to discriminate against someone with that disorder, losing them
their job. Health data is private for good reasons.
Determining the best practices of keeping health data private provides those tasked to do
so with the tools they need. The first section of this thesis is a review of the state of health data
privacy. This leads to an overview of the best practices of the field.
Then the specific health data problem of contact tracing is tackled. Both the privacy and
security of contact tracing applications is important. The privacy of the application was mea-
sured using privacy principles created by a contingent of security and privacy experts from
across Canada. From these privacy principles, a metric for assessing an application’s privacy
was created.
To assess the security of the contact tracing applications eighteen attacks were theorized.
These attacks were then applied to the systems that the application’s use. An application’s
vulnerability to the attacks was measured using a scoring system developed for this purpose.
The results of the security scores were used to create a metric for assessing the security of
contact tracing systems.
Five contact tracing applications were assessed using developed privacy and security met-
rics. The results of this assessment are that for privacy and security one out of the five was
ranked as low, one was ranked as high, and three were ranked as medium. This means that of
the five applications scrutinized four out of five have privacy or security concerns. As these
applications are intended to be used across the globe by everyone for the safety of the populace
these concerns are important to address.
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The total amount of digital data in the world is estimated to be 44 zettabytes in 2020 [48]. In
2013, there were 4.4 zettabytes of data. For reference the entire Encyclopedia Britannica in its
final volume was one gigabyte of disk space [92]. One zettabyte is a trillion gigabytes. Data has
been important to humans since the creation of language, the library of Alexandria in Ancient
Egypt was the largest store of data in 300 BC [48]. Humans it seems, have always believed
that the collection and analysis of data was the key to something. That data was the foothold
from which civilization could rise above its current problems and become greater. Knowledge
is, after all, power.
The Information Age arriving in the 1970’s changed humanity’s understanding of data.
With the creation of transistor technology data has become digital. It was the development
of the Internet and the Internet’s growth over the last two decades that truly and completely
changed how humans thought about data. Prior to then, people had to actively create data.
Data had to be actively collected from research, written into books, copied, and read through
to be utilized. Now data is generated by the systems we are using every day. Data is created
and stored without humans ever having to touch it.
Humans still use data to create solutions to problems. When the amount of data available
became too large for people to analyze they turned to the machines that had generated so much
of it for the solution. Machine learning was created. Computers could be used to analyze the
hard drives full of data. Using new analytical methods data could be utilized to guide solutions
and train predictive models. From the analysis of data, knowledge could be created, however,
power can be misused.
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
Some information, even in the digital age, needs to be kept private. Military bases for
instance sometimes need to keep their location and movements of soldiers secret. The location
data from soldier’s Fitbit watches could be used to learn such things [145]. Data that needs
to be kept private is not restricted to state secrets. Personal data can be powerful as well. In
2017 a data breach of Equifax (one of the largest credit bureaus in the United States) exposed
the personal data of 147.9 million people [29]. The data Equifax held could be used to steal
identities, steal money, and in the long run hurt every one of those people.
The medical industry has been no different from any other in recent decades. Data has
been used to create solutions and solve problems. Artificial intelligence is being used to create
predictive models that will advance health care in the future. Faster diagnosis, a better under-
standing of illnesses, a better understanding of the efficacy of different treatments, these and
more are all possible results of leveraging the health data that is available [65]. The healthcare
industry collects a huge amount of healthcare data from patients through clinic appointments,
hospital visits, and medical studies. More than just hospitals and universities are collecting this
data as well, IBM [65], Apple [66], Google [60], Microsoft [85], and Amazon [24] all have
some form of healthcare research or service or application.
All of the data generated by every one of the 7.5 billion people on this planet needs to be
protected because every single one of those people deserves to be protected. Information is
knowledge and knowledge is power. Privacy is about how much power we give to those we
trust. Security is about keeping that power in the hands of only those we trust. The only way
to ensure that our data is private and secure is to test and scrutinize its handling.
1.1 Motivations
On January 30th 2020 the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Director-General declared the
novel coronavirus outbreak a public health emergency of international concern, the WHO’s
highest level of alarm. On March 11th due to the concerning levels of spread and severity of
symptoms the WHO assessed that the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) could be char-
acterized as a pandemic [131]. The Director-General said that “all countries can still change
the course of this pandemic” if they “detect, test, treat, isolate, trace, and mobilize their people
in the response” [55].
The pandemic of 2020 is the first outbreak to spread across the globe since the dawn of the
digital age. Naturally, the digital world has turned to digital solutions. One of which is to take
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the detect and trace parts of the pandemic response and automate them. Digital contact tracing
is a new idea for the health care field. When new tools are created whose purpose is to collect
data and trace people the privacy and security field need to move quickly. To pump the breaks
when the momentum is picking up. Not to stop the advancement, but to move with the caution
the icy road of data collection requires to navigate safely.
The goal of this thesis is to create a metric to use against digital contact tracing applications.
This begins with a review of the entire field of health care data. Once the best practice of how
to treat the different data types that are a part of a modern health record is established the field
of digital contact tracing can be assessed. Contact tracing applications have the potential to
assist the pandemic response and impact the spread of the virus. However, any application
with the intention of tracking its users needs to be thoroughly vetted before implementation.
This thesis intends to create that vetting process.
1.2 Contributions
The intention of this body of work is to layout first the current landscape of health data pro-
tection. A complete review of health data privacy was performed to determine how data is
protected. This review was intended to determine not only what methods are being used but
what methods have been shown to be broken and what overall the best practice of health data
privacy should look like. This forms part one of this document.
Part two takes this knowledge and applies it to a new aspect of the health care field. Digital
contact tracing. Using principles of data privacy fifty-five of the contact tracing applications
being released by governments around the world were assessed. This information was then
used to create a metric for measuring the level of privacy their users have. Then a security
assessment of the apps was performed. Through analysis of the applications’ operations, eigh-
teen different potential vulnerabilities were used to test security. From this security assessment,
a metric for measuring the level of security of the apps was created.
Governments and citizens could use the assessment tools created in this thesis to scrutinize
contact tracing applications prior to their adoption. Thus, proactively protecting their citizens
or themselves from the dangers inherent to unsecured health data. The developers could use
these metrics to determine how they should design the systems or improve them. Making the
systems more secure moving forwards.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.3 Organization of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows.
• Part 1: Systematic Review of Health Data Privacy. The chapters in this section form
a detailed review of the state of health data privacy.
– Chapter 2: Background of Privacy and Health Data. This chapter details, how
they can be privatized, how they can be attacked, and the dangers of those attacks
succeeding.
– Chapter 3: Review of Health Data De-identification Attacks. A review of at-
tacks performed to determine the identity of the individuals from released data sets
that had privacy claims was performed. This chapter details that review.
– Chapter 4: Observations from Review of De-identification Attacks. The review
of attacks is applied to future data with a set of guidelines on what to do when
removing identities from data sets.
• Part 2: Security and Privacy of Patient Contact Tracing. The chapters in this section
form a detailed review of the privacy and security of contact tracing apps. A method to
determine the risk to the populace when digital contact tracing is implemented with the
intention of being used country-wide is developed.
– Chapter 5: Background on Contact Tracing. This chapter details background
information on contact tracing. Detailing what it is and what it is becoming.
– Chapter 6: Contact Tracing Schemes. A detailed overview of the operation of
the most popular digital contact tracing schemes.
– Chapter 7: Methodology of Developing a Tool to Assess Contact Tracing Ap-
plications. In this chapter, the methodology followed to create an assessment tool
for contact tracing apps is detailed.
– Chapter 8: Assessing Contact Tracing Applications. This chapter contains a
complete privacy analysis of the contact tracing apps released in over fifty coun-
tries. Comparing them against the determined standards and ranking them accord-
ingly. Then a security review of five of these apps is performed. The assessment
system of both the privacy and security of the apps is developed and tested.
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– Chapter 9: Discussion, Future Work, Conclusions. A concluding chapter that
discusses the contribution of this thesis and the scope of future work from it as well
as some concluding remarks.
Part I
Systematic Review of Health Data Privacy
6
Chapter 2
Background of Privacy and Health Data
Data has become a commodity of the modern world. Both companies and research groups want
to use the vast amounts of the data that has been collected from people to create innovative
solutions, perform groundbreaking research, or optimise their designs. A common use of this
data is to train machine learning algorithms with it to make them better predictors of customer
behaviour. For example, companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft [33, 143, 144]
have all fed voice data to their software-based assistants (Echo, Siri, Google Assistant, and
Cortana respectively) to teach them to better understand human speech patterns and accents.
Voice data is not the only type of data that can be leveraged and there are many different
data types and structures that can be used. Some examples being geolocation data, cell phone
records, social media networks, medical data, and browsing data. The data collected is diverse
in type and form, making even single data sets complex, as they can contain any combination
of this variety.
Much of the data that has been collected has the potential to reveal the identity of the
people it is about. The information would initially contain personal details, like data about
online shopping habits that enter a database connected to an account and thus contains the
name, email address, phone number, credit card information, etc. of the customer. Due to
this, to protect people’s privacy, many countries have legislation in place to limit the collection
and control the distribution of data about its citizens. For example, Canada has the federal
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) [164], which places
protections on personally identifiable information collected about Canadians.
De-identification refers to the processes used to separate someone’s identity from the data
collected from them to prevent their identity from being revealed through observation and
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analysis of the data, or linking data sources together. The idea of data de-identification then is to
reduce the risk of connecting the data to the originating individual to a statistically insignificant
amount. Under legislation such as that in Canada, data that has been de-identified is no longer
considered protected personal information because of the idea of there being a statistically low
risk of exposure [164].
There is a growing view that the risk assurances of de-identification are flawed, and that
de-identification does not work [111]. Several notable cases have shown that supposedly de-
identified data could still be used to re-identify individuals [89]. Cases of this occurring cast
doubt on whether de-identification can protect an individual’s privacy. Testing the accuracy of
this view is a goal of chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
2.1 De-identification Methods
The field of research into different methods of lowering the re-identification risk is quite broad.
Not only are there are many different forms of data but each data set is different in its collected
attributes. For example, geolocation data sets, one from a vehicle’s GPS and another from a
social network site. The data set generated from the vehicle might contain only two pieces
of information, the time and position coordinates. The social network might contain the same
timestamp and coordinate information, but also the user’s name, age, the content of their post
on the site, and other information outside of the scope of what one would consider geolocation
data. This extra information can help inform researchers that intend to use the data to learn
something about the populace. For example, social media data could be useful to the planning
of public transport routes by providing the movement patterns of specific age groups. Due
to this variance between the data within sets of the same “type” often data sets need to be
considered individually. The unique combination of features in a data set could reveal more
information than the features of another data set would.
De-identification literature typically splits data features into two types: direct identifiers
and indirect identifiers. Direct identifiers include anything that on its own can be tied to an
individual’s identity, a name, social insurance number, account number, etc. These are values
that are unique to an individual and can act as their identity in some contexts. An indirect
identifier is a value that on its own is not enough to identify a person; date of birth, gender,
race, etc. However, when used in combination they create indirect identifier sets that can be
used to identify a person. These can also be called quasi-identifiers. A third category could
2.1. De-identificationMethods 9
be non-identifiers, values that cannot identify a person, though it can be difficult to draw the
line between them and indirect identifiers, as generally the larger the indirect identifier set the
easier it becomes to identify an individual, even when the information seems inconsequential.
Thus, except for cases where the attribute is not externally available for an adversary to exploit,
the line between non-identifiers and indirect identifiers is difficult to set.
Due to the variance in data types and data sets, different actions need to be taken to de-
identify data sets. These actions can be generally grouped into six types of manipulations:
suppression, masking, generalization, perturbation, aggregation, and access control and moni-
toring.
Suppression.
Suppression is the removal of some aspect of the data set entirely. This could include com-
pletely removing a field or column in the data, such as the individual’s name, or removing
specific entries in the data set. Outliers in the data set that are too extreme might be suppressed
for a variety of reasons, one reason being that the uniqueness of any outlier makes that indi-
vidual more likely to be identified in the data set. Providing the same privacy assurance to the
outlier as all other individuals in the set could require manipulations that reduce the research
utility of the data set too far, as the section on generalization explains. Thus removing the
outlier can be the more prudent choice.
Generalization.
Generalization is a decrease in the granularity of the information, resulting in the information
being less specific. This could be changing the time stamp from the second that it occurred to
the minute, a five-minute interval, or more as required. It could also be changing the location
from the exact address to the city block or general neighbourhood. The chosen generalization
level for a feature in the data set is applied to that feature for every entry in the set. The risk
with generalization is that increases in generalization are also decreases in utility. The greatest
amount of privacy that could be provided to individuals would be to make all of the entries the
same, or not include any at all, which would not provide much information for researchers to
use. For example, if every location is generalized to the country but the researchers need to
know which provinces or even townships an illness is most prevalent in the data has been too
generalized to be useful to them.
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Masking.
Masking is when the data is left in the set but is obscured so that the original values cannot
be readily obtained. This is usually used on direct identifiers. Sometimes this is done to
make it easier for researchers to identify entries that have been made by the same individual,
creating a perpetual identifier used through the data set that allows them to trace a single person.
Depending on the intended usage, the data may need to be able to be linked back to the original
individuals at a later time and so a value connecting the entry back to the data set containing
their identity is required. Pseudo-anonymous identifiers do not appear to be an identifier, but
information can be linked to them by the service providers or site administrators. For example,
in cell phone records for many users, every individual would require a perpetual identifier so
that the logs for the same person can be grouped together. This can be done using techniques
like encryption or, in limited cases, hashing on the original value.
Perturbation.
Perturbation is to alter the reliable accuracy of the value, typically seen as adding noise to the
system. This is not a generalization, as the granularity does not need to change, but instead,
the value itself is slightly altered. An example is shifting GPS coordinates randomly by a small
amount so that the exact location cannot be assumed to be reliable. The goal is not to alter the
result of any analysis but the reliability of a single value so that it cannot be used to concretely
learn someone’s identity.
Aggregation.
Aggregation is the process where raw data is collected or grouped together. In some cases only
statistics about the data may be released, in others, attributes or entries may be combined. This
way instead of revealing the entire data set collections of statistics derived from the data set or
information about small groups within the data set can be revealed. For example, if analysis
of the raw data shows that 50% of men over a certain age living in a specific township have a
disease that is being studied, only that statistic would be released. For geolocation data, this
could also mean showing the popularity of certain locations rather than the actual mobility
traces of the individuals, or grouping multiple traces together into average movement patterns.
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Access Control and Monitoring.
Access control and monitoring is the limitation of access to the data set. For this thesis, this
will be considered anything that actively limits how someone can access the data, or shields
the data in some way, as opposed to simply a signed agreement to not misuse the data upon
receiving it. Things like the data only being query-able instead of allowing access to the raw
data, or limitations on who has access to the data, or parts of the data. The data set might also
have monitoring on it that records who is accessing it when, for how long, a record of queries
made to the data, etc.
2.2 The Threat of Re-Identification
The purpose of de-identification is to strip the personal identity of the data source from the data
itself. This is done so the data can be passed to researchers or made publicly available with
minimal risk to individual privacy. In encryption literature, there is the concept of encryption
being broken. Essentially if currently available computers could guess the encryption key
within a relatively short amount of time, then the encryption is not secure. However, if it
would require more computing power than is currently conceivably possible the encryption
can be considered secure. A similar concept is used in de-identification research. “Factual
Anonymity”, sometimes referred to as “Practical Anonymity,” says that if it would require an
excessive amount of time, expertise, manpower, and expense to re-identify individuals of the
data set, then the set can be considered “factually anonymous” [79]. From factual anonymity, it
becomes clear that the study of re-identification attacks should take into account the expertise
required of the attacker, as well as the information that they have available to them or the cost
of the type of data that might be required to link to someone’s identity.
There are some commonalities between re-identification attacks. Typically they require
information outside of the de-identified data set to match with individuals within, an individual
that then appears in both data sets, common information about the individual in both data sets,
and enough information to be statistically sure that a match is correct [6].
2.2.1 Identity Disclosure
Identity disclosure is the full re-identification of one or more individuals within the data set.
The attacker has somehow re-identified these individuals despite the de-identification efforts
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that were made to prevent this. There are many ways this can occur, and the accuracy of the
re-identification can vary depending on the attack method and the original data set. Though it
should be noted that the miss-identification of an individual as someone in the data set can also
be harmful to them as many of the negative impacts of identification could still occur to them
in real life despite the inaccuracy of the attack.
2.2.2 Attribute Disclosure
This can also be referred to as “Homogeneity Attacks” or “Inference Attacks” when discussing
k-anonymity, which is described in Section 2.3.1. The idea of this type of privacy loss is that
the attacker learns something about the individual that is not public knowledge without fully
re-identifying their entry within the data set. For example, if an attacker is trying to discover
an individual’s illness and has access to health data they know to contain that information, then
they are likely able to narrow down the possibilities of who the individual is. Say they are
looking for a male age 40, removing anyone who does not meet this requirement might leave
them with 10 possible individuals. If all 10 individuals have the same illness, then the attacker
has learned what they wanted to without ever re-identifying the exact entry of the person they
sought information on.
2.2.3 Internal Attacks
These are attacks that originate from within the data set. The attacker starts with the data set
and attempts to find unique individuals within the set. The methods will vary depending on
the type of data. In geolocation data, an attack will look for unique movements or outliers.
Once individuals are isolated, the attacker will take the information available and compare it
to public information to identify someone. With geolocation data this could mean analyzing
the mobility traces to find a likely home address that can be searched in public databases, thus
providing them the identity of these individuals.
2.2.4 External Attacks
These are attacks that originate from outside of the data set. An attacker might be someone
who knows that a particular individual is within the data set and seeks them within it. It could
be someone who knows the individual personally or, in the case of public figures, simply has
background information on the individual. In this case, the attacker would access the database
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and use the background information to isolate the individual they are seeking. For geolocation
data, if an attacker knows where an individual was at a specific time, they could use that to
isolate their mobility trace and learn their movements over the entire time coverage of the data
set.
2.3 De-Identification Measures
There are two main measurements of privacy in the literature that can be used to determine
how much privacy is being provided for individuals in the set. These are k-anonymity and
differential privacy. k-anonymity looks at the uniqueness of every individual in the data set,
while differential privacy balances the amount of accurate information revealed with the error
created in the analysis of the data.
2.3.1 k-anonymity
k-anonymity is a de-identification measure that was developed by Sweeney [151]. The general
idea is that every individual should be indistinguishable from k − 1 other individuals in the
data set when k > 1. To make individuals indistinguishable, information is typically either
suppressed or generalized. Any generalization to an attribute must be uniform throughout the
data set. It also might require the removal of extreme outliers from the data set as they may be
so unique that generalizing the entire data set would remove too much information. By doing
this it becomes less likely that an attacker could isolate a single individual in the data set.
There are also multiple extensions of k-anonymity; `-diversity [95], p-sensitive k-anonymity
[163], and t-closeness [86]. These extend the requirements of k-anonymity based on examina-
tions of when the asserted k-anonymity promise of privacy might break. The methods of these
papers should be considered when looking at what constitutes best practice.
An issue with k-anonymity is that since alterations to the data set must be made computa-
tional resources are required to perform these operations. Though much of the manipulation
could be automated, often manual manipulations or checks on the anonymity level still need to
be made, and the alterations could make the data significantly less useful. By generalizing the
data the caretaker could make the data too generic to be useful for the purpose of the release
and would then have no reason to release the data.
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2.3.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et al. [37]. The basic idea is to balance the
level of privacy provided to individuals in the data set with the accuracy of the data. Privacy
is created by introducing unreliability to the singular attribute entries by adding noise to the
values of the attributes. If the noise is calibrated carefully then the results of the analysis will
be within an acceptable error of the unchanged data so the result of the intended analysis of the
data is unharmed. However, anyone trying to identify someone will be prevented from doing
so because there will be no way to tell if the values are correct so long as the noise that is
introduced is not predictable.
The exact method of introducing noise is up to the data custodian to determine. As well as
the level of privacy and error. Differential privacy is often discussed when dealing with query
systems, as the noise can be added to the data at the time of the query and adjusted according
to the specific query.
An issue with differential privacy is that, similar to k-anonymity, it is difficult to say what
value the privacy/accuracy level should be set to. If too much noise is added to the data then
the analysis might be unreliable, and the amount of noise that is added depends on the values
themselves. If there is little variance in a value across all the data entries, then only small
amounts of noise can be added. It requires knowledge of the data, and an understanding of the
attributes themselves to tune the noise. This also means that each feature of the data set may
require individual tuning. In a data set that has many features this can be computationally and
time-intensive. As well, even with the balanced noise, the more queries that are performed the
more data that is released, and potentially enough data is released to re-identify someone if the
queries are not limited.
2.4 Tools of Re-Identification
Though this list is not exhaustive it provides a basic overview of the common methods and
tools that attackers will use to identify people within a data set.
2.4.1 Linkage Attacks
These are attacks that are performed by connecting the information from two data sets. It is
a very common attack, particularly when public records of names and addresses are available
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to the attacker. This could also involve linking two de-identified data sets that originated from
the same raw data (or not) to gain enough information to identify the individuals that appear in
both data sets [150]. These attacks can be done manually or be automated in various manners.
2.4.2 Machine Learning Models
Common with internal attacks, machine learning models can be trained to analyze the data and
determine the information that can be used to identify individuals. For example, Geolocation
data can be analysed with clustering models to find an individual’s most likely home address
or workplace [36]. It could also be taught an individual’s patterns and then used to find that
individual again within other data sets that are released [46].
2.4.3 Markov Chains
A Markov Chain is a statistical model. Specifically, it is a model that describes the probability
of the next state of the system based on its current state. Markov chains are often used with
geolocation data to create statistical models of individuals’ movements. It could be used to
make predictions of where an individual will be and when for an attacker to identify them in
person [155].
2.4.4 Reversing Masking
This depends on the type of algorithm used to mask values within the data set. In some cases,
it is possible that the actions performed on the original data can be reversed and so the original
value can be discovered by the attacker [31]. If masking is done by performing reversible
mathematical operations on the raw data the attacker could discover the steps of alteration and
reverse them [84]. Or if hashing was performed it might be possible for an attacker to brute-
force match the hash with its originating value [133]. Even encryption could be vulnerable
depending on the type and its implementation.
Chapter 3
Review of Health Data De-identification
Attacks
3.1 De-Identification Review Methodology
A systematic review was performed of the relevant evidence demonstrating successful re-
identification attacks on data sets that had some transformations applied to hide the individuals’
identity. Papers and articles from a wide array of communities reporting on such attacks were
examined, including statistics, computer science, and health informatics. As well as journalis-
tic explorations.
3.1.1 Search Method
Articles were searched using the general terms “anonymization”, “de-identification”, and “re-
identification”. Broad search terms were chosen to ensure that we did not miss any relevant
publications. The searches were performed on PubMed, IEEE Xplore (the online library of
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), the ACM Digital Library (the online li-
brary of the Association for Computing Machinery), ScienceDirect, Research Gate, Springer,
and JSTOR online repositories, and the records for all relevant English language articles were
obtained for further consideration. The resulting set of articles was augmented with previously
known articles, identified through targeted searches on Google Scholar (e.g. for specific au-
thors), and articles identified through the reference lists of the included research. Technical
reports, presentations, and news articles with re-identification events performed by the journal-
ist were also included.
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3.1.2 Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
Many articles were identified through the search performed. The article titles, keywords, and
abstracts were screened and the primary inclusion criteria was that the researchers had taken
a real data set that was available to them and worked to identify the individuals within the
data set or break the privacy promise made by the releasing party. Emphasis was placed on
the data set being real and was not placed on the releasing party being the one to perform the
de-identification. In some cases, the data set was created by the researchers themselves, de-
identified using the same standard as previous releases of similar data, and then attempts to re-
identify the individuals were made. Since this was done to obtain consent from the individuals
whose data makes up the set this did not exclude a paper from the scope of this review.
3.1.3 Data Abstraction.
The following criteria were used to summarize each eligible study: (a) the type of data included
in the attacked data set, (b) the method of de-identification used, (c) the profession of the adver-
sary, (d) country of re-identification, (e) the proportion or number of individuals re-identified,
and (f) whether the re-identification was verified. The first four criteria were used to character-
ize the nature and scope of successful re-identification attacks, whereas the last two are quality
indicators for the attack. While not comprehensive, these criteria were believed to provide a
descriptive summary by which the nature of the attacks could be examined and compared.
Type of Data Included.
Not all data sets are structurally the same, and each type of data set requires its own de-
identification and re-identification methods. The de-identification of health data requires dif-
ferent actions than geolocation data, along with browsing data. To fully explore the space and
issues with the success of de-identification the type of data used must be considered.
The Method of De-identification Used.
Not all de-identification methods are the same, different methods and measures are used for
different types of data and there are few official standards in place. Health data has the most
standards about what constitutes a de-identified data set in particular The US Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Which provides a description of
how to de-identify health data to meet the privacy requirements of US law. This standard has
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been applied in other jurisdictions, research organizations in Canada will cite it as best practice
[42] and perform de-identification according to its provisions as they often have overlaps with
US agencies [40].
Outside of these set standards, a standard of best practice is often used which mimics many
of the edicts of HIPAA. The removal of names, complete dates, and exact addresses. Though
HIPAA extends these further with requirements of ’experts’ to perform the de-identification,
that the risk of re-identification is ’very low’, and that the methods used are documented.
Due to the open interpretation in some areas of the standards that do exist and the differ-
ences in the methods used to de-identify different types of data the type of de-identification
used was examined. Whether or not this data was ’defensibly’ de-identified will be discussed
and determined with the standards more rigorously considered.
The Profession of the Adversary
Who is re-identifying data sets helps to determine how widespread re-identification attacks
are. If people of many different professions, skills, and resources are launching successful
re-identification attacks this may indicate how easy these attacks are to perform or learn to
perform.
The Country of Re-identification.
This refers to both the country of the adversary and the country where the individuals of the
data set reside. This is considered because some countries make population databases readily
available for free or for a modest fee. A good example of such publicly available population
databases are state-level voter registration databases in the US [10]. There is also a thriving
industry specializing in the creation and sale of databases containing personal information
about the population, making a successful re-identification attack on a de-identified data set
more likely [134].
The Percentage/Number of Individuals Re-identified From the Data Set.
The percentage of individuals from the data set that can be re-identified is an indication of the
success and severity of the re-identification attack. A large percentage of records in a database
being re-identified is a more severe attack than a single individual being re-identified. For
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this review, the success rate was based on what was reported within the documentation of the
attack.
Re-identification has been verified.
Once the adversary has linked various records from the de-identified data set to real individ-
uals there is the possibility that some of the results are false positives. Re-identification is
probabilistic. Often it is based on the probability that there is only one person with the spe-
cific characteristics that are being analysed. Even if the probability is high, without some form
of verification there is the potential for false positives. Data sets also have quality problems.
There is no guarantee that the information about an individual in the data set is completely
accurate, particularly for values that change on a semi-regular basis. The date of birth might
be entered incorrectly, or the phone number could change, people can move addresses. There
is the same issue of reliability with the reference data that the attack may be used to perform
the re-identification.
The adversary could verify that the re-identification is correct using some additional infor-
mation. This is simple to do when the adversary has created the original unchanged data set or
otherwise has access to it, or if the data was synthetically generated. In some cases verification
could require contacting the individuals directly if the original data set is not available, these
are direct methods of verification.
In some situations, verification could be indirect. If the individual is a known public figure
then there may be information publicly available about them from other sources that provide
the required verification.
Though it is not possible to know with certainty if the chosen record is the correct one
without verification, in some cases, this is not possible. It could be that directly contacting the
individuals would be too great a breach of privacy, depending on the type of data that has been
de-identified. If the data custodian is not able or unwilling to grant access to the complete data
set or confirm internally any identifications that have been made. In such cases, a thorough
examination of the error rate of the re-identification method should be done by researchers.
For this review, if verification of some kind was performed it is indicated in the summary
table. If instead error was calculated this is indicated as well. If there was no mention of
verification, a false positive rate, or error calculation then it was assumed that these were not
performed.
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3.2 Results From the De-identification Attack Review
There were 60 studies included in the final de-identification review of this thesis. There were
some that were excluded because though the study the researchers were performing was similar
it did not go so far as actually finding the identities of individuals. These include papers in
which likely homes were found [4] [146] [70]. Some studies linked anonymous users visiting a
site from different browsers so that they could be identified [23] [13]. Or studies that performed
inference attacks to learn traits of users from data available [81] [20].
3.2.1 Notable Observations
There were several notable observations made during the review that should be highlighted:
The provided detail of attack varied.
Some of the reports had in-depth and detailed descriptions of exactly how they attacked the data
and performed their re-identification. While others provided little information on the specifics
of the failure in de-identification. In the case of [31] this was because of the nature of the data,
as it was medical data with a faulty implementation of an encryption algorithm for masking.
Even fewer directly indicated the secondary data used to identify individuals, often referencing
public voter lists. This makes it difficult for researchers to verify the results received by those
who performed the original attack.
Majority of the attacks were performed by researchers.
Only three of the attacks found were performed by groups outside of a University or established
research centers like Microsoft Research, or IBM Watson. In one case [133] the individual is an
engineer who also reports on privacy and software topics. In the other cases [39] [8], journalists
performed the attack. In the case of [39], a data scientist was brought in. This was also the only
attack that indicated the information was not received through public release, or in agreement
with the data custodian to test the de-identification.
Majority of the Attacks were in the United States.
Of the attacks that were studied most of them were performed by US researchers and the data
was about US Citizens. This likely reflects a greater availability of public and semi-public
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information available to researchers for performing re-identification attacks. The success of
many of the attacks was noted to be jurisdiction dependant because of the differences state to
state in the availability of public information. It could also reflect a larger group of researchers
in the field for this region.
Most of the attacked data sets were not de-identified to existing standards.
There were only three attacks that mentioned the data having been de-identified to HIPAA
standard [149],[71], and [11]. Though there is the potential that some of the health data sets
were de-identified to HIPAA standard and it was not specified. Three mentioned that an im-
plementation of differential privacy had been used as a measure for the amount of data that
was being released [73], [156], [87]. There was only one that mentioned the data following a
k-anonymity framework [148]. It should be noted that except for [11] all of these papers used
data sets from the last 4 years.
Often the issue seems to be that direct identifiers were removed, however, what exactly
is considered a direct identifier varied. As in the case of [91] which left the 3 digit ICD-9
diagnosis codes, which in many cases where specific enough to be unique when compared
to resources that mentioned the health issue. But best exemplified by [103] which left phone
numbers in the call records that could simply be looked up. This issue repeated itself many
times with collections of quasi-identifiers that could be compared to voter lists and identify
individuals.
This is also apparent with the geolocation data. For the majority of the attacks, identifiers
had been removed or masked. However the mobility traces were unique enough that individuals
could be isolated and their home address, or home-work pairs that could be matched to public
data.
A similar problem existed with the attacks on browsing data. Both of them [39] and [8]
contained only time stamps and searches made, however, the URLs themselves contained ad-
dresses and other personal information that made identifying individuals possible.
3.2.2 Health Data
Attacks on medical data included personal information, illness history, prescription history,






































Table 3.1: Summary of Re-identification attacks










































[71] 2018 Researchers USA l l l m m m Theory N/A No
[159] 2018 Researchers TR,USA l m m l m l Theory 90% No
[110] 2018 Researchers USA,CHN l m m m m m Theory 94.9% Yes
[30] 2016 Researchers AUS l l m l m m Theory 80% No
[31] 2016 Researchers AUS l l m l m m Implementation 100% Yes
[43] 2013 Researchers CAN l l m m m m Theory 30% No
[154] 2013 Researchers USA l l m m m m Theory 97% No
[153] 2013 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 43% Yes
[83] 2012 Researchers USA m l m m m m Theory 95% Yes
[80] 2010 Researchers NLD l m m m m m Theory 99.4% No
[11] 2009 Researchers USA l l l m m l Implementation 60% Yes







[91] 2009 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 96% Yes
[96] 2006 Researchers USA l l l m m m Theory 70% No
[98] 2003 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 100% Error
[152] 2003 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 6.1% No
[151] 2002 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory N/A Yes
[97] 2000 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 98% No
[46] 2019 Researchers CHN,USA l m m m m m Theory 50% Yes
[54] 2019 Researchers CHN,CAN l m m l m m Theory 90% No
[102] 2019 Researchers BEL l l m m m m Theory 80% Yes
[36] 2019 Researchers GRC,USA l l m m m m Implementation 92.5% Yes
[156] 2018 Researchers USA l l m l m m Implementation N/A No
[100] 2017 Researchers FRA l l l l m m Implementation 79% No
[155] 2017 Researchers USA l m m l m m Theory N/A No
[87] 2016 Researchers USA l m m l l m Implementation N/A No
[84] 2016 Researchers LVA l l m m m m Theory N/A Yes
[35] 2014 Researchers USA m l m m m m Theory 91% Yes
[133] 2014 Blogger USA m l m m m m Implementation 100% Yes
[161] 2014 Researchers USA m l m m m m Theory N/A Yes
[52] 2013 Researchers FRA l m m m m m Theory 45% Yes
[94] 2013 Researchers CHN,USA l l m l m m Theory 50% Yes










[170] 2011 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 35% No
[50] 2011 Researchers CHN m l m m m m Theory 65% No
[53] 2010 Researchers FRA l l m l l m Theory 50% No
[75] 2009 Researchers UK l m m m m m Theory N/A Yes


































Table 3.1: Summary of Re-identification attacks










































[109] 2008 Researchers UK,BEL l m m m m m Theory 80% Yes
[82] 2007 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 5% Yes
[17] 2006 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 79% No
[138] 2019 Researchers UK,BEL l m m m m m Theory 99.98% Error
[149] 2017 Researchers USA l l l m m m Theory 28% Yes
[77] 2011 Researchers CAN l m l m m m Theory 98% No





[6] 2001 Researchers DEU l m m m m m Theory 14% Yes
[150] 2000 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 87% No
[99] 2018 Researchers CHN l m m m m m Theory 58% Yes




[113] 2007 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 30.8% Yes
[73] 2019 Researchers USA l m m l m m Implementation 7% Error
[32] 2015 Researchers USA,DK l l l m m m Theory 90% Yes
[147] 2017 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 70% Yes
[39] 2016 Journalists DEU l m m m m m Theory N/A Yes
[8] 2006 Journalists USA l m m m m m Theory N/A Yes




[49] 2006 Researchers USA l l m m m m Theory N/A Yes
[148] 2018 Expert Witness USA l l l m m l Implementation 66% Yes
[103] 2014 Researchers USA l m m m m m Implementation 86% Yes
[116] 2001 Researchers USA l m m m m m Theory 75% No
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ined, it was not explicitly stated that the HIPAA guidelines were followed, however for data
released from the United States after April 14th of 2003 when it became the federal standard.
The two medical data sets that were explicitly de-identified to HIPAA standards [71] had
data about motor vehicle accidents. Due to this, they determined the identity based on limited
quasi-identifiers using news reports about accidents that contained the individual’s identity.
[11] compares HIPAA protections with another “Limited Dataset” standard that removes
identifiers and has a contract signed that dictates proper use of the data set. Depending on the
state the individuals lived in from the safe harbour protected data they could identify 0.01 to
0.25% . From the limited data set 10% to 60% . The difference between states was because
they used the voter information, the detail of which is state-controlled.
Other attacks used newspapers as their secondary source as well [153] used articles with
the term “hospitalized”, [43] used publicly available obituaries. This one had genomic data
[154] and used public record
Two studies looked at health data in Australia. Both examined the same data release and
were performed by the same researchers. [31] is reported to have discovered a vulnerability
in the encryption used for the patient insurance numbers. Due to the very sensitive nature of
this data the government was informed, the data was taken down and the information about the
encryption used that had previously been available on the website was also taken down. [30]
then took the same data set and attacked it without using the encryption vulnerability.
3.2.3 Geolocation Data
For the geolocation data there were two different general types that were attacked. Some of the
geolocation data was continuous and made up of mobility traces [46], [35], [102], [156], [155],
[133], [161], [94], [107], [50], [53] from a variety of sources. Typically gps from cellphones.
There were also some that contained only spatiotemporal points [54], [102], [87], [84], [170],
from location based queries. Other studies were unspecific on the style of the geolocation data,
or the exact source of the data was not listed and so the continuity could not be interpreted.
The attacks on geolocation data followed a clear pattern. The attackers would take the
available mobility traces and then find locations that could be used to identify the individual.
The most common was the home/work pairings. In some cases, just the home address could
be located. Geolocation data in particular poses a problem with de-identification. Though
six of these data sets had some form of noise added to the data points to make them less
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accurate the uniqueness of human mobility traces was still exploited. The main issue seems to
be the amount of time that individuals spend at home and work creates a unique fingerprint of
movement. Once those locations are discovered identification is not difficult. Even in larger
cities, few people live in the same building as people they work with.
One particular data set was used in three separate studies; [35] [133] and [161], all used
a data set that was released about New York Taxis. They each attacked different aspects of
the data, however. [133] looked at the hashing of the taxi medallion values and discovered the
algorithm used, then leveraged the limited values of the medallion to create a rainbow table
and reveal all of the taxi drivers using the public information on medallion numbers. [35] took
the same data set and ignored the hashing vulnerability but through analysis of the mobility
traces identified many of the drivers. [161] then compared the data to paparazzi photos with
the location and times of celebrities entering taxis. From that, they were able to extrapolate
other trips the celebrities took based on the characteristics of the trip.
3.2.4 Differential Privacy.
For the data sets that had been protected using differential privacy, different weaknesses were
exploited. For the [73] attack the data was privatized using common zero-concentrated differ-
ential privacy and Rényi differential privacy which are relaxed definitions for easier implemen-
tation. Though the researchers proved weaknesses in these implementations the main theory
of differential privacy was not proven false.
For [156] and [87] the data was geological traces that were obfuscated, but this was done
without consideration for the dependency between the traces. Friends and family often go
to the same locations repeatedly. This could be leveraged to gain more information than the
privacy guarantee should have allowed.
3.2.5 Breaking Masking
Of the attacks that were reported four performed some kind of reversal to the masking that was
done to values in the data set. [84] was able to reverse the mathematical operations performed
on the id numbers. The data curator had multiplied the IDs by a constant value, then subtracted
another constant. Once the constants were discovered the operations could be reversed and the
original IDs discovered.
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As described in section 3.2.3, [133] found the type of hashing algorithm used on the medal-
lion numbers for the taxis. This was discovered because of an error in the data input. There
was an outlier of one hashed identifier appearing to have significantly more business than oth-
ers. The researcher realized that a data entry error could have occurred and discovered that
the associated hash string was the MD5 hash for ’o’. Leveraging the limited possibilities of
original values the original values were discovered.
In these two cases, the best practice for data sanitizing was not followed. Simple reversible
mathematical operations were used in place of a standard hashing or encryption algorithm for
[84]. For [133] hashing without salting was performed which is not standard practice when
using hashing for this purpose.
As described in section 3.2.2, [31] found a weakness in a no longer disclosed method of
encryption on patient insurance numbers. This resulted in the data set being removed from the
hosting website along with a description of the encryption method that was used. This example
is a good model for why the method of de-identification should be available so that researchers
can test the validity of the privacy claim.
For [83], bloom filter encodings were built from identifiers of a medical record system and
then crypt-analysis was applied using identifiers from a voter registry. The researchers them-
selves took the data set and encoded then tested and broke these encodings. They also claim
that the crypt-analysis, though successful, may not be practical for more realistic scenarios.
These were the only studies found that were able to break the encryption used on infor-
mation within a data set. Though more attacks of this nature may be possible, with reference
to the other studies found, this appears to be an attack vector with more skill required of the
attacker than the average type of de-identification performed necessitates to be broken.
3.2.6 External Data Availability
Though many of the attacks set in the US used voter records to determine the identity of the
individuals there are a notable number of attacks that did not require a pre-made collection of
names and addresses to identify individuals. News reports on unique events, property records,
social media, and others were used on data sets outside of the US and in a few cases within it.
Of the cases that specify the source of the public information used to identify the indi-
viduals, the sources included, Linkedin, undisclosed social network information, property tax
registers, taxi medallion data, news articles, obituaries, death records, movie reviews, online
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forum data, reverse phone number searches, ambulance, and hospital discharge records, social
security death index, German employment stats.
Though the availability of these data sets may be variable as well within different coun-
tries. The only universal data availability would be newspapers and social media. It should
be noted that in regards to the geolocation data attacks, depending on the intent of an attacker,
public information about property owners might not be required as one could in person confirm
identities once an address is disclosed.
3.3 Remarks on De-identification Attack Review
Though many of the attacks performed revealed personal information about individuals in-
volved there is little evidence to suggest that the modern theories of de-identification are flawed.
The majority of the attacks discovered were performed on data sets with removed or masked
directly identifying values, but little was done beyond that to remove identities. Though there
is a trend of custodians beginning to employ more modern ideas of de-identification. Of these,
it was found that the implementation, not the theory was at fault for the privacy breach.
In the cases of geolocation data, browsing history [39] [8], or a homicide database [116] the
information that is being studied must be altered in a more direct manner to provide security.
As in the case of browser history, people will type personal information into the search bar that
is easy enough to use to identify them. Or with geolocation data home addresses are where the
majority of the population spends their time.
Though there will be a trade-off in utility when performing operations on data beyond
removal of direct identifiers [34] it is important to maintain the public’s privacy. As well the
current measures and theories of de-identification it seems have yet to be rigorously tested to
ensure that they provide the privacy levels promised. Increased adoption and testing of these
methods would be beneficial to the entire research community and the public.
Chapter 4
Observations from Review of
De-identification Attacks
In this chapter, some best practices for de-identifying different data types will be laid out. The
set of best practices are based on the review of 3. These best practices are based on what has
not been observed as broken at the time of this thesis’ writing.
4.1 Best Practices for All Data Types
There are some aspects of de-identification that are not dependant on the type of data that
is being de-identified. The actions that need to be taken on any data set intended to be de-
identified are laid out in this section.
4.1.1 Suppression
When determining what data should be suppressed it is important to look at what single ele-
ments of the data set are unique to the person. There are many identifiers or personal infor-
mation that custodians know to remove, such as a SIN number, credit card number, account
numbers, and the like. A name is an obvious identifier that people will remove. However, an
email address is likely more unique than a name. There might be many John Smith’s but there
is only one johnsmith@gmail.com. Other examples of identifiers that might be overlooked
are phone numbers, physical addresses, IP addresses, and unique hardware identifiers such as
MAC addresses. In many cases, these are unique to the person and so all need to be removed
to protect identities [103].
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When determining if a value is a direct identifier the uniqueness of the value and the ability
of someone to search for that value are considered. In some cases, there is no publicly available
data to compare to, for example, if a company uses a unique number to reference a user that has
been randomly assigned. Releasing that information likely has no way of leading an attacker
back to the person’s identity. However, how that unique value was created can determine
whether it is an identifier as well, see Section 4.1.3. On the other hand, values like phone
numbers can be overlooked though these have been proven to be trivially re-identifiable in a
study of telephone metadata [103].
When suppressing data it is important to note all of the places that the information appears
in. When looking at the personal genome project the information was supposed to have direct
identifiers such as names removed. However, the researchers found that because the data was
supplied by the users some profiles still contained names in unexpected areas, and many of
the downloadable files associated with the profile had a filename that included the name of the
person [154].
A summary of the best practices of suppressing data:
1. Consider if the value is unique to the person to determine whether it is a direct identifier,
2. Ensure that none of the information seen by the attacker contains the direct identifiers
you intend to suppress,
3. Consider whether the information that is being suppressed can be found or inferred from
any of the values remaining in the data set,
4. Create a limit of utility to use to determine when the alterations required on the data have
rendered its utility too low for the intended research.
4.1.2 Generalization
When determining how to generalize data first a set of indirect identifiers should be recognized
within the data set. This can contain all of the attributes of the set. Then the privacy level
that the de-identification should provide to the individuals should be set. Finally, a utility level
should be set that determines how general the attribute can be before it is no longer useful for
the intended research should be determined.
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Though it can be difficult to know exactly what information is available to an attacker to
leverage it is important to be aware of what information is available to be linked to the released
data set. It has been noted that the difference in available information between regions will
significantly alter the ease with which an attacker can re-identify individuals [149].
It is important to consider the distribution of values within the data set when generalizing.
If the data contains individuals mostly between the ages of 30 and 50, then users outside of that
range will be more unique than those inside and thus have less privacy in the data set [150, 58].
Using a k-anonymity measure explained in the 2.3.1 section can help to remove this difference
in privacy levels, and control how much privacy a user has.
Another consideration should be made for data that has been collected over time. When
generalizing time data the difference between 1 year and 2 years might be large in terms of
privacy loss, but 10 years to 11 years will not have the same impact on privacy loss. Thus when
generalizing time frames large time frames need to be reduced more to significantly lower the
privacy loss [77].
A summary of the best practices of generalizing data:
1. All quasi-identifiers must be considered together as a set when performing risk assess-
ment,
2. Use a k-anonymity measure to control the amount of generalization being done on the
data and measure privacy level,
3. Generalizations should be done to a greater degree when the data is from the same pop-
ulation over time,
4. Reducing a data set over a time span should be proportional, the larger the time span the
greater the time alteration needs to be for a significant change in risk to occur,
5. Have an awareness of the types of large organized data sets about the populace that have
been made available and consider that in the risk assessment.
4.1.3 Masking
Though the reversing of masking is not a common method of re-identification, as it typically
requires more skill or specialized knowledge than other methods, bad masking practices can
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be a serious privacy risk. When masking is broken the original value is revealed, which could
be the full name of the individual, an identifying number [84], or an account number [31].
There are different methods of masking that can be performed and it is important that
when performed they are implemented correctly, used on data appropriate for their intended
purpose, and any extra requirements of their standard use practice are performed. The two
most common methods of masking are hashing and encryption. Though often seen as similar
there are important differences in their implementations and best practices. An encryption
algorithm takes the plain text and then using a key creates a ciphertext value that can then be
returned to the original plain text value using either the same or another key. While a hashing
algorithm will take in the plain text and output the hashed value.
There are some principles of thought that both hashing and encryption algorithms share.
For one the ciphertext or hashed value that is output should not share similarities to one that
came from a similar plain text value. That is to say, if the plain text is 12345, the ciphertext
should be no more similar to that received from 12346 than any other. Another is Kerckhoffs’
Principle, which states that “A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the
system, except the key, is public knowledge”. That is to say, a hashing algorithm should be
one in which the entire structure of the algorithm can be revealed and the attacker still cannot
reverse the hash to plain text. For encryption, this means that the only secret required should
be the key. For example, AES, RSA, and TripleDES are all well-known encryption algorithms
the are explained in thorough detail online and are still secure. As well, a masking algorithm
should also be such that observation of the output does not allow an attacker to guess any of
the secret values used [84].
Hashing has unique qualities, the first of which is string length uniformity, the output will
be the same size no matter the size of the original plain text that was used. For instance, SHA-
256 is a hashing function that will take in plaintext of any length and always output a string of
256-bits long. This can be important as the length of output changing with the length of the
input can reveal information to the attacker [84]. Hashing functions have output uniformity,
meaning that the output hashed value will be the same every time the same plain text is sent
through the algorithm. Hashing functions should also be mathematically infeasible to take the
hash value and reverse the operations to return it to the plain text value.
The main aspect of an encryption algorithm is that it is designed to be mathematically
reversible. The output ciphertext of an encryption algorithm can be returned to the original
plain text through the algorithm with the correct key. This key can be either the same as was
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used to encrypt the plain text (symmetric key), or a different key (public key). Encryption
algorithms all have different key lengths, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has typical
key lengths of 128, 192, or 256-bits. The key length can affect the computational cost of
the algorithm, but it also affects how long it would take an attacker to brute force attack the
algorithm.
When using hashing functions best practice is to add a random salt to the value. This
makes attacks like dictionaries and rainbow tables more difficult to implement against the hash.
Hashing also becomes less secure when the possible input is of a limited structure. This means
if the inputs are all structured the same, have the same length, are comparatively small, some
digits are constant, or have a small range, then an attacker will potentially be able to brute force
the hash. For example, taxi medallion numbers are all 4-6 characters with specific characters
being letters and the rest numbers. Overall there are 22M possible plain text values and outputs
of the hashing function or 2 minutes of computation time [133]. Another thing that should be
done is looking at the data itself to ensure that there are no errors that may reveal information.
If data for a few entries were imported incorrectly and are all 0 for instance, once hashed these
values can create an anomaly that will reveal information to an attacker [133].
When using encryption one of the most important things to remember is that the key needs
to be kept secret. Whether using public or symmetric encryption the key that is required to
decrypt the ciphertext must not be stored along with the ciphertext values, or hard-coded into
the system performing the encryption. Doing so would provide attackers the information that
they need to reverse the masking.
A common error with masking is not using the appropriate algorithm, or not using the ap-
propriate algorithm according to best practice. For example, if you have an ID number that
needs to be encrypted, performing just any mathematical algorithm on it is not the same as
performing encryption. Adding, subtracting, multiplying, or dividing the ID number by con-
stants will change the ID value and is reversible for the data holder, but it is also reversible
for the attacker. These constant values can be discovered from the analysis of the ID numbers
and knowledge of the original structure of the number. For instance, the manipulations de-
scribed will result in identifiers that have a different number of digits depending on the input
value, comparing these different length identifiers to the original can give an attacker informa-
tion they require to reverse engineer the algorithm [84]. Masking algorithms should all follow
Kerckhoffs’ principle.
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Something that should also be considered is whether the information needs to be masked at
all. Though it is necessary if the information needs to be tied back to the original individual by
the data holder if all that is required is a unique identifier to be carried through the data set that
does not contain private information it is more secure to use a value that is not derived from the
individual at all. A completely random string or number to replace the attribute is a more secure
identifier to carry through the data set than one generated by a true value. As well this would be
less computationally intensive for the data holder than implementing encryption. It is important
that this number not be derived from a value belonging to the original individual as seeded
pseudo-random generators can be reversed depending on their implementations [30, 31].
A summary of the above best practices of masking data:
1. Masking requires mathematical operations whose secret values cannot be reverse engi-
neered,
2. Encryption or hashing algorithms of fixed-length output should be used,
3. Weed out anomalous data or errors in the data before release,
4. When hashing is performed, random salting should also be done,
5. Hashing is not ideal for use on inputs with known limited structures,
6. Encryption keys need to be secret and secure,
7. If no reversal is required a completely random identifier should be considered for creating
a perpetual identifier.
4.2 Best Practices for Demographic Data
Demographic data is not specific to a field of research. Often when collecting data for any
reason there are standard values about the person that get collected as well to provide further
information to researchers about the trends in the data. Examples of these types of data would
include age or date of birth (dob), gender/sex, race/ethnicity, home address, name, education
level, etc.
This section details information about data sets that were de-identified using the demo-
graphic data contained within them. The data sets themselves were varied in their content
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otherwise, some were data sets of only demographic data, others contained health records or
other information on the individuals as well.
4.2.1 Suppression
When protecting demographic data there is typically some suppression required, as some of the
information will be direct identifiers. The rules of suppression explained in Section 4.1.1 apply
to this type of data as well. The main idea is that any value unique to an individual should
be considered as a potential direct identifier and suppressed if it can identify an individual.
Names, full home address, and other things that are unique to the person need to be completely
removed to protect identities [103].
4.2.2 Generalization
The indirect-identifier sets of Table 4.1 show how unique a set of values can be. Once the
direct identifiers are suppressed the indirect-identifier set should be studied. These are very
important for privacy, according to one study 99.98% of people in Massachusetts would be
correctly re-identified in a data set containing any 15 demographic attributes [138].
The studies researched looked at populations from the US, Canada, Netherlands, and Ger-
many, and used different types of attacks to re-identify the data. In some cases a secondary data
set was used to find identities, in others, the uniqueness of a person within the set was used and
if the person was completely unique this broke the privacy guarantee stated by the custodians
and was considered a successful re-identification attack. Though the census information may
not be available in all places, with enough knowledge of an individual through personal experi-
ence or looking for information online it could be possible to find them within the de-identified
set. Some of the details of the studies of Table 4.1 are discussed in Section 4.1.2.
That is not to say that this information cannot be kept in a data set together. Generalization
of these values can increase the privacy of the data set. The Canadian study into the identifia-
bility of people in Montreal shows that altering the date of birth to the year makes less of the
population unique. The same occurs when less information on someone’s historical postal code
record is released. From the conclusions of the study changing the date of birth to month and
year of birth, as well as altering the postal code to only the first 3 digits reduces the uniqueness
to a “very low value” [77].
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Table 4.1: Indirect-identifier sets of demographics
Study Year Country List of identifiers Linked Data Re-id’d
[138] 2019 USA






Race, gender, date of birth, education level,
year they moved into their residence, home
ownership status
Property tax registers, data
purchased from brokers
28%
[154] 2013 USA date of birth, ZIP code, gender
Voter list, public records
website
49%
[77] 2011 CAN date of birth, postal code Uniqueness 98%
[77] 2011 CAN year of birth, postal code Uniqueness 85%
[77] 2011 CAN date of birth, 3 char postal code, gender Uniqueness 80%
[77] 2011 CAN Postal code trail of 2 years Uniqueness 17%
[77] 2011 CAN Postal code trail of 5 years Uniqueness 35%
[77] 2011 CAN Postal code trail of 11 years Uniqueness 43%
[11] 2010 USA County, gender, date of birth, race Voter list 60%
[11] 2010 USA County, year of birth Voter list 10%
[11] 2010 USA Gender, year of birth, race Voter list 0.25%
[11] 2010 USA Year of birth Voter list 0.01%
[80] 2010 NLD
4 char postal code, gender, year/month of
birth
public register data 4.8%
[80] 2010 NLD Municipality, gender, year/month of birth public register data 0.07%
[58] 2006 USA Gender, ZIP code, date of birth 2000 Census data 63%
[151] 2002 USA ZIP code, date of birth, gender Voter list N/A
[150] 2000 USA Gender, ZIP code, date of birth 1990 Census Data 87%
[150] 2000 USA Gender, municipality, date of birth 1990 Census data 53%
[150] 2000 USA Gender, county, date of birth 1990 Census data 18%
[6] 2001 GER
Income, year of birth, sex, schooling, weekly
work hours, occupation, region, time
employed, time unemployed, duration of
previous employment, marital status, number
of children, nationality
Uniqueness 69%
When looking at the indirect identifier set the external data sources need to also be consid-
ered. In the US things like publicly released census data, voter lists, data brokers, and public
tax registers can provide a lot of information for an attacker. Though their availability is var-
ied state to state or in the case of property taxes, between municipalities. In one study on air
quality, the information on health data was redacted heavily according to HIPAA standard [40],
however, the redacted data contained enough information to use computer inference methods
to create race and gender estimations, and the data contained date of birth. Then using property
tax registers and information bought from data brokers residents could be re-identified [149].
Similarly, the Personal Genome Project gathers genetic information on participants, but it
was the demographic information that allowed for re-identification. The data contained date of
birth, full zip code, and gender. The demographical information revealed 22% of people when
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linking to voter data set and 27% of people when linking to a public records website, for a total
of 49% of records [154].
In the Netherlands, research into the identifiability of hospitalization and welfare records
was investigated. These records are all available upon request from the governing body that
collected them. Using public register data the researchers identified 4.8% of the people in the
health care set from a shortened postal code (4 values of 6), gender, and year and month of
birth. The welfare data contains information about investigations of welfare fraud; using mu-
nicipality, gender, year of birth, and month of birth 0.07% of people were uniquely identifiable.
The total percentage of citizens identifiable to a group of 10 or less was 2.14% within the data
set [80].
A summary of the above into best practices of generalization:
1. Full date of birth, postal code and gender cannot be left untouched in a data set intended
to be de-identified,
2. Generalizing the date of birth to month and year of birth, as well as altering the postal
code to only the first 3 digits significantly reduces the identifiability.
4.3 Best Practices for Health Data
Health data is typically information that would be in a medical record. It could contain in-
formation on prescriptions, illnesses, DNA sequences, medical procedures, or any other data
that might be collected or created by doctors or nurses in a clinical setting. This data could
also be from pharmacy records, insurance records, hospital discharges, or ambulance records.
Some of the information collected by devices and apps that track fitness can also be considered
health data. Health data is often protected by laws such as HIPAA in the United States [40] or
PIPEDA in Canada [164] as well as various state or provincial level laws and standards.
If health data is released that contains information that can be re-identified there are many
ways in which the individuals in the data set may be harmed. For example, personal infor-
mation about the illnesses that they have had or are seeking treatments for could affect their
current or future insurance rates. Previous diagnoses of mental illnesses could be used to neg-
atively impact their current or future employment due to stigmas held by employers, as well as
negative impacts on their personal lives.
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Within the literature of re-identification of health data, there are a few main methods that
are employed. The first is to leverage the demographical information that is included within the
medical records. This is information like age, sex, race, home address, etc and the risks created
by this type of data was laid out in Section 4.2 of this document. Then there is the leveraging of
newspaper articles and obituaries. These attacks use the nature of reporting on motor vehicle
accidents and deaths that contain the person’s name to match to records and find their identity.
Other attacks have used unique alleles in genomes or the unique pattern of illnesses to reveal
information. There has also been a case of the masking used on health insurance numbers
being broken. The breakdown of attacks is displayed in Figure 4.1. This shows that of the 18
health data re-identification attacks that were studied 33.3% were performed by leveraging the
demographic information, 11.1% leveraged vulnerabilities in the masking methods used, and
the other 55.6% of attacks used information unique to medical data. This is the information
that will be focused on in this section.
Table 4.2 contains the information about data that was released, what was leveraged, the
levels of suppression and or generalization that was applied to the information, and how that
affected the identifiability of the individuals. This is based on the half of the attacks that did
not solely use demographical information, those attacks were included in Table 4.1.



































Table 4.2: Identifier sets of Health Data
Study Year Country List of identifiers Linked data Re-id’d
[71] 2018 USA
Hospital records of vehicle accidents, year of
accident, location of accident, patient age,
patient sex
Newspaper articles on vehicle
accidents
N/A
[110] 2018 USA 15-min aggregated physical activity data Demographical data 94.3%
[110] 2018 USA 24-hr aggregated physical activity data Demographical data 87%
[30] 2016 AUS
Date of hospitalization perturbed randomly





Date of birth perturbed randomly by up to
two weeks, date of child’s birth perturbed
randomly by up to two weeks
Uniqueness N/A
[30] 2016 AUS Breakdown of billing Uniqueness 100%
[153] 2013 USA
Patient demographics, ZIP codes, diagnoses,
procedures, attending physician, hospital, a





Province, age at death, gender, and exact
date of adverse drug event report
Obituaries 30.78%
[43] 2013 CAN
Age at death, gender, and exact date of
adverse drug event report
Obituaries 5.05%
[43] 2013 CAN
Province, age at death, gender, and month
and year of adverse drug event report
Obituaries 0.63%
[91] 2010 USA Pattern of diagnosis codes Hospital discharge data 96%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits
Hospital discharge data 96%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes with least
common 5% removed
Hospital discharge data 75%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes with least
common 15% removed










































Table 4.2: Identifier sets of Health Data
Study Year Country List of identifiers Linked data Re-id’d
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes with least
common 25% removed
Hospital discharge data 0%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits with least common 5% removed
Hospital discharge data 70.4%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits with least common 10% removed
Hospital discharge data 48.2%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits with least common 15% removed
Hospital discharge data 16.3%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits with least common 20% removed
Hospital discharge data 0.25%
[91] 2010 USA
Pattern of diagnosis codes generalized to 3
digits with least common 25% removed
Hospital discharge data 0%
[44] 2009 CAN
Sex, age (days), postal code (3-char),
admission and discharge (day/month/year)
Uniqueness > 20%
[44] 2009 CAN
Sex, age (weeks), postal code (1-char),
admission (yearly quarter), length of stay
Uniqueness 33%
[96] 2006 USA DNA information with familial connections
Online genealogy data from
obituaries
70%




[152] 2003 USA Diagnosis, inferred ZIP, drug, dosage, refill
Ambulatory data, hospital
discharge data, voter list
2.3%
[97] 2000 USA
Inferred gender and illness from DNA,
hospital name
Hospital discharge data 98%
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4.3.1 Suppression
Often some amount of suppression is required to meet the health data protection standards in
the region. For example, the HIPAA standard requires names, social security numbers, insur-
ance plan or group numbers, medical record numbers, medical device identifiers, biometric
identifiers, or any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except a code to
permit re-identification of the de-identified data by the data custodian to be removed from the
data set [40]. Similar expectations are laid out in other legal protections for health data at the
federal and provincial/state levels. The legislation of HIPAA was enacted in 1996 [40] and
PIPEDA in 2000 [164], though not all US States have to follow the HIPAA standard. Based on
its exemptions all of the data sets studied were released after these legislations were enacted,
though only 3 directly mention HIPAA in the study.
Though all of this information has been removed from these data sets patients can still be
identified. For events that are reported on by local news stations, for example, motor vehicle
accidents, assaults, fires, arrests, or other unique circumstances, the year and 3 digit zip code
providing a municipal location of the accident is enough to identify an article about it. News
articles often contain the names of people involved especially those that were injured, thus
the attacker learns their name. If the data utility does not require the location data then it is
recommended to remove it, as this made finding the articles far less likely [71] [153].
In Washington state, a data set containing health information on virtually all hospitaliza-
tions occurring in the state in a given year, including patient demographics, diagnoses, pro-
cedures, attending physician, hospital, a summary of charges, and how the bill was paid, was
available for $50. It did not contain patient names or addresses, only five-digit ZIP codes.
Newspaper articles printed in the state for the same year that contain the word “hospitalized”
often included a patient’s name and residential information and explained why the person was
hospitalized, such as a vehicle accident or assault. 43% of the health records in the state could
be re-identified using newspaper articles about the same events [153]. It should be noted this
data was not released to HIPAA standards.
Similarly, obituary data can be used to match medical records involving patients dying.
Using publicly available data-sets from statistics and health Canada on adverse drug events it
was possible to match deaths to obituaries in the newspaper. Disclosing the province, age at
death, gender, and exact date of the report has quite a high risk of re-identification, but the
removal of the province brings down the risk significantly. By only generalizing the date of
reporting to month and year and including all other variables, the risk is always low [43].
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When dealing with DNA sequencing data it is important to recognize that this data alone
can leak information. If the entire DNA sequence is revealed then the genetic sex of the indi-
vidual is also known. Then due to the nature of genetic disorders and recent breakthroughs in
research, some diseases can be directly tied to the presence of a specific gene’s allele. It is pos-
sible to use this information to find patients that have these types of illnesses and match them to
publicly released hospital records, using some demographic data (age, gender, generalized zip
code) to confirm the match. Using hospital release records, census data, and DNA sequences
released for research purposes patients with diseases such as cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s dis-
ease, and sickle cell anemia were 98–100% identifiable [98] [97]. This is one example of how
removing information in one area of the data set might not completely remove it from the
attacker’s hands.
When removing information it is important to consider whether it can be inferred from the
data that has been left. For example, in prescription data the patient’s zip code was removed,
however, the pharmacy’s zip code was included. Most people stop at a nearby pharmacy on
their way home from an appointment. Thus a close approximation of the patient’s zip code can
be inferred about the patient from the information that was made available about the pharmacy
[152].
In the table, one study found that they could use a combination of suppression and gener-
alization to remove the possibility of their attack succeeding. Their attack relied on the unique
combination of illnesses and diagnoses a single patient may have over their medical history.
The problem the researchers found was that to get to 0% identifiability they were suppressing
25% of the least common diagnosis codes from all the patients, and in doing so the information
was assessed to be clinically useless for the intended research [91].
A summary of the above into best practices of suppression:
1. News-worthy events require their location information to be removed or strongly gener-
alized,
2. DNA sequences contain information that may have been intended to be removed such as
gender,
3. DNA sequences containing alleles for rare genetic-based illnesses should be considered
direct identifiers in many data sets.
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4.3.2 Generalization
In all cases of generalization, the balance of information and privacy can be difficult to main-
tain. The more detailed the data the more useful, the more general the data the more private is
the basics of this balance. In 2009 when studying whether the prescription data over 18 months
could be released for research purposes the Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario (CHEO),
ran a study into the re-identifiability of the requested information. The original request con-
tained the following information generalized to the indicated level if at all: sex, age (days),
postal code (3 characters), and admission and discharge dates (day/month/year), as well as the
drug and diagnosis information. Using a k-anonymity threshold of 5 and thus the risk of re-
identification probability of 0.2 it was found that this did not provide sufficient protection of
patient identities. When they considered the data usage concerns, the best solution was to raise
the threshold of probability to 0.33 and provide: sex, age (weeks), length of stay (days), postal
code (1 character), and admission date (quarter and year). To meet the risk threshold for some
entries values had to be removed, for instance, 11.3% of the age category would still need to
be suppressed [44].
When dealing with diagnosis codes in patient records it was found that in a sample of more
than 96% of the records are shown to be uniquely identified by their diagnosis codes with
respect to an entire population of 1.2 million patients. This was found using ICD-9 diagnosis
codes when looking at the re-identifiability of disseminated EMR data. ICD-9 codes are 5 digit
diagnosis codes containing three-digit disease codes, followed by two possible digits of further
specification. They found that for the majority of patients the set of ICD-9 codes was unique,
and thus could be used to identify a patient’s record in a set containing private information.
Suppressing codes that appeared in less than 5, 15, and 25% of patient’s records was performed
as well as generalizing the codes by removing the 2 digit specification. Both of these failed to
provide sufficient de-identification [91].
When DNA data is being researched the genealogy can identify the individuals. Often with
DNA data researchers are looking at inherited illness. In many cases, this means that the famil-
ial relationship between the DNA sequences are released even though identifiers are removed
or generalized on the data set. By revealing the familial relationship between individuals how-
ever they can be identified. Using genealogy record sites and death records from newspapers
a family structure can be built, and approximately 70% of the are unique. They can then be
compared to the data revealing the family and then the individuals [96].
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In a study from Australia discussed further in Section 4.3.3 researchers looked into billing
records containing information on medical events, year of birth, date of event perturbed to two
weeks, and other information. Researchers were able to identify Australian public figures by
linking publicly available information about them to the medical records. In doing so they
attempted to make the task more difficult by generalizing everyone’s year of birth to 5 years
but found this had little effect on their uniqueness.
A summary of the above into best practices of generalization:
1. Sex, age, postal code, and admission dates are an indirect identifier set,
2. Patient diagnosis sets are unique and should be considered an indirect identifier set,
3. The structure of a person’s familial tree can also be considered an indirect identifier.
4.3.3 Perturbation
The methods by which random noise can be added to a data set vary. There are different meth-
ods of generation and not all features necessarily require noise to be added to them. In Aus-
tralia, the public healthcare system released a data set containing billing information. Perpetual
identifiers were used to identify the same patient across different records and other information
included; year of birth, sex, medical events, codes indicating service provided or prescriptions
given, the date, the location as State, the price paid, the breakdown of payment sources. The
data was de-identified through suppression of some rare events and all dates were perturbed
randomly by up to two weeks. Using publicly available information about well-known Aus-
tralians researchers could search for mothers using their date of birth and the birth dates of
their children. By querying the data, with the error in reported dates accommodated for, the
individuals were shown to be unique in many cases. This indicated that the individuals were re-
identifiable as they also proved there was enough information to further confirm identity within
the medical record. They also found similar results from professional athletes and their known
injuries, and news stories about politicians and their medical events. As well they found that
the billing breakdown of payments and dates was often unique, thus private insurance compa-
nies, banks, and credit card companies, could use their own records to match to the medical
records and learn the individual’s medical history [30].
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A summary of the above into best practices of perturbation:
1. Decreasing the precision of the data, or perturbing it statistically, makes re-identification
gradually harder at a substantial cost to utility,
2. A 2-week perturbation of dates makes little impact on sparse data, increasing the pertur-
bation has little effect.
4.3.4 Aggregation
The only health data set studied that used aggregation did so on physical activity data col-
lected from wearable devices. The aggregation on this set was performed within the attributes,
as an individual’s average walking intensity for every chosen time interval was calculated and
released. Researchers then used a data set containing 6 demographic variables; age, sex, educa-
tional level, annual household income, race/ethnicity, and country of birth, about the individu-
als in the data set to link to the aggregated walking intensity data. This matching was performed
using a random forest machine learning algorithm model. It correctly matched 94.3% of adults
and 87.2% of children when time intervals of 15-minutes were used. When 24-hours was the
time interval it matched 87.0% of adults and 70.2% of children. This study shows that this
type of physical activity data can be used to learn more about the individuals within than ever
intended by the data custodian [110].
4.3.5 Access Control
A common method of access control is query control. In one case having data sets of genomic
information, but only allowing yes or no responses as to whether a specific allele is in the
data set. Some researchers who had access to such a data set found that because an allele’s
presence can be dependant on other allele’s in the genome an individual’s presence in the set
could be discovered from queries of their single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) [159]. 5
queries to the set revealed with 95% confidence whether someone was in the set. Removing
the ability to query SNPs with less than 5% frequency in populations did not affect their ability
to identify presence. Due to the few required queries, limiting the number of queries to the set
is ineffective as it would be necessary to limit queries below a number allowing useful analysis
of the data. As well it was found that hiding parts of the genome completely caused a similar
loss of usefulness to the data set to be effective at preventing the attack.
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HIPAA has within its exemptions the limited data set rules. A limited data set under HIPAA
is identifiable healthcare information that the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits covered entities
to share information with certain entities for research purposes, public health activities, and
healthcare operations without obtaining prior authorization from patients, if certain conditions
are met, one condition being they signed a data use agreement that specifies: Allowable uses
and disclosures, approved recipients and users of the data, an agreement that the data will not
be used to contact individuals or re-identify them, require safeguards to be implemented to en-
sure the confidentiality of data and prevent prohibited uses and disclosures, state the discovery
of improper uses and disclosures must be reported back to the covered entity, state that any
subcontractors who are required to access or use the data also enter into a data use agreement
and agree to comply with its requirements. With that settled a limited data set also cannot
contain any of the following information: names, street addresses, or postal address informa-
tion with the exception of town/city, state and zip code, phone/fax numbers, e-mail addresses,
Social Security numbers, medical records numbers, health plan beneficiary numbers, other ac-
count numbers, certificate and license numbers, vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, includ-
ing license plates, device identifiers, and serial numbers, URLs and IP addresses, biometric
identifiers such as fingerprints, retinal scans and voiceprints, full-face photos and comparable
images.
Even with all of this removed it was found that in Ohio 18.7% of the population is 1-
distinct, or unique, and 59.7% are 5-distinct based on their County, Gender, Date of Birth, and
Race [11]. This is compared to the risk if the data is kept under the full HIPAA protections,
under Safe Harbor, 0.0003% is 1-distinct and 0.002% are 5-distinct This means that though
the data is HIPAA compliant the data receivers now hold health data that can be linked back
to the individual. Though the receiving entity is bound by the data use agreement to never use
it for such a purpose, there is now an increased risk of another entity gaining access to the
information from their data center.
A summary of the above into best practices of access control:
1. Dependencies in the attribute values need to be considered as they reveal more informa-
tion than intended,
2. Access control cannot completely remove risk for the individuals in the data set.
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4.4 Best Practices for Geolocation Data
Geolocation data is information based on an individual’s position at a point in time. This
information could be traces of their movements over time, such as from a continuous GPS
connection providing constant updates of their latitude and longitude coordinates, pings of
their location as they access specific services in certain locations, such as when accessing
public transit, or a general location such as cell tower connections, where each tower has a
range of area that the person connecting could be anywhere inside of. In all cases, the location
data contains details of where someone was, and when they were there. Often from this data,
a trajectory of the individual’s movements can be made as they move through an area and
connect to different cell towers or connect to services as they use them.
If a geolocation data set is released that contains information that can be re-identified the
effect on the individuals within the set can be damaging. Attackers could learn personal in-
formation like average income [133], or habits and vices [161], and home address [36]. They
could also predict where someone will go and when they will be there [170]. Attackers thus
could learn detailed information about the patterns of their life as well as other private infor-
mation.
Researching attacks on this type of data revealed a lot of information about the protections
that were being used. For a majority of the data, nothing was done beyond removing direct
identifiers to the individual’s identity. Most of the data sets contained only the times, locations,
and a perpetual identifier used to track traces made by the same individual through the data set.
It also revealed the methods used by the attackers to break this de-identification. The spread
of the attacks and used and their course of re-identification is laid out in Figure 4.3b. There
were different methods of doing this, many attackers used clustering to find likely home ad-
dresses or home and work pairs. They could also use Markov Chains to match the de-identified
location patterns to known location patterns that the attacker created themselves from knowl-
edge about the individual or from other public data that contains an identity. Some attacks were
only looking at the uniqueness of the location patterns and many found that the information
was unique to an individual which provides a reasonable assumption of identifiability. The
only cases not discussed in the following sections are the two cases of broken masking that
were studied as these are discussed in Section 4.1.3 of this document.
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Figure 4.3: Break down of the attack methods used on geolocation data sets
4.4.1 Suppression
With geolocation data typically suppression will include the removal of names and other known
demographic information that can identify the person. Many data holders consider the times-
4.4. Best Practices for Geolocation Data 49
tamps and location as well as some form of a perpetual identifier as enough de-identification.
However in multiple cases, it has been found that the location data itself when connected can
leak information about the person, including home address and place of work, which together
can identify an individual [59, 50, 53]. From an analysis of the census data in the US, it was
found that home/work pairs at the location granularity of the census block were unique for a
majority of the population, and less granularity offers more privacy [59].
In some cases, the only information released is the address of an individual. For health care,
a data set with a map containing patient addresses was released with the intention of allowing
analysis of illness and geographical location through the city of Boston. It was found that the
data released was precisely accurate for the home address of 79% of the patients and within 14
meters for all of the addresses. From there researchers determined finding the identity of the
patient was possible from an accurate home address [17].
Machine learning models can be used to match individuals between data sets. In a study
performed using credit card information that contained the time and location of the transaction
it was found that 4 points of an individual’s time and location were enough to re-identify their
trace within the data set. Overall 90% of individuals were unique with only 4 points [32].
Machine learning models can be used to create models of human behaviour, when it comes
to geolocation data a neural network being fed discrete GPS locations and times a map of
someone’s trajectories and frequented locations can be built. Using this it is possible to use
the location features of social media apps such as Twitter, Foursquare, Weibo, and ISP data
to match an anonymous social media account to an identity. Researchers were able to take
21 months of twitter and 48 months of foursquare data and match accounts between the sites
without looking at the content of posts or the account names. Similarly, they used 1 week of
data from Weibo which used GPS coordinates, and 1 week of data from an ISP which provides
the coordinate of the base station that the user was connected to at a certain time to connect
individuals between the data sets. They were able to accurately match 50% of users between
the two services [46]. A similar analysis can be completed using a Markov chain with a 35-45%
match rate [52].
Another research group took the GPS coordinates from Twitter data and used machine
learning models to create clusters of coordinates and then create a centroid of these coordi-
nates. This centroid assumed to be the true location the person was at once the clustering
accounted for the error in the coordinates. Using knowledge of human behaviour between
work and home hours the models then predicted the centroid that was likely to be an individ-
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ual’s home and their workplace. Once this was done the contents of the tweets were searched
for relevant information about the location the individual was at at the time of the tweet and
the model would consider this as well. The model created by researchers was able to predict
an individual’s home and workplace with 92.5% accuracy [36]. Another study focused on the
re-identification of 3 people in this manner and learned names, dob, occupation, family info,
home and work address, several facts about their life, info about their web presence and other
miscellaneous information [75].
In a case that compared bike share and jogging data, it was found that the knowledge of
someone’s daily routine could easily be leaked to an attacker. Many people have a daily routine
that location data covering their morning or evening jog would reveal information about. As
would data about their use of a bike share service to and from work, or another form of public
transit. Both of these data sets provide near-continuous updates of an individual’s locations
and researchers could create models based on the released data of the individual’s movements
and predict a bike-share users location and time with 75% accuracy [102].
Using a taxi data set from New York that contained no information about the passenger’s
identity it was shown that it is arbitrary to re-identify a passenger in the data set if some in-
formation is known about where and when they used a taxi, or their address, as the taxi data
is detailed enough to see the address that the taxi picked someone up or dropped them off at.
This can reveal information previously unknown to an adversary about the trip that was taken,
and the habits and behaviours of an individual. For detached homes, previous knowledge can
be minimal as information about the owner can be searched through the address to reveal their
identity [161]. A similar study of taxis in San Francisco and Shanghai, as well as busses in
Shanghai, found that 10 pieces of external information were enough to identify a passenger in
the data set. Even when the external information was inaccurate [94].
If some external information about a person’s location behaviour is known then cell tower
data consisting of the entry and exit time of a cell phone from each cell tower’s area of coverage
can be used to build a model of their location patterns and compared to this external information
to find them in the data set. Using this an attacker can achieve 80% accuracy in connecting the
identity to the location trace [109].
A summary of the above into best practices of suppression:
1. Home address should be considered a direct identifier for a homeowner and information
that reveals a home address is an identifier,
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2. The uniqueness of specific locations and patterns of movement to an individual should
be considered personal information,
3. Four external locations and times are enough to uniquely identify an individual and thus
require de-identification.
4.4.2 Generalization
Generalization with geolocation data can typically occur in one of two ways, either the location
is generalized or the time is generalized. Potentially both of these alterations are occurring.
Generalization will alter the specific latitude and longitude to cover a wider area or change
the specific time to cover a greater time frame that the person may have been at that location
during. Some information about the types of generalization and the identifiability of the data
after this was performed is displayed in Table 4.3.
In some areas of the world, road cameras are common. In Guangzhou China road cameras
along major roads take images of a vehicle’s license plate and place it in a database along
with the time stamp, which camera took the photo, and whether the vehicle is local or not.
This amounts to a location, time, and perpetual identifier that can be used to track the vehicle
along its route. This means that they can create a trajectory of movement based on these single
instances in time. They attempted various time granularities but found that even with 12 hours,
5 of these records was enough to uniquely identify 90% of the individuals driving on the roads
[54].
One method for generalizing the data in the time domain referred to as Promesse [135]
erases user points of interest by using a speed smoothing technique, which assures that between
each successive points in the obfuscated trace the distance and time difference is the same.
This way someone spending a lot of time in a single location should appear similar to their
location trace to somewhere they spent less time. However, with this, some methods can release
information to an attacker. Though a place of interest may be harder to determine from a single
trace, using a heat map to create points of interest over multiple traces is still possible and will
leak enough information to identify a user [100]. This study looked at multiple data sets and
re-identification types and found that the same de-identification measures did not result in the
same level of de-identification of the records. Despite the structure of the data being the same
in all cases the nature of the data resulting from its source, cabs, or users on a social network,










































Table 4.3: Re-identifying Geolocation Data
























Exact Exact Uniqueness 68%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 1 min Exact Uniqueness 91%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 5 min Exact Uniqueness 90.3%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 15 min Exact Uniqueness 88.6%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 30 min Exact Uniqueness 86.7%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 1 min Census tract Uniqueness 87.8%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 5 min Census tract Uniqueness 83.5%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 15 min Census tract Uniqueness 81.4%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 30 min Census tract Uniqueness 75.5%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 1 min ZIP code Uniqueness 84.1%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 5 min ZIP code Uniqueness 78.4%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 15 min ZIP code Uniqueness 68%
[35] 2016 USA Taxi GPS positions 30 min ZIP code Uniqueness 54.9%

































Table 4.3: Re-identifying Geolocation Data
Study Year Country Type of Data Time Location Identification Re-id’d









4 Points of time and
location of purchases
Exact Exact Uniqueness 90%
[94] 2013 USA,CHN









4 Cell tower points
covering 0.15km2 to
15km2
1hr Cell tower Uniqueness 95%
[107] 2012 USA,CHL,BEL
2 Cell tower points
covering 0.15km2 to
15km2
1hr Cell tower Uniqueness 50%
[107] 2012 USA,CHL,BEL



















































































Table 4.3: Re-identifying Geolocation Data
Study Year Country Type of Data Time Location Identification Re-id’d
[170] 2011 USA
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have much less uniqueness than a person and so are more difficult to re-identify once de-
identification is applied to the data [100].
In a study of taxi GPS traces from New York taxis, researchers tested the privacy of different
generalization levels on the data by looking at how unique the traces were. This was considered
a successful attack because they were also able to prove that a trace could be matched to the
public medallion information which revealed the driver’s identity. With location generalized to
the neighbourhood and time generalized to 30-minute intervals it was still possible to identify
30% of the individuals [35].
Looking at cell phone data where the locations are generalized to the area covered by a
single cell tower with 1 hr samples only 4 positions are required to uniquely identify someone.
From this, it was found that statistically, traces are more unique when coarse in one dimension
and fine along another, than medium-grained along both dimensions. Given four points, 40%
of individuals are unique in a data set with a temporal resolution of 15 hrs or a spatial resolution
of 15 antennas while 60% are unique in a data set with a temporal resolution of 7 hrs and a
spatial resolution of 7 antennas. According to their analysis uniqueness decays 1/10 the power
of the resolution [107].
Another study looking at cellphone data was generalizing the location starting with the
sector of the cell tower’s area of coverage, the cell towers area, the zip code area, city, county,
and state. They base their analysis on the uniqueness of the set of most common locations
starting with one location up to the top 3. From their analysis, they determined that a trace
longer than 2 weeks reveals the top 2 locations of more than 50% of a population.
A summary of the above into best practices of generalization:
1. Location traces overtime should be de-identified to prevent attacks that look for impor-
tant places in people’s lives,
2. When generalizing locations it is important to note the uniqueness of home/work pairs
extends to areas, not just exact addresses,
3. Generalizing locations so that every point is at least a specific distance apart still allows
for points of interest to be found when multiple traces from an individual can be tied
together,
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4. Data sets from different sources should be considered new data sets when determining
the required methods of de-identification as methods used on similarly structured geolo-
cation data will not provide the same protection level,
5. Large data sets with many records for each individual require significant generalization
to provide k-anonymous privacy.
4.4.3 Perturbation
Perturbation is used on coordinates to alter the exact positions slightly and create uncertainty
to prevent attackers from knowing specifically where someone was, while researchers can still
learn from movement patterns. Two studies of different data sets that added noise to individual
geolocation traces found vulnerabilities in the implementation. They found that many of the
traces were correlated, people that know each other of course often go to the same places
together and immediate family will be in the same location even more often. As such models
like Markov chains can be used to compare the traces and find people that are likely to know
each other. Using the correlated traces and clustering the points where the individuals were
likely together the real location can be found [156, 87].
Specifically, for the case of [87], the noise was applied to geolocation traces from a social
networking site using a differential privacy bound and laplacian noise. By leveraging the infor-
mation about relationships between individuals available on the social media website combined
with the geolocation traces specific users could be inferred to know each other. Once that con-
nection was known points on the traces where they were likely in the same location could
be exploited using clustering to defeat the noise applied to the positions and learn the exact
location [87].
Noise can be generated in different manners to be applied to geolocation traces. One study
looking at the noise that was drawn from a planar Laplace distribution, as is the case with
the Geo-Indistinguishability protocol [2], found weaknesses in this style of noise addition.
Using a heatmap to create a pattern of visited locations and frequencies an attacker can still
find uniqueness in the trace, and potentially reveal the user from external knowledge of their
movements to link to the data set [100].
Other studies were able to use Markov chains to break perturbation applied to the loca-
tion as the adversary can focus on a subset of transition probabilities. From these, the entire
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transition probability matrix can be recovered. This allowed for the adversary to estimate the
locations of the users and thus re-identify them [156].
A summary of the above into best practices of perturbation:
1. Noise added to the location should account for the same person being in the same place
multiple times to counteract attacks based on frequency in a location,
2. The method through which the noise is generated and applied should always account for
areas in which people would not be, such as the middle of a lake,
3. When noise is added to traces without considering the dependencies between the traces
relationships between users can be used to learn exact locations through the noise.
4.4.4 Aggregation
Aggregating similar user’s traces together is a method that can add some anonymity to the data
set. Traces with similar movement patterns can be merged together to create a single trace that
is then released. Essentially this creates a k-anonymous set, if 5 traces were aggregated then
any trace could be at least k = 5 different people. However, using heat maps to match a known
trace to the aggregated ones can still leak information about the user that was not previously
known to the attacker [100].
4.5 Best Practices for Browsing History
Web browsing history typically consists of nothing more than accessed links and times, and
occasionally a perpetual identifier used to identify the same user. There is typically nothing
else in the data set yet browsing history can be used to identify people, as well as personal
information about them.
4.5.1 Suppression
As with all considerations of suppression unique attributes of the data to the person need to
be considered. When visiting a site like social media the URL is not always the same for
all people. Sometimes when accessing features only available for your personal profile the
URL is unique to you [39]. Other unique URLs might include employer websites, or google
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searches containing personal information like names, ages, and locations [8]. Only 10 known
searches are required to create a fingerprint of browsing behaviour that can be used to discover
someone’s entire browsing history from a data set of just URLs and timestamps. These unique
searches should be removed from the data or altered before release.
Through social media, it is also possible to take the browser history and find someone’s
identity by matching their browser history to their social media feed. When sites like Twitter
contain embedded links accessing the secondary website through the provided link creates a
URL that indicates that this link was opened through a website such as Twitter. These types of
links create a “fingerprint” that can then be matched to a Twitter feed 70% of the time
4.6 Best Practices for Call Records
Many consider telephone metadata to be without identifiers because the information contains
no values that are traditionally thought of as direct identifiers, such as names [103]. However,
information like locations, relationships between people, and sensitive information can be ob-
tained from the metadata of cellphone records, all of which can contribute to re-identification.
4.6.1 Suppression
Though telephone metadata contains little information in terms of direct identifiers there is one
attribute that can reveal a lot of information about an individual’s identity, location, relation-
ships, and sensitive information. Much of the telephone metadata referred to by organizations
contains phone numbers. These have been found to be trivially re-identifiable using directories,
and social network application programming interfaces [103].
Phone numbers in metadata can reveal not only the identity of the individual the data is
from but the identity of people that they know because the call and text logs contain recipi-
ent and sender phone numbers. Phone numbers can also reveal locations from the business
numbers that are called, and learn personal or sensitive information about a person based on
the phone calls to businesses, doctor’s offices, clinics, religious affiliations, and other organi-
zations. Linking a phone number to a business and physical address is trivial through google
places or review services such as yelp. It was found that using 10 phone calls it is possible to
predict the individual’s location [103].
Telephone numbers should be considered as an identifier and treated as such when de-
identifying data sets. If full suppression of the phone number would reduce the utility of the
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data set below utility thresholds other methods of de-identification could potentially be used to
prevent identity leakage.
4.6.2 Generalization
The relationships between individuals can be inferred from the telephone metadata. From
the concentration of call and text volume and length, time of day for call and text volume
and length, and comparisons of whether the most called number was the most texted, and
comparisons between most called number and most texted number, it is possible to determine
who the individuals are in a relationship with. This is despite metadata containing none of the
contents of the calls and text’s [103].
4.7 Best Practices for Social Networks
Social networking data can often be released in the form of undirected graphs with nodes
representing the people and edges representing their network of “friends” within the site. More
information can be released along with this including usernames or geolocation positions one
such case was discussed in Section 4.4 on Geolocation data.
One of the issues with most social networks is that the data that is released is available to
an attacker through the nature of the social network. Even with privacy settings on the site set
as high as possible some information about a person on the site is available to anyone looking
for it. This would give an adversary a clear external data set to compare the information to.
4.7.1 Suppression
When these social networking graphs are released they often contain no information about
the identity of the individual, and in some cases, the social network would not have a real
name only a username on record. If there are names associated with the account they are not
released and only the structure of the nodes representing people and the edges between them
representing relationships are released.
This graph structure can be used to connect the information back to an external de-identified
data source. Looking at networks from Gowalla (a social network from 2009-2012) and
Google+ (a social network from 2011-2019), it was found that the uniqueness of the struc-
ture of the graph allowed for re-identification of the nodes. From the social network graphs
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that were released 83.3% of users of Gowalla and 95.5% of users of Google+ could be identi-
fied. This privacy leakage would also get worse the more nodes and edges that a network had
[76].
A similar attack was done with Twitter and Flickr accounts. By looking at the structure of
the networks they were able to match anonymous accounts between the two social networks.
The algorithm used found a few matching node pairs between the networks and was able to
use these to expand to further nodes and identify 30.8% of the nodes that appeared in both
networks [113].
Suppression of the structure does not provide enough privacy for a balance with the utility
of the data. For instance, if the degree of a node (the number of edges, meaning, in this case,
direct relationships to other nodes) is unique, then someone could be re-identifiable from that
information. Applying k-anonymity principles to the degree of the nodes so that k − 1 nodes
all have the same degree is a method that has been proposed to de-identify these graphs [88].
When one such method was implemented and attacked it was found that an attack that focuses
on the structure of the network was still successful, as there was an overlap of 58% of the edges
in the network with the external data. Higher k values would have required the removal of more
data that would make the entire data set far less useful [99].
4.7.2 Perturbation
An interesting method of perturbing the information in a social network graph was proposed
that involves adding and deleting edges of the graph at random [169]. The idea is to create
noise in the structure of the graph and prevent an attacker from being able to use this structural
information to match the de-identified node back to the true node and de-identify the user.
However, a structural based re-identification attack was successful for 61% of the nodes in this
data until while the added noise was held to an acceptable level of error [99].
4.7.3 Aggregation
A different way of implementing a k-anonymous measure of privacy to a social network graph
is to group similar graph nodes into clusters with a minimum size constraint [160]. This was
implemented and then attacked using structure-based methods. Despite the de-identification
there remained 63% overlap with the external data when the method was implemented on a
network at acceptable utility levels [99].
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4.8 Best Practices for Billing Information
Billing information includes details about any products or services that were paid for by one
group to another. This typically involves a breakdown of the amount paid, and how it was
paid, any tip that might have been added on top of that, and potentially details about what was
purchased.
4.8.1 Suppression
With billing information, there is always some suppression of data, credit card information,
bank account numbers, and other data that someone could use to fraudulently make transactions
must be removed from the data before release.
In a case of credit card data being released that contained times, locations, and the amount
paid it was found that 4 locations known by an adversary could identify 90% of the individuals
in the data set, this is discussed in Section 4.4, and that the adversary knowing the price of
the transaction increased the re-identification risk by 22%. Their attack was performed using
machine learning methods applied to the data and looking to match records within the data set
to their external data [32].
4.8.2 Perturbation
When applying noise to a data set the current common method involves some form of differ-
ential privacy. In a study, three different definitions of differential privacy were implemented
on a data set containing customer purchase records corresponding to 100 frequently purchased
items. The differential privacy implementation that were tested were naı̈ve composition, ad-
vanced composition[38], zero concentrated differential privacy [19], and Rényi differential pri-
vacy [105]. The study focused on using the data for machine learning purposes and comparing
the utility of the data to the chosen privacy budget ε. They concluded that for the machine
learning models to create accurate predictions of the data the privacy budget has to be set far
too high to provide any protection from a realistic adversary [73].
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4.9 Conclusions from the De-identification Attack Review
De-identification is the process of lowering the probability of information being used to identify
an individual or a unique pattern in the data set. There are six general ways that this can be
done, and their effectiveness depends on the data type, the specific data set, and the external
data available to an attacker. The effectiveness of a de-identification method depends on the
data type it is being implemented on and the contents of the data set. Key considerations need
to be made based on the type of external data available to an attacker and the uniqueness of the
values or set of values in the data set.
Though many of the attacks investigated revealed personal information about individuals
involved, there is little evidence to suggest that the modern theorems of de-identification are
flawed. The majority of data sets had the direct identifiers removed or masked, but little was
done beyond that to remove identities. Though there does appear to be an increase of custodians
beginning to employ other methods of de-identification in recent years, as all studies involving
obfuscation of data are from after 2010, with 10 of the 12 being from the last 3 years (2016)
[54, 73, 148, 156, 159, 51, 100, 155, 87, 30, 94, 53]. These found that the implementation, not
the theory was at fault for the privacy breach.
Though there will be a trade-off in utility when performing operations on data beyond re-
moval of direct identifiers [34] it is important to maintain the public’s privacy. Data custodians
need to be up to date on de-identification methods and implementations, as well as documented
failures of them. Increased adoption and testing of de-identification methods would be bene-
ficial to the entire research community and the public. Testing these methods on real-world
data sets is the best way to determine what methods and standards work and which do not.
Testing will guide best practices to be better and give data custodians more information they
can use when considering the de-identification methods, standards, and processes their data
will require.
Part II




Background on Contact Tracing
In December of 2019, the office of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the People’s
Republic of China received a media statement from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commis-
sion on cases of ‘viral pneumonia’ in the city of Wuhan. On January 30th 2020 the WHO
Director-General declared the novel coronavirus outbreak a public health emergency of in-
ternational concern (PHEIC), the WHO’s highest level of alarm. On March 11th due to the
concerning levels of spread and severity of symptoms the WHO made the assessment that the
coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19) could be characterized as a pandemic [131]. The
Director-General said that “all countries can still change the course of this pandemic” if they
“detect, test, treat, isolate, trace, and mobilize their people in the response” [55].
On March 20th 2020 the government of Singapore released a mobile app called Trace To-
gether. This app was based on the open trace code base which is an open-source implemen-
tation of the BlueTrace protocol that they also released. This was the first national Bluetooth
contact tracing app in the world [127]. The intention of a tracing app is to facilitate the process
of notifying all of the people that a contagious person has come into contact with that they may
have been exposed to the virus.
5.1 History of Contact Tracing
Contact tracing is not a new idea. 500 years ago a physician used tracing methods to track
the bubonic plague [28]. Methods of tracking how an illness spread has also been used with
syphilis and yellow fever (though it was later found yellow fever was not spread through human
transmission). A hospital duties book from Nuremberg Germany compiled between 1500 and
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1700 contains a list of questions every patient was asked relating to how, when, where and, if
possible, from whom the patient had contracted their illness [28]. In more modern medicine
practices contact tracing has been used widely when patients are diagnosed with a sexually
transmitted illness (STI), though this is often referred to as partner notification or partner ser-
vices [12].
Originally doctors studying the spread of illness focused on disease tracking. Doctors
sought to track what was the great pox, and would later be known as Syphilis, in the early 1500s
by following and tracking the disease using contemporary histories including the Journals of
Christopher Columbus. They could track the spread of the disease in this manner through the
Americas to Barcelona then through soldiers and others to Italy with the Siege of Naples in
1495. This is what we might now call a “super spreader” event as the siege itself and then the
dispersal of mercenary soldiers after. Then the disease continued to spread into eastern Europe
likely due to Venetian Commerce. [28]
The earliest record of a doctor tracking whom a person came into contact with or where
they went was during the Italian Bubonic plague outbreak of 1576. Doctor Andrea Gratiolo
aimed to prove that a woman who had travelled between two cities had not been the cause of
the plague’s spread. The doctor argued that if the woman had been the cause of the spread,
then the passengers in the boat she had travelled in because of the tight conditions would have
caught the illness, but they had not. Neither had anyone in the woman’s household. [28]
Now contact tracing has changed from tracking the spread of disease to preventing the
spread of disease. Using it as a tool doctors aim to prevent further spread and catch cases
sooner. Hoping that the sooner they know someone has the disease the sooner they can begin
treatment and the more likely they are to recover or the better chances that they have [166].
A common form of contact tracing that people may be familiar with because of examples
used in popular culture is what is known as “Partner notification responsibility” in Ontario. This
is where health professionals have a responsibility to notify the sexual partners of a patient that
has been diagnosed with an STI. This form of contact tracing typically consists of the patient
themselves listing the names and contact information of anyone they could have transmitted
the illness to and either the Physician or patient contacting them that they should get tested.
[130]
There are other examples of modern contact tracing before now. During the 2014 Ebola
pandemic in Guinea, it was used as a tool to contain the virus [139]. It was used during
the H1N1 pandemic [142], as well as other modern pandemics. Manual contact tracing is a
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three-step process. First, ask the infected person about their activities and the people around
them during the contagious period of the illness. This typically consists of family, colleagues,
friends, and health care providers. Second efforts are made to identify these contacts and
inform them. This would be telling them about their contact status, what actions to take, and
symptoms to watch for. In some cases, isolation or quarantine might be required, either in their
home or at a hospital. Then lastly there is follow-up. Regular checks should be conducted to
monitor for symptoms and test for infection [166].
5.1.1 Privacy Concerns of Traditional Contact Tracing
There have been privacy concerns with contact tracing since it became a more common prac-
tice. The information about the patient and the people they were in contact with is both private
health information and personal information. The contact tracer requires the name and contact
info for all parties in order to perform their task, as well they likely will learn or need to know
what the relationship between parties are, how often they are with each other, and where they
meet. They could even know where they live, as in some places the contact tracers will go to
the address if they cannot contact someone by phone [132].
Some of the concerns can be mitigated by procedures similar to what some call centers
implement and releasing to the public statements about these procedures. The privacy concerns
themselves are often best written as questions about what the procedures for the tracing team
are. Since the contact tracer themselves now has the information, are there safeguards in place
to make sure that they are not keeping the personal contact info, etc. from the patient or the
people that they have to contact? Are the calls recorded? Are new hires subject to background
checks? What kind of database is any information being entered into? What happens to notes
that the tracer makes while working? How is the data secured? How long is data retained
and under what policies? If there is a data breach where is the liability? [56] Providing these
answers would create a clearer picture of the privacy protections available through manual
contact tracing.
5.2 Purpose of Contact Tracing
It is important that the purpose of why something is being designed is kept in mind during the
process. When a group sets out to do something, if the main goal is not always at the forefront
of the design it can result in an ineffective solution. The point is more than we manually contact
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trace, so why not try and automate it. If there is no evidence that contact tracing helps, then
perhaps we should not be making technology-based versions, or something fundamental in
what contact tracing is, needs to change. The first thing to look at is whether there is evidence
that contact tracing aids doctors in stopping the spread of the disease and treating patients.
Then what the defined goal of the design is, as there are different ways to implement a system.
5.2.1 Benefits of Contact Tracing for the Populace
There are many reasons that doctors and researchers may be interested in contact tracing. For
one people who are in close contact with someone infected with an illness that is or possibly
is human-to-human transmissible are at a higher risk of becoming infected and then infecting
others. Thus finding and monitoring or testing these people can allow medical professionals to
get them the care they need faster and prevent further spread of the virus. [166]
It has been proven through studies of partner notification that allowing the partners to seek
care early if they have an infection, can prevent them from spreading the disease. Informing
them of the possibility as early as possible enables them to take preventative actions. It also
reduces incidents of serious complications from these illnesses. [130]
It was found that during the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Guinea contact tracing was a significant
tool for epidemiologists in containing the infection. The use of contact tracing reduced the
time it took to detect and treat cases and significantly minimized the risk of transmission to
subsequent individuals. However, its success is determined by the level of trust between the
community and the public health system. [139]
5.2.2 The Goals of Contact Tracing
Though contact tracing uses have been discussed, as well as how it can benefit the populace it
is still important to discuss what the goals of creating a contact tracing program are. As modern
contact tracing based on technology brings with it more possibilities of what contact tracing
can do.
There are three separate use models that appear commonly in many of the proposed and
implemented contact tracing schemes. [137]
1. Inform the health authorities about who might need to be tested or quarantined
2. Serve as a digital permission slip to access various services
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3. Inform people that they might have been infected so they can consider getting tested and
isolating
The various applications that will be discussed all are designed to meet at least one of these
goals. Some have multiple functions and can meet more than one goal. However, there are
some ways in which the goals are counter to each other. In the first, the health authorities need
to know who is at risk so that they can contact them, wherein the third the health authorities
may not know who needs tests. In the second model, the digital permission slip reveals to
those it is shown someone’s risk status, thus revealing information to someone if the individual
wishes to access the service. Depending on what the service is this can essentially remove the
consent from the release of this data if the service is essential like a grocery store. [137]
5.3 Digital Contact Tracing
There are many ways that modern technology can be leveraged to perform contact tracing. It
can be as simple as using a calendar app to determine your locations over the last two weeks,
or as advanced as using the GPS from your phone to know exactly where you were at every
minute of the day. Many different technologies have been suggested to assist with manual
contact tracing. Including GPS [123], Bluetooth [127, 158, 162, 67], speaker and microphones
at ultrasonic frequencies [68], QR codes [115] and others.
In Chapter 6 the full protocols will be explained for these technologies. Here the basic idea
will be covered for some of the contact tracing methods that have been proposed or are in use.
Bluetooth Based Contact Tracing Methods
An app broadcasts an anonymous identifier using Bluetooth and other devices running the app
scan for this. When the devices detect each other they exchange identifiers and log that and
the signal strength. If someone then tests positive for COVID-19 they release information that
allows the system to alert the people they were close enough to for long enough to be at risk.
This is typically 2 meters for 15 minutes. [127]
GPS Based Contact Tracing Methods
An app logs the GPS location data of the phone and either broadcasts it live to a server or
stores it. When someone tests positive the places they have been are identified. Then either
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other people that were there at the same time are notified, or a publicly available map is updated
and people compare to see if they were in an at-risk location. [93]
Contact Tracing with Heat Maps
These are typically hosted on a website and inform users if areas they are, have been, or plan
to go are at-risk areas. This can be connected to a GPS based system, or be based on patients
recalling where they have been. It could even be based on where patients live. There is a lot of
variance on what exactly the map is showing. [26]
Audio Based Contact Tracing Methods
These can be used in conjunction with other methods, an app would use the microphone and
speaker of the phone to determine the distance to other devices at the time that an interaction
is logged. The idea being that it is more accurate as sound does not travel well through walls
and so the app would have fewer false positives. [68]
Contact Tracing with QR Codes
QR codes are seen to be used in two different ways. The first is location logging. A restaurant
or store will have a QR code that they display. Upon entering the establishment a user takes a
picture scan of the QR code in the app and the location and time are logged. Then if someone
later tests positive the location can be informed and anyone who does not have the ID exchange
app could still look up the list of at-risk locations and times and determine if they should get
tested.
The other way in which QR codes are used is they are generated in the app based on a user’s
risk level. This risk level is determined in a variety of ways. Things like where they have been,
where they live, how many people they have been around, whether any of those people have
reported testing positive etc. Then when someone tries to enter an establishment like a store,
or public transit a worker scans their QR code and allows them entry if they are below the risk
threshold.
5.3.1 Privacy Concerns of Digital Contact Tracing
This is all-important for the mitigation of the spread of the virus within a community. However,
there are many ways in which it can become a threat to the privacy of individuals within that
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community. When this tracing is performed manually it is limited by the nature of human
memory. A human has to remember every place they were for two weeks, and everyone who
was with them. A simple task for people you are regularly around, that becomes much harder
when you consider public spaces where there could be many people nearby that you do not
personally know. The introduction of technology is intended to fill the gap of human limitations
and perfectly recall every place and every person whether you know them or not. An admirable
goal for the fighting of a disease, a potential threat to the privacy of the individual.
Making available not only everywhere you have been, but every person you have interacted
with as well as how long you were with them, is information that can be used to determine who
you are even if your name is not connected to the data. From the location data, someone can
determine your home address or work address based on how often you are there, how long you
spend there, and the hours that you are there during [36]. Similar to how home and work can
be determined friends and family could be determined by the number of times that they appear
nearby, coworkers could be determined based on hours spent together, romantic partners as
well. Then there is the addition of whether the data is being transmitted constantly or stored on
the phone and uploaded. Having the ability to know where someone is at all times accurately
rather than probabilistic guessing is powerful data with the potential for abuse. There is also the
potential for security threats that could allow someone access to the system that they should not
have, or other forms of attack that undermine the trust in the system as well as prevent health
care providers from being able to use the system effectively.
Chapter 6
Contact Tracing Schemes
Turning contact tracing into a more automated digital system can take many forms. Every
team has slightly different ideas of what needs to be done and every country can have different
requirements for societal or legal reasons. The two main competing technologies are Bluetooth
and GPS. There are also two competing data control systems, the centralized and decentralized
systems. The differences of these methods and their combinations will be described in this
section along with the protocols that have been developed for the apps that will be the focus of
this thesis.
6.1 Bluetooth Contact Tracing Systems
The Bluetooth contact tracing technology focuses on who and for how long someone is in con-
tact with another. The main idea of the system is that the app scans the Bluetooth wavelength
looking for other apps. When it finds one the two devices perform a Bluetooth handshake,
exchange strings that act as identifiers, and then disconnect from each other. Information like
signal strength at the time of connection is also passed. The signal strength is used to measure
the distance between the two devices. Then at a later time if someone tests positive the identi-
fiers are compared to determine who might be at risk of having caught the illness. The people
identified from the comparison are contacted and informed of the risk so they might isolate and
test as they would with manual contact tracing methods [127].
Modern devices use the Bluetooth low energy (BLE) protocol. In BLE parlance there are
two roles during communication. A device is either has the peripheral or central role. In every
handshake, one device takes the central and the other the peripheral role. In the first stage of
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communicating, that is finding the other device, the peripheral is advertising services, while
the central is scanning advertisements. A service is a collection of data, such as characteristics,
that the central device can read. Once the central finds the peripheral advertising what it is
looking for it can move to the next step of the handshake which is discovering the peripheral’s
characteristics and reading the value. For contact tracing the characteristic is information like
the identifying string and signal strength. The central reads this information and writes it
into its own memory, then it writes back its own characteristic value to the peripheral. This
is important as the peripheral has no write privileges during this exchange. This write-back
allows both devices to store the other’s identifying string and signal strength [127].
It should be noted that on all of the android applications that use a Bluetooth based method
location services need to be enabled for the app. This is because the android software bundles
the Bluetooth permissions in with the location services permissions. For the app to access the
Bluetooth services continually as it does these permissions are required, though the application
does not use the GPS based location services.
6.1.1 Centralized Bluetooth Contact Tracing Systems
The basic framework of the centralized data approach is as follows and can be seen in figure
6.1. Users download the app and register with the health authority. The health authority server
passes them a list of IDs that they will rotate through for a period of time, lets say every day
it gives a list of IDs that are incremented through every 15 minutes. When two devices are
close enough they exchange the ID currently in use. User A stores User B’s ID and B stores
A in a “contact list”. Then if A tests positive they authenticate this information with the health
authority and upload their contact list to the server. On the server, the list of contact IDs is
processed. The infectious period of the positive user is determined and any IDs on the list
during that time are determined and their corresponding user identified. In this case user B will
get a notification [127].
What makes the system “centralized” is that the processing of contacts and risk levels is
performed on the central server. This is not the case in the “decentralized” system.
BlueTrace
BlueTrace is the protocol that was developed in Singapore by the department of . There is
an open-source code base called Open Trace that was created to allow others to more easily
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Figure 6.1: Visualization of the basic design of the centralized system [137]
adopt this protocol and the TraceTogether contact tracing app released in Singapore is based
on that code base [127].
The BlueTrace protocol starts with the registration. A user downloads the app then the
back-end service generates a unique randomized user ID that it associates with the phone num-
ber the user provides. The purpose of the phone number is to contact the user in case of
exposure. Then the back-end server generates the first set of temporary IDs (TempIDs) that
will be used. A TempID is comprised of the user ID, the use start time, the expiry time, a
random initialization vector (IV), and an authentication tag. The user ID, use start time, and
expiry time are all encrypted using AES-256-GCM encryption. Then the initialization vector
and authentication tag are concatenated onto the string resulting from the encryption. Then the
entire thing is base64 encoded. One single tempID is 84 bytes in length. The start and expiry
time refer to the time block that the device will be broadcasting this ID for [127].
The tempIDs are designed with some security in mind. They have a set length of time
they should be broadcast for to prevent a permanent identifier from being broadcast publicly.
A public broadcast could allow an attacker or the health authority to track an individual. It
will also help to prevent replay attacks. An attacker could read an ID and then broadcast it
themselves somewhere else pretending to be another user. The time limit means this would
only work for the valid period of that tempID as the attacker would have to keep grabbing the
user’s tempID to continue the attack. BlueTrace recommends a lifespan of 15 minutes for a
single tempID. The protocol also recommends that the IDs be sent in batches that are forward
dated to the user to ensure that the same tempID is not broadcast longer than the set time [127].
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The entire message that is recorded at an encounter is more than just the tempID. The
message stored in the contact list is the time stamp, version of software, tempID, organization,
sending device model, receiving device model, signal strength. The organization refers to the
authority under which the app is operating, in Singapore, this is the Singapore government. For
the Australian implementation, this is the Australian government. The sending device model is
the make and model of the device that was connected to. That is user A would have the make
and model of user B’s phone listed. The receiving device model is the user’s own device’s
make and model. The reason for this is that the developers discovered that different models
of cellphones had different BLE signal strengths. Thus the only way to adequately measure
distance was for them to test many cellphones and create a database. When determining if a
contact is at risk the back-end server references the signal strength database to determine how
far apart the devices were. [157]
To ensure that as many devices in an area as possible are contacted instead of the same
device over and over a blacklist is created in the app. The blacklist contains recently seen
devices. Any devices on the list will not be contacted again until they are removed from the
list. According to the protocol a device should be blacklisted for between one and two scanning
cycles [127].
The contact list that the device creates is only held for a limited amount of time. On a
rolling window, the list should only have contacts from the 21 days prior to the current date.
Any older than that are completely deleted. The reasoning is that only the contacts during the
patient’s infectious window are relevant to contact tracing [127].
The back-end server is where the risk assessment is performed. A positive user will upload
their contact list to the health authority server. This upload requires an authorization code that
will be provided to the individual by the health authority. When the code is entered in the app
the server authenticates it, then provides a valid token allowing the contact list to be uploaded.
The health authority then decrypts the tempID of each contact, obtaining the user ID and valid
period for that tempID. It then finds the tempID list of that user and verifies that the encounter
falls within the validity period of the tempID. Then the risk assessment is done based on the
disease’s epidemiological parameters, the length of exposure, and distance. Length of exposure
is measured by the length of a continuous cluster of encounters. Distance is measured by the
received signal strength. Using these parameters the health authority determines which users
need to be informed of their possible exposure [127].
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The protocol recommends that a manual interview is still performed with the patient. This
can be used to adjust the information that has been collected by the app [127].
ROBERT
The ROBERT (ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing) scheme is the result of
collaborative work between Inria (led by the PRIVATICS team) and Fraunhofer AISEC. It
was first implemented in the contact tracing app released by the government of France called
StopCovid, then in the update of that app now called TousAntiCovid.
As is the standard order of operations the first stage of the protocol is the registration,
referred to in the ROBERT protocol as initialization. Once a user has downloaded the app
then registers with the server. The server generates a permanent identifier (user ID) and several
Ephemeral Bluetooth Identifiers (EBIDs). The back-end maintains a table, the ID table, that
keeps an entry for each registered ID. The stored information is not associated with a particular
user (no personal information is stored in the ID table). [158]
The ID table contains the following information for every user A. The authentication key
for user A. The authentication key is of some length greater than 128 bits and shared with the
app of A to authenticate messages. The encryption key for user A. The encryption key is also
of some length greater than 128 bits and shared with the app of A to encrypt information sent
from the server to the app. The permanent identifier for A. The permanent identifier is a 40-bit
identifier that is unique for each registered app and generated randomly without replacement to
avoid collisions, this is not shared with the app. A notified flag for user A. This flag indicates if
the associated user has already been notified to be at risk of exposure (“true”) or not (“false”).
It is initialized with the value “false”. Once set to “true”, the user is not allowed to make any
additional status request. The flag can be reset if the user can prove that they are not at risk
anymore. A status request epoch. The epoch is a 24-bit value indicating the last epoch that user
A sent a status request (detailed below). A list of exposed epochs. Each time one of A’s EBID
appears in the proximity list of an infected user, the epoch j when the encounter happened
between the infected user and A is added to this list. [158]
During the registration, a user will have to pass a proof-of-work system such as a CAPTCHA,
which the system will use to avoid automatic bot registrations. The app will then establish with
the server the duration of an epoch, current epoch time, and starting time of the next epoch.
The epoch information is used to synchronize with the user. The app will then receive the
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authorization and encryption keys from the server by means of a key establishment procedure.
Finally, the app receives an initial list of ephemeral IDs and country code pairs. [158]
The generation of the ephemeral Bluetooth identifiers is performed on the server. Every set
amount of epochs the app will connect to receive a list of EBIDs and encrypted country codes
(ECCs) pairs. When the server receives the request it generates the pairs. The country code is
used to determine which country the app that is being communicated with is from. Having this
allows the server to identify when a contact is using an app developed by another country and
potentially pass at risk IDs to the server for that country to notify their user. [158]
An EBID is a 64-bit identifier generated for an epoch i using a 64-bit block cipher as shown
in equation 6.1. The ECC is an 8-bit code that can be decrypted by back-end servers that have
federation agreements providing them the information required to decrypt another country’s
country code. The method for this encryption is detailed in equation 6.2. The country code is
encrypted using AES in Output feedback (OFB) mode. In this form, the federation key is used
to encrypt the EBID that has been padded with zeros. Then the most significant bits (MSB)
are taken and XOR’d with the country code (CC). The list is encrypted before being passed to
the app using AES-GCM with the app encryption key and a random 96-bit initialization vector.
[158]
EBIDi = ENC(Ks, i|ID) (6.1)
Where ENC is a 64-bit block cipher, Ks is the server encryption key, and ID is the permanent
ID of the user
ECCi = MS B(AES (KG, EBIDi|064)) ⊕CC (6.2)
AES using Output feedback (OFB) mode is used where the key KG is the federation key, CC is
the country code, and the EBID is used as the initialization vector. Then the most significant
bits are taken
It should be noted that by using the padded EBID as the initialization vector in the AES-
OFB encryption they are using an initialization vector that is shorter than the 128-bit required.
As the randomness of the IV is now relegated to the first 64 bits. Assuming that KG is the
same for every user, which is implied, it makes it cryptographically possible for an attacker to
learn two individuals’ country codes. With a 64-bit randomly pulled number using the birthday
paradox after 232 random draws, it is likely there will be a collision. Thus if an attacker were to
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set up Bluetooth receivers in a busy area, for example, an airport, after they have collected 232
or approximately 4 billion EBID and ECC pairs they will have collected two EBIDs that are
the same. If the country codes are different the attacker can XOR them to get the unencrypted
country code. This is made slightly more possible by the fact the EBID is a temporary value
that gets regularly rotated and so many are being generated. If the attacker knows the country
codes then they will learn the country of the individuals though be unable to know with that
information alone which individual is from which country. The country codes would have to be
known but as they are just an 8-bit number representing a country there is no reason to assume
they are secret.
Then the app goes into the proximity discovery stage. Once the app has a set of EBIDs to
broadcast and permissions on the device it begins to do so. When it detects other devices over
Bluetooth it exchanges encounter messages with them. These messages contain the encoun-
tered app’s EBID. The app collects the messages received and stores them, together with the
time of reception and possibly other information such as the strength of the Bluetooth signal or
the user’s speed into a local list of the application, the LocalProximityList. This is equivalent
to the BlueTrace encounter message and contact list. [158] [158]
The message that is broadcast between devices consists of the ECC, EBID, a 16-bit times-
tamp, and a 40-bit message authentication code (MAC). The entire message has a total length
of 128-bits. The layout of the message is seen in equation 6.3. The MAC is created by using
HMAC-SHA256 with the user authentication key as the key and an 8-bit prefix ’01’ concate-
nated onto the ECC, EBID, and 16-bit timestamp as the IV as described in equation 6.3. The
MAC is then truncated to 40-bits. [158]
Mi = ECCi|EBIDi|Time|MACi (6.3)
MACi = HMAC − S HA256(KA, c1|MA) (6.4)
Where KA is the users authentication key with the server, c1 is the 8-bit prefix ’01’, and MA is
the ECC, EBID, and 16-bit timestamp.
If a user tests positive for Covid-19 they initiate the declaration stage. With the user’s
consent and authorization from medical services, the user’s LocalProximityList is uploaded to
the server. Only the contacts recorded during the infectious period are uploaded. ROBERT
specifies that the LocalProximityList should be removed of any information that could tie it to
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the infected user. The server then goes through the messages, verifies the times and MAC of
the message, and determines if that EBID is at risk. EBIDs determined at risk are added to the
exposed ID list. After the message is processed it is deleted from the server. [158]
The ROBERT protocol suggests different solutions to the possibility of the server being
able to rebuild the social graph of the infected individual from their LocalProximityList. This
kind of attack was described in section 4.7 and examples of this attack being performed were
detailed. To break the link between any two EBIDs in the list multiple solutions are suggested.
The first solution is that every item in the list is sent individually using a mixnet. The second
is that the LocalProximityList is uploaded to a trusted server like that of a hospital or health
organization that mixes all the lists of all the infected users together. The back-end server
would then access this mixed list. The third solution is that the back-end server is equipped
with a secure hardware component that processes the uploads of the LocalProximityList. Then
the back-end server only has access to the exposed entries via the secured hardware. [158]
Every initialized app periodically sends exposure status requests. The app queries the server
by sending its EBIDs. The server then checks if these EBIDs have been flagged as exposed.
If any EBIDs have been flagged the server computes a risk score from information like how
many times it was flagged, the exposure duration, or the user’s speed/acceleration during the
contact. If the risk is larger than a given threshold, the ROBERT protocol does not specify the
threshold, then the server returns the query with a ’1’ bit meaning at risk of exposure. If there
is no risk the server returns a ’0’ bit to the app. When the app receives a ’1’ a notification is
displayed to the user. [158]
The query that the app sends consists of the EBID, its valid epoch of the EBID, the 32-bit
timestamp of the transmission time, and a MAC. The MAC is again created using HMAC-
SHA256 using the authentication key of the user as the key and an 8-bit prefix ’02’ concate-
nated onto the EBID, epoch, and time stamp as the IV, as displayed in equation 6.5. [158]
Requesti = EBIDi|i|Time|MACi (6.5)
MACi = HMAC − S HA256(KA, c2|EBIDi|i|Time) (6.6)
Where KA is the user’s authentication key with the server, and c2 is the 8-bit prefix ’02’
When the server receives the query it parses out the information. Then verifies that the time
is close to its current time. Then decrypts the EBID to get the user ID which is used to get
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the ID table of the user which is needed to get the authentication key of the user, check the
user notification flag, the status request epoch, and the list of exposed EBIDs. Then the server
verifies the MAC, an incorrect MAC results in the request being silently rejected. The server
verifies that the user notification flag is currently false, if the flag is true the request is silently
rejected. The server also verifies that the last request was at least T number of epochs ago, T
being some value, if the last request was too recent the request is silently rejected. In the case
of a valid request, the server updates the status request epoch of the user with the current epoch.
Computes a risk score value derived from the list of exposed EBIDs. Replies with either a 1 or
0 if the user is at risk, or not respectively. [158]
6.1.2 Decentralized Bluetooth Contact Tracing Systems
The basic framework of the decentralized data approach is as follows and can be seen in figure
6.2. Users download the app and the app generates a list of IDs. The IDs will be used for
a short period of time each, let us say every day it creates a list of IDs that are incremented
through every 15 minutes. When two devices are close enough they exchange the ID currently
in use. User A stores user B’s ID and B stores A’s in a “contact list”. Then if A tests positive
they authenticate this information with the health authority and upload their list of IDs from
their infectious period to the server. Every user device periodically fetches this list from the
server. Then the device compares these IDs to those in its own contact list and determines if the
user is at risk. If a match is found and the system determines the user could have been exposed
to the virus it notifies the user. In this case user B’s device would perform these steps to find a
match and a notification would appear in the app.
What makes the system “decentralized” is that the processing of contacts and risk levels is
performed on the user’s device. This is not the case in the “centralized” system.
Decentralized Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T)
Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) was created by an international
consortium of technologists, legal experts, engineers, and epidemiologists. In the white paper,
the creators note that the design of the Google Apple Framework is similar to a specific case of
DP-3T. Contact tracing apps based on DP-3T have been released in Austria, Belgium, Croatia,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland. [162]





















Figure 6.2: Visualization of the basic design of the decentralized system [137]
The DP-3T white paper actually outlines three similar protocols that are generally similar
to provide developers a choice regarding the trade-off between privacy and computational cost.
The three protocols are the low-cost design, the unlinkable design, and the hybrid design. The
DP-3T white paper alone does not cover the secure mechanisms used to validate an upload
of information, though the team did develop three protocols laid out in a different document.
[162]
In all three DP-3T protocols, apps locally generate frequently-changing ephemeral identi-
fiers (EphIDs) and broadcast them via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Apps observe the beacons
and store them together with a time and measurement used to estimate exposure risk, such as
signal strength. The tracing process is supported by the back-end server that distributes a list
of IDs for the apps to process to all the apps. The back-end acts only as a communication
platform and performs no processing. If patients are diagnosed with COVID-19, they will be
authorized by health authorities to publish a protocol-specific representation of their EphIDs
for their contagious period. Apps periodically query the back-end for information and recon-
struct the corresponding EphIDs of COVID-19 positive users locally. If the app has recorded
beacons corresponding to any of the reported EphIDs, then the user might have been exposed
to the virus. The app uses the exposure measurements of the matched beacons to estimate the
exposure of the user. [162]
The low-cost protocol will be detailed first. The initial seed generation occurs once the
app is downloaded. The app generates a random initial daily seed S Kt, for the current day
t. Every day after the initial day the app rotates its secret key using a cryptographic hash
function S Kt = H(S Kt−1. The EphIDs are generated from the S Kt. EphIDs should be regularly
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changed and only broadcast for a single epoch, the length of an epoch will be L and is a system
parameter. At the beginning of every day, the app generates a list of n = (24 ∗ 60)/L new
EphIDs to broadcast for the day. A pseudo-random function such as HMAC-SHA256 is used
with the S Kt and a public string as the inputs. This is then passed to a pseudo-random generator
such as AES in counter mode and every 16-bytes is an EphID. This is displayed in equation
6.7. The app then randomizes the order in which the EphIDs are used and broadcast them for
L length of time. [162]
EphID1||...||EphIDn = PRG(PRF(S Kt, “broadcastkey”)) (6.7)
Where PRG is a pseudo-random generator, PRF is a pseudo-random function, and the broadcast
key is some published string
When the app receives a beacon it stores the EphID, an exposure measurement like signal
strength, and the day the beacon was received. For efficient storage, it is suggested that the
entries be grouped by EphID. The app also stores the S Kt seeds that it generated for the last 14
days. The 14 days is a system parameter that defines the maximum period for which any data
is stored. [162]
Once authorized as a confirmed COVID-19 positive user the user can instruct their phone
to send to the back-end server the seed S Kt corresponding to the first day in which the user
was considered contagious. The contagious window can be determined by a health authority
or the user. After reporting the seed S Kt the app deletes S Kt and selects a new random seed to
generate EphIDs from. [162]
The back-end collects the pairs of (S Kt, t) from positive users and stores them. Apps peri-
odically download these pairs from the server. An app then uses the EphID generation method
to reconstruct the list of EphIDs of the positive users and compares these to the app’s contact
list. The app also checks that the EphID was collected prior to when the S Kt was published
to prevent malicious replay attacks. For a matching entry, the receive time and exposure mea-
surement that was stored is assessed to compute the risk of exposure. [162]
The unlinkable decentralized proximity tracing protocol differs in that it does not dissemi-
nate a list containing the seeds of users who have reported to be COVID-19 positive. Instead,
the EphIDs of positively diagnosed users are hashed and stored in a Cuckoo filter, which is
then distributed to other users. [162]
For the unlinkable system apps generate an EphID by drawing a random 32-byte seed per
epoch that is input to a cryptographic hash function. The output of the hash function then
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has the leftmost 128-bits of the most significant 128 bits is taken as the EphID. The EphID
generation is shown in equation 6.8 The app then stores the seeds used for every epoch in the
last 14 days. [162]
EphIDi = MS B128(H(seedi)) (6.8)
Where seedi is a random value generated for epoch i, H is a cryptographic hash function, and
MS B128 takes the leftmost 128 bits.
When an app observes a broadcast beacon it stores the EphID and epoch the beacon was
received during as a hashed string. The hashed string is stored along with the exposure mea-
surement of signal strength and the day that the beacon was received. It is recommended that
the beacons are stored grouped by the hashed string. [162]
Once authorized as a confirmed COVID-19 positive user the user can instruct their app to
send to the back-end server a representation of the EphIDs used during the contagious window.
The user can select specific epochs that they do not wish to be included before uploading the
seeds. [162]
The back-end periodically creates a new Cuckoo filter F and for each pair of epoch and seed
received it inserts the most significant 128 bits of the hashed seed concatenated with the epoch
and passed through another hashing function. This is illustrated in equation 6.9. Thus it inserts
into the Cuckoo filter the hashed EphID and epoch pair. Then the back-end publishes the filter.
Apps download the published filter F and check if any of its stored hashes are included in filter
F. As before they check that the stored hash was collected prior to the publishing of the filter
and use the stored exposure measurements to determine the risk of exposure. [162]
H(MS B128(H(seedi))|i) (6.9)
Where H is a cryptographic hash function, MSB128 takes the 128 most significant bits, and i
is the epoch
The protocol notes that Cuckoo filters have a low non-zero probability for false positives.
Thus making it possible for the system to report that it contains an element that was not within
the input set. The parameters of the Cuckoo filter have been selected to make false positives
highly unlikely even with heavy usage of the system over years. They calculate the filter will
produce one false positive in a million users over a period of 5 years. [162]
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The final hybrid design combines aspects of the two previous protocols. In this design,
an app generates a random seed that is used to generate the EphIDs using a similar method
to the low-cost design but only for a window of time. Thus if the window is two hours all
of the epochs within those two hours use an EphID generated from the same random seed.
At the beginning of every time window, the app picks a new random 16-byte seedw. Then
computes the EphIDs for that window by inputting the seedw and a fixed public string into a
pseudo-random function such as HMAC-SHA256. The output of the pseudo-random function
is then used as the input to a pseudo-random generator such as AES-GCM. The output of the
pseudo-random generator is split into 16-byte chunks to obtain the EphIDs for that window.
The generator is displayed in equation 6.10. An app broadcasts the EphIDs in random order.
[162]
EphIDw,1||...||EphIDw,n = PRG(PRF(seedw, “publicstring”)) (6.10)
When an app collects a Bluetooth beacon it will store the EphID, exposure measurement,
and the time window that the EphID was received within. As before storage purposes suggest
storing the beacons grouped by EphID. [162]
If authorized as a confirmed COVID-19 positive user the user can instruct the app to upload
the relevant seeds for the windows within the contagious period. For efficiency, if the app does
not have any entries in the contact list within a window within the contagious period it will not
upload the seed for that window. The user also has the ability to select windows to not upload
the seeds from. [162]
The back-end receives the seed and corresponding window from a positive user and then
publishes them. Apps periodically download these pairs. The app then reconstructs the list of
EphIDs of the positive users. The app then checks if it received any of the generated EphIDs
during their corresponding window in the past. Then if there is a match of EphIDs the app
calculates the risk assessment based on the exposure measurement and if the risk passes the
threshold notifies the user. [162]
Google Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) System
The Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) system is a framework and protocol spec-
ification developed jointly by Apple Inc. and Google to facilitate digital contact tracing. It
was created to be used as an opt-in feature within COVID-19 contact tracing apps developed
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and published by authorized health authorities. Originally unveiled on April 10, 2020, it is
compatible with devices supporting Bluetooth Low Energy and running Android 6.0 “Marsh-
mallow” or newer with Google mobile services, or iOS 13.5 or newer on apple devices. It is not
compatible with Huawei devices released since May 2019 due to the US trade ban on Huawei.
Exposure Notification apps may only be released by public health authorities. To discourage
fragmentation, each country will typically be restricted to one app, although Apple and Google
stated that they would accommodate regional approaches if a country elects to do so. As of
May 2020 22 countries had received access to the protocol, these include Canada, Germany,
Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, The United Kingdom, and The United
States [16]. [67]
The GAEN system is noted to be similar to the DP-3T hybrid design. The GAEN system
uses one seed to generate the ephemeral identifiers of that day, and thus corresponds to the
specific case where windows are 1 day long [162]. However in version 1.0 of the protocol did
use a persistent tracing key for the generation of the identifier keys, this was altered in Version
1.1 [61]. As version 1.2 is the most recent version at the time of this document’s creation
GAEN version 1.2 will be the one detailed. It should be noted the difference between 1.2 and
1.1 is only in terminology. In the GAEN system terminology exposure notification is used in
place of contact tracing [63].
In version 1.2 to log encounters between devices the system exchanges messages with
nearby devices running the protocol. The encounter messages contain unique identifiers called
Rolling Proximity Identifiers (RPID) and Associated Encrypted Metadata. The RPIDs change
every 15–20 minutes at the same time as the Bluetooth MAC address. The simultaneous change
is done to help prevent third-parties from tracking a user. [62]
Every day a new random 16-byte Temporary Exposure Key (teki) is created using a cryp-
tographic random number generator. From this teki two 128-bit keys are calculated, the Rolling
Proximity Identifier Key (RPIKi) and the Associated Encrypted Metadata Key (AEMKi). RPIKi
is created with the algorithm of equation 6.11. The generation of RPIKi requires an HMAC-
based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) they use the SHA-256 hashing
function. The HKDF requires a Key, salt, info, and output length, respectively tek1, no salt,
a byte array that corresponds with the “EN-RPIK” string in UTF8, and 16 noting the 16-byte
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output. AEMKi is created with the algorithm of equation 6.12. The generation of AEMKi is
the same as RPIKi except the byte array corresponds with the “EN-AEMK” string in UTF8.
RPIKi = HKDF(teki,NULL,UT F8(“EN − RPIK”), 16) (6.11)
AEMKi = HKDF(teki,NULL,UT F8(“EN − AEMK”), 16) (6.12)
In the BLE specification, the MAC address is changed every 15-20 minutes to avoid devices
being traced based on their MAC address. In GAEN every time the MAC address is changed
a new temporary RPID is generated. The RPID j is generated with the algorithm of equation
6.13. Where j is the Unix Epoch Time at the moment the roll occurs. The RPID j generation
uses the AES 128(Key,Data) encryption function. The data portion is made up of a 6-byte
array corresponding with the EN-RPI line encoded in UTF8, six zero bytes for padding, and Ti
a 4-byte number of a 10-minute temporary interval, calculated as unixtimestampdiv(60 ∗ 10)
where div stands for integer division. [63]
RPID j = AES 128(RPIKi,UT F8(“EN − RPI”)|0x000000000000|Ti) (6.13)
Next, the 4 bytes of Associated Encrypted Metadata (AEM) are encrypted. This is done
using the AES 128−CTR(Key, IV,Data) encryption function. The AEMKi is used for the key,
the RPID as the initialization vector, and then the metadata is the input data. [63]
AEM j = AES 128 −CTR(AEMKi,RPID j,Metadata) (6.14)
The entire BLE advertising payload is broken into three sections in order: Flags, Com-
plete 16-bit Service UUID, and Service Data. The flags section contains the BLE general
discoverable mode and shall have bit 1 set to 1, the UUID section contains the UUID of the ex-
posure notification service which is 0xFD6F. The service data section contains two sections of
payload. The rolling proximity identifier is the first 16 bytes, then the 4 bytes of associated en-
crypted metadata. Contained within the associated encrypted metadata is byte 0, of which bits
7:4 are the system version, bits 3:0 are reserved for future use. Within byte 1 is the measured
radiated transmit power of Bluetooth Advertisement packets, and is used to improve distance
approximation. Bytes 2 and 3 are reserved for future use. [62]
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Once a registered health authority has confirmed the infection of a user, the user’s Tem-
porary Exposure Keys teki and their respective interval numbers i for the past 14 days are
uploaded to the central reporting server. Apps then download the list of pairs and individually
regenerate every Rolling Proximity Identifier. The RPIDs are compared against the app’s local
encounter log. A single encounter is also only stored for 14 days in the encounter log of an app.
If a matching entry is found, then the app decrypts the associated metadata for that encounter
and performs a risk assessment based on the transmitted power level. If the risk level passes
a developer determined threshold the app presents a notification to the user warning them of
potential infection. The method through which daily encryption keys are transmitted to the
central server and broadcast is left to be defined by individual app developers. [67]
It is noted in the specification that the associated encrypted metadata does not get decrypted
unless a match occurs. This data then needs to be sanitized and validated as the associated
encrypted metadata is not authenticated. It also notes that it is computationally infeasible for
an attacker to find a collision on a Rolling Proximity Identifier. [63]
6.2 GPS Based Contact Tracing Systems
GPS contact tracing methods focus both on who someone was near as well as where they went.
GPS data is recorded, and then if someone tests positive that information is used in a variety of
possible ways to inform other users of their exposure risk. A few countries have implemented
GPS based tracking of their citizens, notably Iceland, Colombia, India, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Norway, Qatar, and Russia. It should be noted the Norway Smittestopp app was taken down.
Some of these countries have released an open-source codebase for their implementation. As
with the Bluetooth system, there are different systems that can use GPS for contact tracing.
The main ideas being centralized and decentralized models. In both systems, location data is
being sent to a server. The difference is in the centralized version the comparisons to other
users happen on the server-side. While in the decentralized version the comparisons happen on
a user’s device.
There have been different ways in which health authorities have used the GPS information
of patients with COVID-19. In some countries, there are websites that are updated with loca-
tions and times that a patient was in that location. Then users can check the map regularly and
see if they may be at risk [104]. In South Korea updates from the government that detailed
the places that patients with COVID-19 visited were pushed to citizens’ phones. Some citizens
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logged this information onto a map themselves and in some cases were even able to re-identify
the sick patient from the information that was provided [104].
Published maps can solve the problem that many of the other digital forms of contact tracing
have. That being not all members of the populace have devices such as smart phones that can
perform digital contact tracing. The published map system allows for people that do not use
the app or have a compatible device to go online and see if they may have been exposed.
6.2.1 Centralized GPS Data Contact Tracing
There are two types of systems that are centralized GPS contact tracing. In what we will call
the Devie Held GPS Data method. The data is stored on the device until a user uploads it to
the server. In the Server Held GPS Data Contact Tracing the data is continually or regularly
uploaded to the server once the user installs the app.
Device Held GPS Data Contact Tracing
The Icelandic government released an app called Rakning C-19 which uses GPS data in a
centralized way. Though there is no specific white paper for the protocol they did release an
open-source code base that has a basic description of how the system operates.
After downloading the app users register with their phone number. The app sends the
user’s phone number, their locale, and push notification token to the server. The app requests
permission to track location in the background. When permission is granted the app stores
geolocation updates on the device in an SQLite database. If the Contact Tracing Team needs a
user’s assistance in tracing the contagion, they will send a request to the back-end. When the
back-end receives a request for data, it marks the user for data collection and triggers a push
notification in the app. The next time the user opens the app, it checks if there’s a data request
and asks the user to approve the request before sending the last 14 days of geolocation data
to the back-end. This information is then used by the contact tracing team to alert citizens of
possible places and times of exposure. [3]
Server Held GPS Data Contact Tracing
The apps released in Russia, Kuwait, and Qatar all do not have a white paper or open-source
code base to inform on how their GPS based contact tracing system work. It is known that
the systems are actively uploading information to a server however through what information
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has been released or analysis of the app’s communications. For example, the Russian app
Contact Tracer logs GPS location data and can inform users of how many infected individuals
are nearby in real-time [126]. It can be inferred that their implementation regularly connects
to the server and uploads the current GPS details of a user. Then in the case of a positive
diagnosis, a user can register that information to the system and in the back-end, it will send
alerts to any users who were in the same locations at the same time as the diagnosed user.
6.2.2 Decentralized GPS Data Contact Tracing
The Israeli government released an app called HaMagen that uses GPS data in a decentralized
way. Though there is no specific white paper for the protocol they did release an open-source
code base that has a basic description of how the system operates.
In the HaMagen system the app stores the user’s GPS data on the device. When a patient
tests positive for COVID-19 and they consent to the upload of their GPS information, their
location data is passed to the back-end server. The back-end server collects this information
into a single list that the apps can fetch. An individual app then pulls the list compares its
own stored history to the list. If there is a match of location and time the app notifies the user.
The app only stores the last 14 days of location history, and this GPS system is paired with
a Bluetooth token exchange system. Thus, if a person is diagnosed with COVID-19 both the
Bluetooth and GPS data from the last 14 days is sent to the server. They note that only possible
points of exposure are taken into account, likely determining this through a tracing interview.
[106]
A difference between this version of decentralization and the Bluetooth system’s decen-
tralization is that in this case, the authority is receiving the full location history of a patient.
Where in the Bluetooth system all that the authority receives is a list of keys or IDs that the
server publishes. Section 4.4 discussed how this information can be used to determine things
like someone’s home, place of work, habits, homes of friends and family, and other private
information. It is a very detailed collection of information about a person’s life.
Chapter 7
Methodology of Assessing Contact
Tracing Applications
When the idea of digital contact tracing was introduced, privacy advocates got to work con-
sidering the privacy implications. The technology was moving quickly, as the tech industry
wanted to help flatten the curve, and suggested systems needed to be analysed and considered
before being implemented. This is an important step, the tech industry in the last 20 years has
been famous for “moving fast and breaking things”. It is their motto for finding problems early
so that they can be solved. However, when it comes to privacy it is difficult to impossible to
fix what has been broken. Once someone’s social insurance number is out in the world their
identity can be stolen for years to come making life annoying at best and at worst very difficult
[5]. With the world panicking over a pandemic hate crimes against marginalized or racialized
communities was on the rise [7]. If the system leaked or gave too much information about
a patient out the effect on someone’s life could be grave [7]. The South Korean system of
notifications led to patients being identified and harassed online [171].
It was also clear immediately that the contact tracing apps were an opportunity for govern-
ments or corporations to collect a lot of information quickly and easily. An e-pass that citizens
are required to have to use public transit or go to the grocery store is a control of many citizen’s
movements. An app that collects all the GPS data on a device and uploads it to a server is
detailed information about an entire populace of individuals that a government might not have
otherwise been able to get. This information is powerful. Even without a name, it is easy to
determine who someone is, where they work, who they are close with, their daily habits, and
create predictive models of where they will be in the future, all detailed in section 3.2. It could
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give a government a lot of power over its citizens, its critics, and its political opponents. In the
UK more than 150 scientists and researchers released a joint statement about their concerns
over the release of a contact tracing application [14].
To fully consider a contact tracing app it needs to be reviewed on two fronts. The privacy
of the system and the security of the system. The privacy of the system is about looking at
what the developers and controllers intend to do with the app. What data they intend to collect,
how they intend to use that data, who has access to the data, etc. The kinds of protections the
governor of the system has on the data are also important to this. The security of the system
is about looking at what someone from outside of the system could do to or with it. These are
attacks against the system or unintended uses of the system. Thus the two considerations are
what the organization is saying they want to do and another is what someone outside of the
organization could do.
This thesis proposes a method to compare the privacy and security of differing contact
tracing apps. The privacy comparison will be based on how well an app meets a set of principles
laid out by experts in the field of security and privacy. The security comparison will be based on
how severe the most severe vulnerability to the system is. 55 apps from a variety of countries
will be researched. Of those 5 representing different methods of contact tracing will be selected.
These representatives will be used to create an assessment system that can then be applied to
other applications.
7.1 The Basis of Our Methodology
The most widely used method to assess and compare the severity of a computer system vul-
nerability is the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS assigns severity
scores to vulnerabilities, allowing those responsible to prioritize responses and resources ac-
cording to the threat. Scores are calculated based on a formula that depends on several metrics
that approximate the ease and impact of the exploit. Scores range from 0 to 10, with 10 being
the most severe. The equations used by the CVSS were developed by the CVSS Special In-
terest Group (SIG) who framed a lookup table by assigning metric values and a severity group
(low, medium, high, critical) to real vulnerabilities. Having defined the acceptable numeric
ranges for each severity level, the SIG then collaborated with Deloitte & Touche LLP to adjust
formula parameters to align the metric combinations to the SIG’s proposed severity ratings.
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Thus the equations were created by qualitative rankings of known vulnerabilities then working
backwards to create a quantitative method that could be applied to future vulnerabilities [47].
The method of comparing contact tracing apps will be created similarly to the CVSS. First,
the apps will be researched. It will then be determined whether they do or do not meet certain
privacy principles. Then 5 representatives will be selected. The apps will be assigned, based
on their privacy, a grouping of green, yellow, or red, corresponding to good, fair, or low privacy
respectively. Then a rating system will be determined and the assigned groups of the 5 apps
will be used to determine the thresholds of the group. It was decided that the rating will be
based on how many of the principles were met by an app.
Then the security of the 5 apps will be determined. A series of potential vulnerabilities
will be theoretically applied to the systems and their ability to prevent or mitigate the attack
will determine a score based on a predetermined rubric. The score, in this case, is higher
the more severe that vulnerability is to the system. Then the apps will be assigned, based on
their security, a grouping of green, yellow, or red, corresponding to good, fair, or low security
respectively. These groupings will then be used to determine how to apply the scores from the
rubric to create a method of ranking other applications.
The CVSS was not directly used for the scoring of the vulnerabilities in this thesis. This is
because the CVSS is designed as a way to compare vulnerabilities of systems not the security
of a system as a whole. Also, a system that is more specialized to the unique requirements
of contact tracing could provide more actionable information. The CVSS does not consider
privacy at all. For the rubric of the security assessment, some metrics are similar to those of
the CVSS, attack complexity, required privileges, scope, confidentiality, and the division of the
rubric into exploitability metrics and impact metrics is taken and adjusted for contact tracing
from the CVSS.
7.2 Privacy Principles of Contact Tracing
If you use software, then you have likely accepted the terms of a privacy policy. This is often
a statement about what data the software collects, how it is used, and who is responsible for
it. Some countries have laws requiring that a company disclose specific information to users
about the data collected from the user, as well as how that data must be protected and for what
purpose that data can be collected. There are also ways in which applications specifically are
prevented from using or gaining access to certain pieces of data without user consent being
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given. These are the app permissions that users have to click okay on before the app can use a
feature.
All of these rules, regulations, guidelines, consent requests, etc. are based on privacy prin-
ciples. A set of fundamental ideas and beliefs about the level of privacy that users should have
and the control they should have over the data that is about them. When new technology or
ideas are created it is important to return to those privacy principles and create a set of princi-
ples that are designed to specifically guide the new creation so as to not erode the privacy of
citizens.
Getting ahead of the technology is difficult, as it moves quickly, but the best way to design
the system is to start with principles. In April of 2020, the Office of the Privacy Commis-
sioner of Canada released a Framework for the Government of Canada to Assess Privacy-
Impactful Initiatives in Response to COVID-19 [128]. The government’s framework identifies
nine guidelines that should be followed by any solution intending to use data to assist in ending
the health crisis. These are legal authority, that is all organizations must continue to operate un-
der an identified lawful authority when collecting, using, and disclosing personal information.
Necessity and proportionality, ensure that the measures the institution wants to take are both
necessary and proportional both to the situation and to the amount the measures will affect the
situation. Purpose limitation, the information that is being collected to alleviate the effects of
COVID-19 must not be used for anything else. De-identification and safeguarding measures,
where every possible personal information should be de-identified, or aggregate data should
be used. Vulnerable population considerations, there are often unique impacts of measures on
vulnerable groups. Openness and transparency, clear and detailed information about measures
being taken now and in the future should be available to the people. Open data, any data made
public should be considered carefully to weigh the benefits and risks before the release of the
dataset. Oversight and accountability, there need to be specific provisions for what authority is
overseeing the measures and accountable for them. Time limitation, any privacy-invasive mea-
sure should be time-limited and end when they are no longer required to alleviate the health
crisis. [128]
The American Civil Liberties Union created a list of basic principles for evaluating tech-
nology assisted contact tracing methods. Their 14 principles focus on the system being vol-
untary for citizens to use, that as little data as possible is collected, that the system is secure,
that the system is designed to be effective and useful so that the risk is worth the reward,
and that there is an end to the systems use. Their principles are not displacing non-technical
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measures, Voluntary, Non-punitive, Built with public health professionals, Privacy-preserving,
Non-discriminatory, Minimal reliance on central authorities, Data minimization everywhere,
No data leakage, Measurable impact, Have an exit strategy, Narrowly-tailored to target a spe-
cific epidemic, Auditable and fixable, Sustainably maintained. [57]
The Chaos Computer Club, Europe’s largest association of hackers that has been provid-
ing information about technical and societal issues, such as surveillance, privacy, freedom of
information, hacktivism, data security for more than thirty years, also released a set of ten re-
quirements for the evaluation of contact tracing apps. These include the societal requirements,
that the system has epidemiological sense and purpose, that it be voluntary and free from dis-
crimination, that privacy is fundamental to the system, and that it is transparent and verifiable.
Then there are the technical requirements, that the system has no central entity users are re-
quired to trust, that data collection is minimal, that data collected is anonymous, that there is no
creation of centralized movement or contact profiles of users, that any identifiers are unlinkable
to the user, and that the communications of the system be unobservable. [27]
There were also a set of privacy principles released by the University of Waterloo Cyberse-
curity and Privacy Institute and signed by security and privacy researchers from across Canada.
This set of privacy principles will be the main focus of the privacy review of contact tracing
apps performed in this thesis.
7.2.1 Waterloo Privacy Principles of Contact Tracing
In May of 2020, the Waterloo Cybersecurity and Privacy Institute released a Coronavirus
statement signed by security and privacy researchers representing twenty universities across
Canada. The signatories claim that the development and deployment of contact tracing apps in
Canada is being done without sufficient technical independent expert review. They argue that
the ten principles that they lay out should be applied to the development and deployment of
any tracing app. These ten principles are independent expert review, simple design, minimal
functionality, data minimization, trusted data governance, cybersecurity, minimum data reten-
tion, protection of derived data and meta-data, proper disclosure and consent, and provision to
sunset. The meaning of these principles will be detailed. [78]
Independent expert review refers to the design and implementation of the app being subject
to open reviews by software security and privacy experts who are not connected with the de-
velopment team or organization. This review should be performed in advance of deployment,
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not post-deployment. Such a review ensures that the objectives of privacy protection have been
properly implemented within the design when the first users are downloading it. [78]
The simple design principle is that the app should be developed using the simplest approach
possible to perform the intended function. The simpler the design the faster it can not only be
implemented but reviewed. The more complex the system is the longer it will take reviewers to
ensure it conforms to the design specification and pertinent principles of data protection. This
includes any supporting servers and their code as well [78]. It also has the additional effect of
being easier for the public to understand the system, and it is important that the public trust any
system that is released. If the system is not trusted it will not be used. A system that is not used
by enough people to be effective is not only a wasted effort but an unnecessary risk of privacy
to those who are using it. No matter how low the privacy risk may be.
Minimal functionality is referring to the app only providing the necessary functionality to
allow for contact tracing. There should be no additional code or secondary purpose incor-
porated into the app. Any additional functionality must be part of the review performed and
included in any design documentation. A consequence of secondary functionality will be a
longer public debate about the value of deploying the app. [78]
Data minimization is common among privacy principles. The only data collected by an ap-
plication should be what is required for contact tracing purposes. Whenever possible, contacts
(and any other required app data) should be retained on the device where they are collected
and should only be shared with other users or to a central repository if required for a contact
tracing incident. Any data collected and stored creates an obligation to properly manage this
data, complicating the design of the app. [78]
Trusted data governance is about who controls the data, who has access to the data, how
the data can be used, overall who is accountable for the data. If data is transmitted to a central
repository, the repository should be a trustworthy actor subject to public oversight. A govern-
ment or health sector agency subject to investigation by privacy commissioners/ombudspersons
should be used to store contact data. No private-sector data repositories should be allowed ac-
cess to contact data. A properly managed central repository can enforce data protection and
cybersecurity of sensitive data. Trust in the authority over the central repository is trust in the
security of the system. [78]
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The cybersecurity principle is about the security of the entire system. A tracing app is
part of Canada’s critical infrastructure with the potential to send many people into isolation or
quarantine. Thus, the highest level of cybersecurity must be implemented for all aspects of the
contact tracing app, including the collection of the data on the device, the tracing app itself, the
communication channels used to move data, and any central locations. All conceived malicious
attacks should be considered. The security of the system includes audits and monitoring to
ensure breaches do not occur or can be contained if they do happen. [78]
Minimum data retention , this principle is about the length of time that the data collected
can be held. The data collected should only be retained for the lifetime of its intended purpose.
For COVID-19, data should only be retained for the infectious period for the person carrying
the device and any data stored centrally (or with other devices) should be permanently deleted
after it has been used for the contact tracing required. [78]
Protection of derived data and meta-data , derived data is data that might be created while
processing other data or is information that can be inferred from the data available, meta-data
is the information about app use for example. Derived data and meta-data allows for sensitive
inferences about users. Derived data should only be used with consent and should be protected
by mechanisms to prevent re-identification. No meta-data should be collected, stored, or used
in the analysis of contact traces. This also relates to the data minimization principle because
collecting or creating data that is not required is not minimizing data. [78]
The proper disclosure and consent of the user is important for the trust of the system.
The user must be made aware, clearly and understandably, what data is collected about them
and how it is used. Uninformed consent is not truly consent. If a user does not have the
opportunity to understand what they are being asked to consent to they cannot consent to it.
Thus, information must be made available to all potential users. This information needs to be
written in language they understand and detail entirely the data that is being collected and its
uses. If there are uses for this data beyond the contact tracing functionality, these must be made
explicit and separate consent received for each such use. This disclosure and consent should be
renewed regularly to ensure both the ongoing need for the tracing functionality and the users’
commitment to continuing to participate. The disclosure also needs to be easy to find so that
users may review it periodically. [78]
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A provision to sunset is a requirement because this health crisis should not be used as an op-
portunity to enact something with a lifetime longer than the crisis. There should be provisions
to sunset the app and delete its collected data after the COVID-19 crisis is contained. Data
collection should be automatically terminated and notification of all participants should occur.
Any residual data should be deleted as soon as the app is no longer used. [78]
7.2.2 Methodology of the Contact Tracing Privacy Review
The privacy review began with searching for all of the contact tracing apps deployed or in de-
velopment around the world. There were a variety of lists available online of contact tracing
apps either deployed or in development. For the ease of access, the list available on Wikipedia
[168] was used as a jumping-off point to find the government websites and published informa-
tion about the specific apps, as well a list published by XDA news of countries using Google
and Apples Exposure Notification system [136]. To find the information on the app official
government websites as well as the google play store and iOS app store were searched for pri-
vacy policies or statements, FAQs, open-source code, white papers, and any other information
available about the app. A focus was made to answer the questions posed by the principles
of the Waterloo statement. News about the app was also searched to determine what external
sources had learned about the app.
As the review was not limited in scope and intended to review apps from many countries it
should be noted that in the case of English language material not being published the translation
was performed by the google translate tool. This is a limitation due to the reviewer only being
fully literate in English. Every effort was made despite this to ensure that the review was
thorough.
The apps included in the review are any discovered whose function was to notify the in-
dividuals that a COVID-19 patient came into contact with during their infection period. Apps
that are of similar or overlapping function but do not have a contact tracing function within
them are not included. There were also apps discovered for which the information on their
operation was lacking to the degree that it appeared meaningless to include them within the
review directly. Though a principle of the privacy review is disclosure. Thus these apps will be
discussed but not directly compared with the others.
Once the information was collected on the apps they were compared to the ten privacy
principles. It was determined that the app could either meet the principle, partially meet the
requirement, or not meet the requirement. Partially meeting the requirement typically consists
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of having the requirement but not to the extent of the strict interpretation of the principle. An
app that had no information directly about a principle and thus it cannot be said whether it met
or did not meet the principle is treated as not meeting the principle. This allows the review to
follow the principle of disclosure. If the user cannot find the information about the principle
then they cannot make informed consent. The entire system of contact tracing relies on trust.
If the public cannot learn the information about the system the public has to assume that the
principle is not being met. Transparency is trust.
Criteria for the Privacy Principles
Independent Expert Review is met if the app was reviewed by independent experts who
provided a documented review of the app prior to the release of it. Half met means that there
is the potential that it can be reviewed by independent experts, something like the source code
being available. Not met means that there was no clear review process performed or able to be
performed.
Releasing the source code does not count as meeting the requirement because it is clear
that the idea of the principle is that the review is performed prior to the release of the app.
In most cases source code is released simultaneously or post the release. As independence is
not defined in the principles the criteria that to be independent you must not be a direct part
of the organization that is releasing the app. This means that while a review by a part of the
government containing experts in the field of security is appreciated and makes the principle
half met, it does not completely meet the criteria.
Simple Design is met if the app is based on a publicly available white paper or equivalent that
details the protocol and design being used. Half met means that there is information available
online about how the system operates though this may be informal or piecemeal across released
information. Not met means that there is no documented or reviewable basis for the design of
the system.
Minimal Functionality is met when the app only does what is required for tracking based
on the protocol or design. Half met means that it has perhaps one or two additional functions
that are detailed and do not require more information that the system already has for tracking.
Not met means that the system has a lot of extra functions.
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There is the issue that some have not released their protocol, for comparison to the system
function. If this is is the case the principle is based on what the system needs to do for contact
tracing using the method that it claims to use. This can require the reviewer to compare similar
methods that have released more information. Also, even a function still closely related to
contact tracing is an extra functionality. For example, symptom tracking, though relevant, is an
extra function. The only function allowed is providing information to users from government
releases about best practices for safety and the current status of the pandemic in the country.
This is because almost all of the apps have this and it does not require more data from the user.
Data Minimization is met if the system does not require the user to enter any personal
information. Half met is if the system requires one or two pieces of information that are not
typically considered an issue. For example, a phone number though it can be used to identify
someone is not considered a privacy violation. Not met means that the system requires more
information than the contact tracing should require. Things like detailed health information, a
national ID, detailed GPS data. All personal information.
The requirement to meet this principle may seem strict, however, the contact tracing pro-
tocols of ROBERT, DP-3T, and GAEN do not require any information from the user. This is
because a notification to the user can be passed through the app directly. What is allowed is if
the app asks for the date a user took a test, the day symptoms started, and the illness status of
the user. Since this is typical information required for determining the contagious window of
the user. Information that is tied to an identity or that is identifiable and superfluous to tracing
is more interesting to us.
Trusted Data Governance is met if the data is owned by the government Department of
Health or an equivalent, does not leave the country, will not be accessed by any other body of
government or third-party, and the authority is subject to public oversight. Half met could be
that the owner is known but the other assurances are not addressed. No means that the owner
is either not known or is a third-party, it can be accessed by other groups or some other clear
violation of the principles.
Cybersecurity is met if there are servers in the country secured to industry standard, the data
is encrypted in transit and when stored everywhere in the system, and the system is monitored
and audited to prevent breaches. Half met means that there are implied or basic statements
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towards the security of the system but no detailed information on what is being done. Not
meeting the requirement means that the security of the system does not meet standard practice.
Minimum Data Retention is met when data is held only for the infectious period of COVID-
19 as stated by the WHO to be 14 days [167]. Half met means that the data is being held for
longer than 14 days, but a stated length of less than a year. Not meeting the requirement means
that the data is held for an undetermined length of time or over years.
Protection of Derived Data and Meta-Data is met if there is a statement to the effect that
no data of this kind is created, any data of this sort is deleted, or that it is secured to an industry
standard. Half met means that while not specifically mentioning these kinds of data there is
some information about what is done with it. For instance, an app may aggregate app usage
metrics and store them securely for a period of time, or delete IP addresses from server logs.
Not being met can mean a few things to the nature of not being mentioned or the information
being sold to a third party.
Proper Disclosure and Consent is met when the use of the app is voluntary, all data being
released from the app is with the consent of the user, the app can be deleted or turned off at the
user’s discretion. Also that the privacy policy is easy to find, detailed, and clear in language.
Half met means that the app use is voluntary and there is a privacy policy however, the policy
may not be completely detailed. Or privacy information was found but there was no clear
privacy document. Not being met is if the app is mandatory for citizens to use, or there are no
privacy statements that can be found.
Voluntary for this principle means not only that the government is not fining or criminally
treating those who do not use the app but that there are no negative impacts on someone’s life
for not using the app, beyond those associated directly with contact tracing. For example, if the
app is voluntary to download but citizens cannot enter a grocery store or public transit without
showing that they have a green symbol on their app then it is not considered voluntary. Some
countries have privacy policies, notices, or statements, these are all treated as a privacy policy
for this review.
Provision to Sunset is met when it is stated clearly that the app and all its information will
be deleted at some time, and there is a clear method for determining when that will be. Half
met is when there is a statement to the effect of sunsetting the app but a definite time or method
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for determining when is not given. Not met is when it is stated or implied that the app will
continue to be used beyond the time of the health crisis.
In a few countries, they state they will sunset the app once the pandemic is over. A simple
statement like that is considered as half meeting the requirement because there are no clear
criteria for when the pandemic is over. It could be when a vaccine program is complete, or if
they have had no new cases for a time, or no deaths for a time, etc. If there is no clear way that
the end of the pandemic will be determined then this criteria has not been fully met.
7.3 Methodology of the Contact Tracing Application Vulner-
ability Analysis
As described earlier, 5 apps that are representative of the different contact tracing schemes
will be analysed through their potential vulnerabilities. A series of potential vulnerabilities
will be theoretically applied to the systems and their ability to prevent or mitigate the attack
will determine a score based on a predetermined rubric. The score, in this case, is higher the
more severe that vulnerability is to the system. Then the apps will be assigned, based on their
security, a grouping of green, yellow, or red, corresponding to good, medium, or low security
respectively. These rankings will then be used to determine how to apply the scores from the
rubric to create a method of ranking other applications.
The review will make a few assumptions about the system that is being assessed. First,
unless there is compelling evidence to suggest otherwise it will be assumed that the information
the authority has provided about the app is accurate to how it was implemented. This review is
not assessing whether there are vulnerabilities caused by human error in the implementation.
Second, if it is not stated in the documentation found then it is not happening in the system.
For example, if there is no information about the system using HTTPS when transporting data
it will be assumed that they are not.
The actual implementation of a vulnerability into an exploit against the system is beyond
the scope of this thesis. The systems were not attacked in any way to perform this assessment.
The review looks only at the theoretical side of the protocol and system to determine if there is
a vulnerability. It should be noted that this is the easiest part of the system for the developer to
get right. As always, the theoretical world can be perfect, while the real world can only strive
for perfection.
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7.3.1 Contact Tracing Application Vulnerability Rubric
The rubric created for the assessment of vulnerability is displayed in table 7.1. This was in-
spired in ways by the CVSS, with those aspects adjusted to the specific issue of contact tracing.
The areas similar to the CVSS are attack complexity, required privileges, scope, confidentiality,
and the division of the rubric into exploitability metrics and impact metrics.
The rubric contains eight metrics, four focused on exploitability and four focused on im-
pact. Each metric is given a score between 0 and 10. A 10 is the worst-case scenario for that
metric, while a 0 is the best case. A vulnerability can score anywhere from 0 to 10 for that
metric. Generally, the scores are 0, 1, 4, 7, 10, corresponding to ideal best case, practical best
case, medium case, bad case, worst case. These values were chosen because in security there
is often the noted difference between perfectly secure and practically secure. In this rubric,
if something were impossible it would be scored 0, while something practically impossible
would score a 1. Then the rest of the numbers are evenly distributed up to 10. The metrics will
be explained and can be seen in the summary within and below table 7.1.
The exploitability metrics are Access, Knowledge, Complexity, and Effort.
Access refers to the privilege level in the system that would be required to exploit a vulnera-
bility. The lower the access level required, the higher the score given. An attacker being able to
perform an attack with minimal privilege on the system is worse than high-level privilege being
required. This is because higher-level privileges are protected and more difficult to achieve. An
attacker is also most likely to take the path of least resistance to achieve their goal. If it can
be done with less effort then that will be the exploit they choose to use. The adage of “work
smarter not harder” is also true for attackers.
Knowledge is about how experienced an attacker would have to be able to be to take advan-
tage of a vulnerability. The more specific the knowledge required to build the implementation
the lower the score. Correspondingly the less knowledge required to build the implementation
the higher the score as a novice being able to build an exploit is the worst-case scenario. The
less knowledge required the more likely the vulnerability is to be exploited because the pool of
people capable of it is larger. As well even experts in the field still will go for the path of least
resistance, so the attack that a novice could build is still one that an expert might use.
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Complexity is about the technical requirements of a possible exploit. This is split into two,
the technical complexity and the build complexity. Technology refers to computing power.
An exploit that is very computationally intensive is less likely to be used as a vector of attack
because fewer people will have those resources available to them to use. Thus an exploit that
can be performed with a cell phone is ranked as a 10, while one that might require a server
farm is considered a 1. The build complexity is about how many people would be required to
create the exploit. If one person of the requisite knowledge level on their own build it within a
week or would a whole team of people be required to build it within a month. The smaller the
group the higher the score.
Effort is also split into two metrics, planning and human. Planning is about how much
organization has to be done to implement the exploit. If there are a lot of different pieces to
the attack, a lot of components working together, especially if they cannot be automated, then
that is a lot of effort. The more effort that an exploit requires the less likely that it is to be used.
Thus, an attack with minimal components that can all be automated will score higher, as that
is the worst-case scenario. Then human effort is about how many people need to be involved
to perform the attack. Having a lot of people involved complicates things even if they are not
aware of their involvement such as a phishing attack. Also, the more people involved the harder
it becomes for an attacker to not get caught. One person keeping a secret is easier than twenty.
The Impact metrics are Scope, Impact, Detection, and Damage.
Scope is about how many people the attack could affect. An attack that can target one specific
person is dangerous, but if it can affect a whole section of the user base or the entire user base
that is worse. Personal attacks should not be completely ignored as there are a lot of ways that
a personal attack could be very harmful. However, it does remain true that everyone losing
their privacy is worse than one person losing their privacy on a scaled system. Thus, if it could
impact the entire user base it is given the worst-case score of 10.
Impact is also split into two. First, there is data. Data impact is either how dangerous the
data that the attacker gains is, or how far into the system the attacker is able to place false data.
An important thing is that an attacker might not just be trying to steal information, they could
be trying to cause havoc for some reason. The attacker gaining information that is hard to use or
tie to someone’s identity is less dangerous than getting information that they can directly use.
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If the attacker is trying to cause chaos or distrust in the system then the information getting
deep into the network will be worse.
The second part of impact is trust. Trust is very important to contact tracing. These are
government systems that are being put in place to try and save lives. To try and alleviate a
health crisis. Since they are a government system they will reflect onto the government that
implemented them. If a system were found to have a critical vulnerability that could be a
powerful factor in the people’s trust of their government. This tied together trust could go the
other way and chip away at governmental trust if the system were to be vulnerable. As well
even if the contact tracing system is sunset a few months from now it is possible that in the
future an epidemic of another illness could breakout and a contact tracing system would be
required again. When that happens the trust in the system now will impact how people view
that future system.
Detection is how quickly an attack using this vulnerability could be discovered. If the system
monitors for these kinds of attacks and alerts the caretaker to the danger even a major attack
could be mitigated quite effectively. The sooner an attack is known the less damage that it can
do. An attack that is never noticed is one that can be done many times and potentially lead to
much greater damage than it would otherwise.
Damage is the final metric. This is split into two as well, the system and the user. The system
damage is about how much would need to be done to get the system back to where it was prior
to the attack. This is not about what would need to be done to prevent the attack from occurring
again. If the attacker can break the system, can make it so that someone has to go in and fix
things, route out false data, and clean house that is worse than an attack that leaves the system
usable. The reasoning being that a hospital losing health data is bad, but the hospital’s systems
being unable to operate as well is even worse as seen in ransomware attacks [114]. As this is
a healthcare system it can be viewed similarly. The damage to the user is about how long the
user will feel the effect of this attack.
Once the scores have been determined for each of the rubric metrics an overall score for
the vulnerability will be determined. Firstly a 0 for any of the exploitability metrics results
in a 0 for the entire vulnerability. This represents that if the vulnerability was impossible
to exploit for some reason then it is not truly a vulnerability. If none of the exploitability
metrics are scored as 0 then an average of the scores is determined. First, the metrics split into
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two are averaged, then all of the metrics are averaged together. The average was chosen as
a simple way to compare the different vulnerabilities, other methods that could be used will
be discussed in 9.2. The method for calculating the score is shown in equation 7.5. Where
A = Access, K = Knowledge, C = Complexity, T = Technology, B = Build, E = E f f ort,
P = Planning,H = Human, S = S cope, I = Impact, De = Detection, Da = Damage, and ∧ =
logical AND.
For many of the metrics, it was determined that the more work the vulnerability takes to
exploit the less dangerous it is to the system. This idea appears in the scoring of all of the
exploitability metrics. This was noted during the de-identification review of chapter 3. It was
noted that if there were two avenues of attack and one required less work that is the attack that
would be used. Work, in this case, is referring to any of the exploitability metrics. It could
be less access or knowledge required, less complexity, or less effort. The easy attack was the
more likely attack, even when experts in the field were performing the attacks.
Complexity = (Technology + Build)/2 (7.1)
E f f ort = (Planning + Human)/2 (7.2)
Impact = (Data + Trust)/2 (7.3)
Damage = (S ystem + User)/2 (7.4)
S core =





Also, when researching different systems, some had a bug bounty program set up. That
is if someone could find a vulnerability or bug in the system, and privately disclosed the in-
formation, they would be rewarded with monetary compensation. However, on some of these
systems like that of India, it was noted that they would not consider it a vulnerability if the
device needs to be rooted to operate the exploit [119]. In this review, if the phone needs to be
rooted this is still considered a valid attack. The access score will, however, be low. The reason
for this is that there is a difference between root access on a remote server or computer that the
attacker does not own or have physical access to and a device that they control. When an app
is released and the attacker can download it onto a device that they completely control, root ac-
cess is much easier for them to achieve. In this case, when an attacker owns the device that the
system is on it to not consider what they can do with root access to the device is ignoring real
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world implications. An attacker will root their device to perform an attack. It is not difficult
for them to do. Thus, if an attacker has ownership and physical access to the device it should

















































Table 7.1: Vulnerability Rubric
Score 0 1 4 7 10
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Table 7.1: Vulnerability Rubric
Score 0 1 4 7 10
Attack has no effect
on the trust in the
system
Temporarily lowers
trust in the system
Lowers trust in the
system
Damages trust in the
system
Destroys trust in the
system
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week to recognize
Could take a month or
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Summary of the Vulnerability Rubric Metrics
1. Exploitability Metrics. These are made up of characteristics of the vulnerable compo-
nent and the attack against it
(a) Access. Level of access (privilege) to the system required to perform the exploit
(b) Knowledge. Level of knowledge required to implement the exploit
(c) Complexity. What the technical requirements of the exploit are, the computing
power, the workers required.
i. Technology. The computing power required to perform or create the exploit
ii. Build. The amount of workers it would take to build this attack and the time
frame they could build it within
(d) Effort. How much work it would take to operate the exploit
i. Planning. The amount of components that have to work together to perform
the exploit (that can’t just be automated to perfectly work)
ii. Human. The number of people required to work together to perform the ex-
ploit and whether they are aware of their involvement
2. Impact Metrics. These focus on the outcome that an exploit of the vulnerability could
achieve
(a) Scope. The amount of the user base that this exploit could affect
(b) Impact. What the exploit allows an attacker to do, this can be get data logs, input
their own data etc.
i. Data. The kind of data that an attacker could get access to, how immediately
useful it is to them. Or how far into the system they are able to place false data.
ii. Trust. How this exploit being implemented will impact the user base’s will-
ingness to use the system, or a similar system in the future.
(c) Detection. How easy it would be for someone to realize that this exploit has been
used on the system
(d) Damage. How easy it would be to fix what the attacker did
i. System. How much the system caretaker needs to do to their system to have it
safely operating again as it was before the attack.
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ii. User. How the exploit would effect the individuals who were impacted by this
in the long run
7.3.2 Attack Tree for Assessing Contact Tracing Application Vulnerabil-
ity
To layout the possible vulnerabilities of the system, an attack tree was created. Attack trees are
a formal and methodical way of describing the security of systems, based on various attacks.
Attacks against the system are represented in a tree structure, with the goal as the root node
and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes [140].
In the attack tree built to layout possible avenues that could be used to take advantage of
a contact tracing system, there are two possible goals. Either the attack breaks the privacy
promises of the system, or the attack introduces false information into the system. These goals
represent the different motives someone attacking a government system designed to protect the
populace might have. Either they want information or they want to be mischievous and create
panic or distrust.
The full attack tree is figure 7.1. The arrows represent the direction that the attack paths
flow. The tree lays out 17 different avenues of attack. However, technically 18 will be posed
against the chosen five systems. This is because for attack 4 it was pertinent to differentiate the
attack between if someone tried to do it on their own and if some larger body wanted to try and
perform it. Thus, there is an attack 4 and attack 4.5. All of the attacks are laid out below.
1. Capture your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and loca-
tions with other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a
user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
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4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
• 4.5 Everything is the same as attack 4 except the attack is a company/organization
that already has security cameras in their facility and is just adding the BLE re-
ceivers to the building
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
7. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See IDs being
sent from user to server indicating Covid+ status→ Determine that person has the virus
→ Break privacy
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
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→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
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Figure 7.1: Attack tree created to represent possible avenues of malicious exploitation of digital contact tracing
Chapter 8
Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
8.1 Privacy Review of Contact Tracing Applications
For quick reference, a list of what constitutes a yes, half, or not met for each principle is listed
below. Table 8.1 contains the review of fifty-five apps representing fifty different countries.
• Independent Expert Review:
– Yes = The app was reviewed by independent experts who provided a documented
review of the app prior to the release of it.
– No = There is no clear independent review process performed or able to be per-
formed
– Half = There is the potential that it can be reviewed by independent experts, eg. the
source code being available.
• Simple Design
– Yes = Based on a publicly available white paper’s protocol or design
– No = No documentation of design released for review
– Half = Some information about the design is available
• Minimal Functionality
– Yes = Only does what is required for tracking based on protocol
– No = There are a lot of extra functions
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– Half = Has 1 or 2 extra things that do not require extra data and relate to contact
tracing
• Data Minimization
– Yes = No personal information collected
– No = Detailed health information, national IDs, detailed GPS data all collected
– Half = Collects one or two pieces of information for clear contact tracing not iden-
tifying purposes
• Trusted Data Governance
– Yes = Data is owned by the government department, does not leave the country,
will not be accessed by any other body for any other purpose. Trustworthy actor
subject to public oversight.
– No = No clear ownership, or has been or could be used by other groups
– Half = Ownership stated but missing the assurances
• Cybersecurity
– Yes = Secure servers in the country, encrypted data in transit and storage, audits
and monitoring to prevent and contain breaches
– No = Security does not meet standard practice
– Half = Implied security, or basic statements towards it
• Minimum Data Retention
– Yes = 14 days as stated for the infectious period by WHO
– No = Unclear or over years
– Half = Longer than WHO stated infectious period but a stated length less than a
year
• Protection of Derived Data and Meta-Data
– Yes = Stated that the data is not created, or is deleted, or is otherwise secured
– No = Not mentioned, or information is given to a third-party
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– Half = Not specifically mentioned but some information about it, eg. deleting IP
addresses from server logs
• Proper Disclosure and Consent
– Yes = App use is voluntary, all data releases are voluntary, app can be deleted or
turned off. Privacy policy is easy to find detailed and clear.
– No = App is mandatory to use or data is automatically released
– Half = there is a privacy policy, but not everything that the app uses is explicitly
mentioned. Or privacy related information was found but there was no clear privacy
policy document.
• Provision to Sunset
– Yes = Stated to sunset and clear method for determining when and how
– No = Not mentioned or implied to continue beyond health crisis
– Half = Stated to sunset but unclear as to definite time or method to determine
8.1.1 Discussion of the Privacy Review
A lot of information about the different applications was disseminated to review their privacy.
A list of the resources used to collect this information is available in Appendix A. While every
detail of every app will not be discussed here some information on various apps as well as
comments on the decisions that were made will be discussed.
Many of the apps had various additional functions. For example, in the UK their app “NHS
COVID-19” uses the GAEN framework for Bluetooth ID exchange but also has a QR code
venue logging system [115]. This allows users to scan the QR code of a venue into their app
and if there was an outbreak at that venue receive an alert if they may be at risk. The NHS app
also has a map showing the risk levels of areas in England, a symptom tracker, a booking system
for tests, and a self-isolation tool [115]. These types of functions are fairly representative of
the types of functions most other apps feature. However, the contact tracing app released in
Moscow Russia has a unique method of proving location. For the “Social Monitoring Service”
app users will randomly receive push notifications requesting users to take a selfie (a picture of
themselves) in the app [165]. If the user does not take the picture within the time limit they are




















































































































Australia COVIDSafe H#1 l7 l H#28 l H#62 H#69 H#72 l H#80
Austria Stopp Corona H#2 H#8 l H#29 m51 l H#69 m36 l m36
Azerbaijan e-Tabib m36 m36 m36 H#30 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
Bahrain BeAware Bahrain m36 m36 m36 m31 m52 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
Bangladesh Corona Tracer BD m36 H#9 l H#30 H#53 H#63 m36 m36 m36 m36
Canada Covid Alert l l10 l l H#54 l l H#73 l H#80
China Health Code m36 m11 l15 m32 l55 m36 m36 m36 m75 m
Colombia CoronApp m36 m9,11 H#16 m33 H#51 m36 m36 H#72 H#76 H#80
Czech Republic eRouška (eFacemask) l H#8 l H#30 H#56 m36 H#69 l l m36
Denmark Smittestop H#3 l10 l m34 H#56 m36 l H#72 l m36
Ecuador ASI (SO) H#2 l10 H#17 H#35 H#53 m36 H#69 m36 m36 m36
Estonia Hoia H#2 l10 l l l m36 l m36 l m36
Ethiopia Debo m36 m9 H#18 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
France TousAntiCovid H#2 l12 l m36 m51 H#64 l H#72 H#77 H#80
Fiji careFIJI m36 l7 l l m36 H#64 H#69 m36 l m36
Finland Koronavilkku H#4 l10 H#17 l l H#63 m70 m36 H#77 m36
Germany Corona-Warn-App l l10 H#19 l l H#65 l l l m36
Ghana GH Covid-19 TrackerApp m
36 m36 m20 H#30 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
Gibraltar Beat Covid Gibraltar m36 l l m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
Guatemala Alerta Guate m36 m36 m21 m37 m57 m36 m71 m36 m36 m36
Hungary VirusRadar m36 m9 l H#30 m36 m36 l m36 H#77 m36
Iceland Rakning C-19 H#1 l13 l m38 l l l m36 l m36
India Aarogya Setu l l9,13 m22 m39 m36 l H#69 m36 m78 H#80
Ireland COVID Tracker H#2 l10 H#17 H#40 H#56 l l l l m36
Israel HaMagen l m9,13 H#23 m41 H#53 H#63 l71 m36 l m36





H#2 l10 l l H#53 l l m36 l m36
Jordan AMAN APP - Jordan m36 m13 l m42 H#53 H#64 l m36 l m36
Kasakhstan eGovbizbirgemizmobile app m
36 l10 H#19 l H#53 m36 l m36 l m36






















































































































Latvia Apturi Covid H#1 l10 l H#30 m51 m36 l m36 l m36
Malaysia MyTrace m36 m9 l H#30 H#53 H#66 H#69 m36 H#77 m36
Netherlands CoronaMelder H#2 m9 l l H#53 H#66 l l l m36
New Zealand NZ COVID Tracer H#5 m14 l H#44 H#58 H#66 m70 H#74 l m36
North Macedonia Stop Korona! m36 m9 l H#30 m36 m36 l m36 l m36
Northern Ireland StopCOVID NI H#2 l10 l H#30 H#59 l l H#72 l m36
Norway Smittestopp m m13 l m42 m36 m36 m36 m36 H#77 H#81
Poland ProteGO Safe l l10 H#17 H#30 m36 H#64 l m36 H#77 m36
Portugal STAYAWAY COVID H#4 l10 l l H#60 m36 l m36 H#77 H#80
Qatar Ehteraz App m36 m11,13 m24 m34 m36 m67 m36 m36 m79 m36
Russia (Moscow) Social MonitoringService m
36 m13 H#25 m45 H#51 m36 m71 m36 m79 m36
Russia Contact Tracer m36 m9,13 m26 l46 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36 m36
Saudia Arabia Tabaud m36 l10 H#17 m47 H#53 H#67 l m36 l m36
Scotland Protect Scotland l l10 l H#30 H#59 H#62 l m36 l m36
Singapore TraceTogether H#6 l7 l m48 H#53 H#62 H#69 m36 l H#80
Slovenia #OstaniZdrav m36 l10 l l l H#68 l m36 l m36
South Africa COVID Alert SouthAfrica m
36 l10 l H#49 H#53 m36 l m36 l m36
Spain Radar COVID H#2 l10 l l l H#66 l m36 l m36
Switzerland SwissCovid App l l10 l l H#59 m36 l m36 l H#80
United Kingdom NHS COVID-19 l l10,14 H#27 H#50 m36 m36 H#69 m36 l m36





H#1 l10 l l m36 H#64 m36 m36 H#77 m36
United States
(Arizona) Covid Watch H#








































1 Released the source code for the app side but not server, no mention of review performed prior to release
2 Released the source code for entire system, no mention of review performed prior to release
3 Government agency performed assessment, specifically does not release source code to protect the app from hackers
4 Released the source code for entire system, government agency performed assessment
5 Government agency performed assessment
6 Open-source code for the entire system, 4 independent experts consulted for use of the tokens no mention of assessment for app or system
7 Based on Bluetrace protocol and Open trace open-source code base available online for review
8 Future update will employ GAEN and DP-3T protocols
9 Bluetooth based design but no white paper released on the specific protocol being employed
10Using the GAEN API
11QR code digital pass system but no white paper released on the specific protocol being employed
12Bluetooth based design following ROBERT protocol
13GPS location tracking but no white paper released on the specific protocol being employed
14QR code location based logging but no white paper released on the specific protocol being employed
15Information is being sent to the server continuously and from sources other than the user’s app
16Information entered into the system is sent with GPS data for hotspot analysis
17Also has a personal symptom tracker built in
18Also has a manual contact tracker built in to log contacts you know
19Also provides access to test results
20App is also a symptom tracker, hotspot identifier, event management aid, and quarantine manager
21App is predominantly a emergency alert system that has had contact tracing added to it
22App has bluetooth token exchange, GPS logging, a symptom assessment, displayed risk status of user, location based covid statistics, e-pass integration, time and status of contacts recorded
23App uses both bluetooth and GPS for contact logging
24App requires access to files that does not make sense for the proposed design
25App requires selfie (picture) based location confirmation
26App has bluetooth token exchange, GPS logging, a symptom assessment, and location based covid statistics
27A symptom assessment, venue logging using QR codes, area based alerts, Covid test booking, quarantine aids
28A name (can be pseudonym), phone number, age range, postal code
29A phone number when user voluntarily informs the system of a positive status
30A phone number upon registration
31Location data that is actively uploaded
32GPS data, travel history, health information, medical test results, spending history, and phone numbers which in China these are in a database tied to government IDs
33GPS data, health information, phone number, age, sex, ethnicity, email, national ID, previous movement history, and requests information on participation in mass events
34National ID
35Area user lives to the municipal equivalent level
36No information was found
37Email address or social media account at registration, collects location data
38GPS data (14 days), requires phone number, if user is positive requests national ID number
39Phone number, name, gender, age, profession, travel history for last 30 days, willingness to volunteer in times of need, displays information about nearby users
40Phone number, county or town, age group, and sex
41GPS data (14 days), history of connected wireless networks
42GPS data (14 days)
43GPS data, phone number, civil ID
44Email address, phone number, National Health Index Number
45GPS location, app accesses on the device calls, camera, network information, sensors
46GPS location, displays information about nearby users

































48National ID, phone number
49Date of birth
50Half postal code, venue time and data, isolation status
51Location of server unknown, no assurances of data access limitations or oversight
52Televised game show gives cash rewards to randomized users that are at home when their name is selected, real-time tracking of quarantined individuals provided to health workers
53Data controlled by government authority, the location of the server is unknown
54Server located within country, data ownership unknown
55User’s location and identifying code number is given to a police server
56Government authority administrator of data, unknown location of server, third-party used for data processing
57App developer had access to user data, third-party vendors collect, store, and process data
58Government authority administrator of data, known location of server outside of country, limitations on data usage
59Government authority administrator of data, server within country, third-party used for data processing
60Server inside of country, unknown government authority acting as administrator of data
61Data ownership is known but not governmental server is owned by a third-party who also processes some of the data
62Data is encrypted when stored, no information about in transit etc.
63Data is encrypted in transit, no information about storage etc.
64Data is encrypted on device, no information about in transit etc.
65Data is encrypted in transit, QR code required to retrieve test results, random noise will be added to notifications on the server side
66Assurances that everything will be to the government’s security standards, no specifics
67No specifics, previously a security flaw was found that exposed sensitive user data
68Metadata sent to the server is encrypted
69Stated data retention limit longer than WHO infectious period of 14 days
70Stated data retention limit longer than WHO infectious period of 14 days on the device and held on the server until no longer needed
71Stated data retention limit is years in length
72Stated to meet relevant Privacy laws in country
73Stated to be designed to minimize data generated/collected
74Stated to de-identify any of the information collected for statistical purposes
75There are negative impacts on a users daily life if they choose to not use the app or disclose data
76The app may be required to access necessities
77A privacy policy was not found
78Government previously made it mandatory for any one employed, there is no required consent to upload information
79Government has made use of the app mandatory
80Unclear as to definite time, stated as when a health authority declares the pandemic over
81App was already removed from the app store due to security concerns
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night when the user was asleep, or in one case the user was in an ambulance on the way to the
hospital [165].
For data minimization, there were some cases, such as the Australian “COVIDSafe” app,
that toes the line of information collection. The Australian app collects a name (which can be
a pseudonym), age range, mobile phone number, and postal code [64]. All of this information
has a reason to be collected however it was discussed in the de-identification review of 3 and
4 that it is possible to identify someone from their age and postal code. Also, a phone number
can easily be an identifier because people can look up the owner of the number.
Of course, there are also apps such as Bahrain’s “BeAware Bahrain”. The app is actively
uploading the GPS information of its users to a server. It notifies users if they are nearing an
area that currently has active cases as well as alerting authorities if someone who should be
under home quarantine leaves their home [117].
In Colombia, they released an app called “CoronApp”. Within the app, users are asked
whether they have attended any large public gatherings. Due to the recent protests in Colombia,
there is the suspicion that the question is being used to find protesters [69]. The system also
asks for names, ages, identification numbers, symptoms, prior medical history, and previous
movements [41].
For the principle of data governance, there are a few notes that should be made. First is
that it is possible that European countries are following the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) guidelines and that those entail an amount of data governance that is overlapping with
what the principle requires. However, if they are marked as not meeting data governance then
from the findings of the review they did not state that they were following GDPR and what
that entails. As part of the disclosure requirement, it should not be expected of users to go
through the legalize of this document and determine what exactly the authority is doing. As
well in Iceland, the data remains within the EU though it does not specify if it remains in
Iceland [123]. However, because of the nature of the EU Iceland has been treated as though the
information remains within the country. Similarly the data server for the Scottish app “Protect
Scotland” has servers in London England [141]. Scotland and England are both a part of the
United Kingdom thus Scotland was treated as though the information remained within the
country.
An app with very interesting data governance is Bahrain. As an incentive to get more
citizens to download the app users were entered into a game show [9]. The game was that the
host would randomly call a user of the app and if they were at home obeying the lockdown
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rules they would receive 1,000 Bahraini dinars (approximately CAD 3475.88). The lockdown
game show called “Are you at home” is put together by Bahrain TV. Originally users were
automatically entered into the game show, this was altered so that users have the option to
opt-out. [9]
The cybersecurity principle only had 8 apps meet the requirement. It is interesting to com-
pare how different countries approach cybersecurity. In India, the government has set up a bug
bounty program for their app [119]. Though some of the criteria of what they will accept as
a vulnerability are strict and specific as some bounty seekers attest [1]. There are also many
countries such as Canada, Singapore, Australia, India, Iceland, the Netherlands, and others that
released some aspect of their source code. Then there are countries such as Denmark, whose
security stance is that they will not be releasing any source code as doing so would make
the system less secure against attackers [118]. The statement implying that security through
obscurity is preferred. This is directly opposite to Kerckhoffs’s principle.
The ruling for minimum data retention is based on the 14 day infection period stated by the
WHO, Canada retains the ID logs for 15 days rather than 14 days [21]. It was determined that
this single day difference was close enough to be accepted.
In some cases the data that was held the longest was used as the determining factor for
instance in the Czech Republic the information about contacts that is sent to the server is only
held for twelve hours, however, the contact list on the device is stored for 30 days [124]. Israel
stores data on the device for 14 days but data on the server including information irrelevant to
contact tracing will be held for 7 years [121]. Whereas in Iceland the only data held for longer
than 14 days was the phone number of the user. This is stated to be because the Icelandic
system requires the phone number to notify users if they have had a contact [123]. Thus this
situation still passed the requirement. As did Ireland’s system which holds everything for 14
days except the symptom log that it holds for 28 days [45]. This was permitted because the
symptom log does not leave the device and while the infectious period is listed as 14 days the
symptoms from the virus could last longer than that [101].
In Finland the legislation currently allows data to be held until March 2021 when the system
will be reassessed [120]. Finland and other countries that have similar data hold lengths did not
pass the requirement because the length of time is beyond a year and could be extended. Other
data clauses specify that the data will be held until no longer needed. Typically it is unclear
what criteria will be used to determine that the data is no longer needed.
124 Chapter 8. Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
In New Zealand location data is held for 60 days on the device, and personal information
will be held the length of the pandemic on the server. Also, some of the information from the
app can become part of a user’s permanent health record [122].
From the privacy review, it is clear that the two principles that the fewest apps meet are
Protection of Derived Data and Meta-data and Provision to Sunset. Only four of fifty-five apps
meet the meta-data principle requirement and all forty-four of the apps that do not meet the
criteria are because of a lack of information.
Some countries like Australia [64] or Denmark [118] have stated that their app meets the
privacy requirement of applicable law. However, as noted before with the GDPR in Europe as
part of the disclosure requirement it should not be expected of users to go through the legalize
of a document and determine what exactly the authority is doing. The authority should state
what protections they are providing.
As mentioned in section 7.2.2 the definition of voluntary to use is not just that using the
app is not mandated by the authority but that an individual’s life is not negatively impacted if
they choose not to use the app. For example in China if you do not disclose the information
the app asks for it will not provide a code to the user. A green code in the app is required to
use public transit and enter many public spaces [108].
In the city of Medellin in Colombia, it is being proposed that access to essential services like
grocery stores should require an individual to display the QR code from the app [41]. In Qatar,
it was made mandatory for citizens and residents to have the app “Ehteraz” active on their
phone when leaving the house. Not having the app could lead to a maximum fine of $55,000 or
three years in prison [74]. The Moscow app is mandatory for anyone who shows symptoms of
COVID-19. Anyone not complying can be penalized with fines or forced hospitalization [165].
Provision to sunset has nine apps that half meet the requirement, one that does not meet
the requirement and the rest of the forty-five do not meet the requirement because of a lack of
information. It is a concern that so many governments are releasing these apps without giving
the public information on if they are planning on continuing to use these apps after the current
pandemic.
The only app to not pass the sunset requirement based on information available was the “
Health Code” app in use in China. Though the authorities have not stated outright that they
intend to continue using the app beyond the current health crisis there is evidence to suggest
that the system could continue to be used beyond the life of the pandemic [15].
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There were some apps that were discovered over the course of the research however not
enough information on them could be collected for their inclusion in the review to be mean-
ingful. These included Croatia’s “Stop COVID-19”, Nepal’s “COVIRA App”, South Korea’s
system, and Turkey’s “Life Fits Inside the House”. The Norway app “Smittestop” was removed
from the app store after security issues were brought to light [90].
8.1.2 Selected Applications for Analysis
The five apps chosen to analyze closely were Canada’s Covid Alert App, Singapore’s Trace-
together app, Iceland’s Rakning C-19 app, India’s Aarogya Setu app, and France’s TousAnti-
Covid app. These were chosen as representatives of the different systems of contact tracing.
Canada’s Covid Alert app is a decentralized Bluetooth System implemented using the GAEN
Framework. Singapore’s TracerTogether app is a centralized Bluetooth system following the
BlueTrace protocol. Iceland’s Rakning C-19 app is a centralized GPS system. India’s Aarogya
Setu is a Bluetooth centralized system that has added functionalities involving location data.
France’s TousAntiCovid is a centralized Bluetooth system that follows the ROBERT protocol.
Three of the apps use the Bluetooth centralized system because this was the model that had
the most variance. The large majority of the decentralized Bluetooth systems used GAEN and
were similar apps with slight differences between them. The Canadian app does not have any
added functionality. Iceland’s Rakning C-19 app was chosen because it is a GPS system that
had a fair amount of information released about it as they have the source code available online.
Singapore, India, and France represent some of the differences in system and functionality that
appear between the apps.
8.1.3 Privacy Ranking of Selected Applications
Canada’s Covid Alert has a lot of information available about their app, the privacy state-
ments are detailed and clear. All of the principles are addressed, though they were not all
completely met. In terms of privacy, Covid Alert was grouped as Green.
Singapore’s TraceTogether does have a lot of information available but does not address
all of the principles. The app also requests personal information that is not required for their
contact tracing protocol to operate. TraceTogether was grouped as Yellow.
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Iceland’s Rakning C-19 was difficult to group. Though there is a lot of information available
about the app and they do meet quite a few of the principles there are still some that they do not
meet. As well, GPS data is, as noted in the deidentification review, a lot of personal information
that is difficult to remove someone’s identity from. If in the future it could be shown that GPS
systems are significantly better than Bluetooth at alleviating the health crisis then the risk to
reward could be reassessed but for now, there is no evidence of that, and GPS data is high risk.
Rakning C-19 was given a Red/Yellow ranking. Meaning that either the red or yellow group
would be accepted as the thresholds are determined.
India’s Aarogya Setu did not meet the most principles of the apps selected. This app is
interesting in that it is a Bluetooth system but it also takes some location data from the user and
displays that to other users showing them how many people at risk they were near. As well the
system does not ask for consent for uploading information. Once the app is downloaded if a
user tests positive their account on the server is flagged and the next time their device connects
it uploads the information required. Due to these factors, the Aarogya Setu app was given a
Red grouping.
France’s TousAntiCovid has a lot of information available about the app. However, the data
governance principle is not met and it is unclear what personal information the app requests
from the user. It also half meets more principles than it completely meets. As it stands the
TousAntiCovid app was grouped as Yellow.
A summary of the groupings of the five apps:
• Canada Covid Alert - Green
• Singapore TraceTogether - Yellow
• Iceland Rakning C-19 - Red/yellow
• India Aarogya Setu - Red
• France TousAntiCovid - Yellow
A quantitative analysis of the data from the privacy review table 8.1. Each principle will be
given a score out of 1. If the app meets the principle it will be given a 1/1. Half meeting the
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Table 8.2: Analysis of Privacy Review
Principles Covid Alert TraceTogether Rakning C-19 Aarogya Setu TousAntiCovid
Met 7 3 6 3 3
Half-met 3 5 1 2 5
Not Met 0 2 3 5 2
Total: 8.5 5.5 6.5 4 5.5
principle gives a 0.5/1. Not meeting the principle gives a 0/1. Thus the privacy of an app can
be scored out of 10. The scoring of each app can be seen in table 8.2
Using this method of ranking a red app is one that scores 0-4.5, a yellow app is 5-7.5, and a
green app is 8-10. This means that an app has to meet five principles, half of all the principles
or some combination to be outside of the red group. Scoring less than 50% on the principles
is a concern. An app scoring less than 50% should be a concern because it can be seen as
the developer or the authority not prioritizing privacy in the design of their system. This is
a concern because privacy by design, or creating the design with privacy in mind from the
beginning is the best way to implement privacy throughout the design [25].
This ranking method does not prioritize any single principle, instead it takes them as equally
important. Something that is reflected by the author’s presentation of them. There was never
any indication that the order in which they were presented was meaningful. If one were to
attempt to form an internal or weighted ranking of the principles an argument could be made
for any one of them to be key or very important. Thus, leaving them as equal maintains the
interpretation that they are all important to the overall privacy of the system.
8.2 Analysis of the Vulnerability of Contact Tracing Appli-
cations
8.2.1 Canada Covid Alert
Attack 1
1. Capture your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and loca-
tions with other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a
user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
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• Access: 2 There is nothing in the protocol to prevent someone from building a tool to
collect GPS location data when the phone makes a BLE connection. The attack requires
either circumventing the app to log the contact information outside of it or rooting the
attackers device to access the logged contact information. The bottle neck of attack 1 is
getting the temporary IDs of the victim to trace through the system. In the Covid Alert
documentation all it says is that the temporary IDs are “securely stored” without a clear
definition of what that means [128]. It is assumed that to see the temporary IDs the
attacker would need to root the victims device. Thus this attack should be marked as a
1. However, because the IDs of positive users are made available through the server an
attacker could collect all of this information then recreate the list of IDs of positive users
find matches and follow them. This possibility is why the score is a 2.
• Knowledge: 3 The attack would require being able to make the GPS logging code, detect
that the device has logged the Bluetooth information. Root the attacker’s own device and
potentially the victims, or pull the list from the server and recreate the IDs of positive
users.
• Complexity: 6
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The analysis can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 5 The attack requires one or two tools, the GPS logger, the access to the
contact list, and the method of collecting the IDs to track. Then the program to
match the ID and every GPS coordinate and map them together. One person could
do this in more than a month, or a few could do this in about a month. All of these
components have been created before for other attacks (the GPS data attacks of
section 3.2.3) and would need to be put together for this one.
• Effort: 1.5
– Planning: 1 This is high effort because the code has to be placed on many phones
to collect all of the required information. Then the data has to be compiled.
– Human: 2 To effectively cover an area quite a few people would need to be in-
volved. Once the software is on their phone they would not have to necessarily do
anything out of the ordinary however just go through their usual routine.
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• Scope: 4 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved whose devices could be accessed to get the IDs or people who test
positive in the community. This is smaller than everyone an attacker knows and is not
every positive individual as it is relegated to the area covered.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The contact log information itself is not easy to use, but the GPS data
allows the creation of a map of where someone has been and could then determine
where they live or something about them from that as seen in the attacks discussed
in 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 This would damage trust in the system. There is the potential that a
politically motivated group could use this to single out certain people. Especially if
they can target those that have the virus.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, the code that collects the info
does not need to interfere with the app, just monitor it, though the amount of people
involved would require quite the vow of secrecy. It could involve access to someone’s
phone to retrieve the IDs which would increase the risk of detection.
• Damage: 2.5
– System: 1 The code added to the groups devices would have to be removed but
otherwise the system itself has not truly been touched
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of GPS location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 3.875
Attack 2
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
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• Access: 2 The limitation of attack 2 is getting the temporary IDs of the victim to trace
through the system. In the Covid Alert documentation all it says is that the temporary IDs
are “securely stored” without a clear definition of what that means [128]. It is assumed
that to see the temporary IDs the attacker would need to root the victims device. Thus
this attack should be marked as a 1. However, because the IDs of positive users are made
available through the server an attacker could collect all of this information then recreate
the list of IDs of positive users find matches and follow them. This possibility is why
the score is a 2. The exploit also requires physical access to locations to place the BLE
devices.
• Knowledge: 3 An exploit would require creating the BLE devices and mimicking the
Bluetooth transmissions of the GAENs protocol, or the attacker could just have the app
on the device then send the message from that through the BLE antennas and boosters.
The victims device would need to be rooted to gain the IDs, or the list published by the
server could be used to recreate the IDs of positive patients. The attacker would need to
also access their contact logs.
• Complexity: 6.5
– Technology: 7 The generation of someone’s temporary ID is possible from a phone
as that is what happens when the app downloads the positive keys and then checks
against the contact list. The BLE devices would likely require a standard computer
to setup.
– Build: 6 The creation of the the Bluetooth devices is something that a single person
could do with enough time. Creating enough of them to cover a larger area would
be time consuming, as would the actual setup of the devices in the locations.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5 Medium to low effort, the BLE components need to be set up and
placed in the area. Retrieving the IDs from a victim’s phone would require care.
Though taking them off the server could remove this factor.
– Human: 7. One or two people could do this, setting up the BLE devices might
require two people.
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• Scope: 4 This would effect some people that the attacker knows personally at most.
It would be difficult to get someone’s temporary ID that you did not know off of their
device. Though the attack could target people that later test positive, the amount that had
also gone through the targeted area would be limited.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The attack provides information on everywhere an individual has been over
an area covered by the BLE devices. Though this might not be able to be used to
determine where they live there remains information that could be used to identify
them. This was discussed in section 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 Due to the promises of not being able to track people with the app this
would make people wary about downloading the app.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this attack would not be noticed, the only time it could
be would be when an attacker tried to take the ID if the attacker was trying to get it from
the victim’s phone.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of GPS location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 4.438
Attack 3
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
This app is created using the GAENs framework. This means that the temporary ID that is
broadcast is randomly created through cryptographic processes. Breaking the encryption as it
were is beyond the scope of this thesis and would not yield information that could be used to
determine a users identity. Thus this vulnerability path is infeasible.
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Attack 4
4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
To implement attack 4 the time of the contact needs to be known to the attacker to match
that with the camera. The contact list stores the time stamp thus an attacker needs to access
the contact list on their device. An added complexity is identifying who the person was from
a photo. If an attacker were to setup a website with someone’s photo saying that they have
COVID-19 this could ID the person quickly, however it would immediately be a target for the
authorities. At the very least the website would be taken down, and potentially information
from that could be used to find the attacker. Thus doing so would make the attack significantly
more detectable.
• Access: 4 An exploit would require access to attackers own list of contacts and the list
of positive IDs from the server.
• Knowledge: 7 Other than accessing the contact log on the device performing the hand-
shake this is not an attack that requires significant knowledge. A graduate level student
could likely figure that out for their own device.
• Complexity: 7
– Tech: 7 In terms of computing power this can be done on a phone because the app
performs the handshake on the phone. Though the matching of the contact list to
the camera would require a standard computer.
– Personnel: 7 This should be possible for a single person to create, the difficult part
being mimicking the blue tooth handshake or accessing the contact list of a device
the attacker has control over. As mentioned previously this is not considered an
impossible limitation.
• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7 low, the camera and the device logging the contact need to be setup.
However the rest can be done once the data is collected and all that entails is match-
ing the contact to the timestamp on the camera and then pulling information from
the server to find a match.
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– Human: 7 one or two people of this knowledge level would be able to create this
and then go place it somewhere
• Scope: 5 Affects a small group, as many people as an attacker could get to walk through
a specific area.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The attacker has gained information about who is actually sick, which is
private health information, but they need to identify the people in the photo.
– Trust: 4 This would lower trust as the attack provides an attacker with the photo of
someone who is sick.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this attack would not be noticed, the only time it could
be would be if someone noticed the camera or if an attacker did something public to
determine someone’s identity.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
– User: 7 Someone has now had their privacy about health data stolen from them,
which is private data that has many protections for a reason see section 2.2 for
examples of why this data is protected.
Average: 5.688
Attack 4.5
The difference between attack 4 and 4.5 is who the attacker is. In 4 the attacker could be
anyone, 4.5 looks at the specific case where an institution or organization of some kind is the
one collecting the information. A system of BLE devices could be placed within a building
or many buildings that the organization owns and already has a system of security cameras
within. A workplace for example, a shopping mall, a campus. The group could already have
the photo ID of the people that are regularly in the building on file if it is a workplace. They
might just hold the data to be used for something at a later date or claim they wish to use it to
ensure employee safety. The intention with this attack is to look at the long term implication
of an organization hanging onto this data.
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• Access: 4. An exploit would require access to attackers own list of contacts and the list
of positive IDs from the server.
• Knowledge: 7. Other than accessing the contact log on the device performing the hand-
shake this is not an attack that requires significant knowledge. A graduate level student
could likely figure that out for their own device.
• Complexity: 7
– Tech: 7. In terms of computing power this can be done on a phone because the app
performs the handshake on the phone. Though the matching of the contact list to
the camera would require a standard computer.
– Build: 7. This should be possible for a single person to create, the difficult part
being mimicking the blue tooth handshake or accessing the contact list of a device
the attacker has control over. As mentioned previously this is not considered an
impossible limitation.
• Effort: 8.5
– Planning: 7. Though all of the BLE devices need to be created, the camera system
is already available. The two systems require some work to put them together.
– Human: 10. One person could set this up within the building or required area.
• Scope: 6. This wouldn’t be a whole demographic, but would affect a large amount of
people that are in that building or on company campus.
• Impact: 7
– Data: 7. An organization with their own personnel files likely containing a photo
would make identification easier.
– Trust: 7. If the attacker is taking this data in this manner people may not find out
about it for a long time however, when they do it will damage the trust in a future
system like this.
• Detection: 10. The system has little to no way of detecting this. Even the victims would
likely not notice anything as the security cameras were already there.
• Damage: 5
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– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 10. They would have this information for a long time, they could use it in
unexpected and interesting ways that could effect people for a long time without
them even knowing it.
Average: 6.813
Attack 5
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
• Access: 10. The access of a regular user is all that is required for this attack.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. The only computer required is the phone itself.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this in less than a month as there are no
extra components required.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10. Very low effort, there are few components or steps.
– Human: 10. One person could perform this alone.
• Scope: 1. Could effect one person that the attacker knows. Then perhaps be used again.
Long term the attacker could use this to effect a few more people.
• Impact: 4.5
– Data: 7. The attacker gains knowledge of whether one person has the virus. This
is protected health data.
– Trust: 2. Though the scope is small, this is the kind of attack that could lower the
trust of some vulnerable communities or people that are unlikely to trust the system
to begin with.
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• Detection: 10. It would be almost impossible for the system to catch that this has
occurred.
• Damage: 3
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 6. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 7.313
Attack 6
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
Due to the Covid Alert app using the decentralized Bluetooth system this attack is not
possible. In the decentralized system the server does not send contact messages directly to
users. This means there are no messages for an attacker to eavesdrop on in this manner.
Attack 7
The documentation for the Covid Alert app says that “Data at rest and in transit are encrypted
using strong encryption methods” [129]. This statement has been interpreted to mean that
communications between the server and the app are secured using HTTPS. Breaking HTTPS
or Secure TLS is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus it should not be possible for an at-
tacker to eavesdrop on the communications as required by both of these avenues of vulnera-
bility. However, analysis of the app has shown that it communicates with two different servers
“retrieval.covid-notification.alpha.canada.ca” and “submission.covid-notification.alpha.canada.ca”
[72]. The retrieval server is where the app receives the file of keys to compare to its contact log
from. The submission server is what the app connects to when verifying a one-time code and
uploading the user’s IDs to the server. This means that the submission server is only connected
to if a user has tested positive for COVID-19 and is informing the app’s system. Thus, an
eavesdropping attacker would still be able to see the server the user is communicating too and
know that they have had a positive diagnosis by the server name.
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• Access: 7. The attacker would need to be using a tool that provides them with informa-
tion of what is being sent over the WiFi network. Many are available. They would also
need to be in an area the WiFi network can reach, be physically present
• Knowledge: 7. Slightly more than novice level, this does not require particularly specific
knowledge, but the attacker would need to be familiar with the tool they are using. There
is a lot of software available that allows attackers to eavesdrop on a WiFi network. They
would also need to know what part of the communication to grab the server name from,
and have probed the servers to retrieve the names.
• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. This attack only requires a computer.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5. The attacker needs to be in the right place at the right time to see the
information being sent to that server. If they were able to find a clinic or somewhere
that patients might receive the results of tests then they might increase the chances
of catching this exchange. Such a thing would require a bit of effort to work out.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together could perform this exploit.
• Scope: 4. The attacker is limited by having to be somewhere that an individual would be
uploading this information from. Finding a location that a larger group of people would
do this within would be difficult. Thus the scope is limited.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker gains the information that a user on the WiFi has the virus.
The attacker would need to determine who it was on the WiFi network that received
the notification.
– Trust: 4. As the authority assures the users that the system is private the ability for
an attacker to learn that someone has the virus would lower trust in the system.
• Detection: 9. It is possible that this would not be noticed, the attack does not need to
interfere with the app, just monitor the communications. The attacker physically being
there would increase the risk of detection.
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• Damage: 3
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 6. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.063
Attack 8
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
• Access: 10. The attack requires no system access, it only requires that something be
placed in a physical location.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 9
– Technology: 8. This is possible with a device that would not have to be a computer,
however could require a computer to build. Various devices can already prevent
Bluetooth signals like microwave interference.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 7.5
– Planning: 7. To cover a large area an attacker would need multiple devices, as well
as the placement of the devices to be discreet.
– Human: 8. One or two people working together could create all of the device and
place them in an area.
• Scope: 6. While not able to target an entire demographic a large area could be covered
where anyone within would not receive any contact logs on their app.
• Impact: 1.5
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– Data: 1. The attack does introduce false data on the device, in that the device
thinks that there are no devices close enough for a contact despite this not being the
actual case. However, the data goes no farther than that into the system.
– Trust: 2. This would cause people to ask why even use the app if the signals can
be blocked. Temporarily lowering their trust in the system.
• Detection: 4. This attack would interfere with other Bluetooth devices in the same area,
and potentially other signals such as WiFi. That makes this attack somewhat noticeable
to anyone in the area.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 4. People in that area could have come into contact with the virus and not
received the exposure notifications. A single test once the attack was discovered
would let them know they are in the clear.
Average: 6.25
Attack 9
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
• Access: 1. For this attack the user would need to have root access on the victim’s device,
to be able to inject the ID into their contact list.
• Knowledge: 2. To gain root access on the victim’s device a close to expert level of
knowledge would be required.
• Complexity: 5.5
– Technology: 7. Such an exploit would require a computer.
– Build: 4. Finding a way to access the contact list of someone’s device and injecting
a contact that appears real would require a significant investment of time.
• Effort: 7
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– Planning: 4. There are multiple components that would have to come together for
this exploit to work. Most importantly getting access to the victim’s device.
– Human: 10. After everything has been built only one person would be required to
perform the attack.
• Scope: 1. It would be very difficult to attack one person’s device in this way. A large
target of people would require remote root access to their devices to be practically im-
plementable. Otherwise the attacker has to have physical access to their target’s phone.
• Impact: 1
– Data: 1. The attack introduces false data onto the device that would then notify
the user that they have had an exposure. The information goes no farther into the
system.
– Trust: 1. The scope of the attack is small, and while it is inconvenient to the victim
to have to quarantine or get tested. The attack would only temporarily lower trust
in the system.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, it does involve access to
someone’s phone to inject the ID which is the most likely point of detection.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does touch the system but the contact logs are removed after
15 days.
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 3.438
Attack 10
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
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• Access: 4. The attacker needs to pull the positive ID list down from the server which is
outside of the typical user privilege. As is creating the Bluetooth message being trans-
mitted.
• Knowledge: 4. An attacker needs to be able to recreate the processes used to generate the
IDs to turn the information from the server into what would actually have been broadcast
by a device. They also need to be able to recreate the entire bluetooth message, and have
their devices operate as though they are the regular app. This indicates a knowledge level
of someone with a career in this area.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. Such an exploit would require a computer.
– Build: 7. One person could create this attack in a month.
• Effort: 6.5
– Planning: 6. Medium level of effort, there are several components, and the setup
of the BLE devices in the target area.
– Human: 7. One or two people could do this, setting up the BLE devices might
require two people.
• Scope: 6. While not able to target an entire demographic a large area could be covered
where anyone within would have a false positive contact logged.
• Impact: 2
– Data: 1. The attacker introduces false data on the device, that will be deleted after
15 days.
– Trust: 3. This attack would lower trust in the system. The victims would all
be instructed to quarantine and test, something that inconveniences their lives and
would make them less likely to trust the next notification they might get.
• Detection: 8. The system itself would not notice the attack, and users are not informed of
the time or location of the contact they are being warned about. So the only time it could
be noticed is if over time enough people that had all been to the same place, received
the notification, and the negative test result and someone within the system recognized
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this. Which could take longer than a week but is possible without the attacker informing
anyone.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does touch the system but the contact logs are removed after
15 days.
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 4.938
Attack 11
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
The Covid Alert system requires more than just an exposure notification for a user to be
able to upload their information to the server. A one-time code only received through a positive
test must be entered into the app to upload the information. Thus, this potential avenue of
vulnerability is not viable for this system.
Attack 12
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but does
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
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– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 7
– Data: 10. The attacker would have the health information of the victims
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
Most email or other systems have filters that will catch a lot of phishing attempts.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0. The attack does touch the system.
– User: 7. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.438
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Attack 13
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information in the documentation for Covid Alert on how the one-time verifi-
cation codes are created. It does however state that they are random. There is information in
the documentation that the code is verified when entered [22]. Such verification would be a
simple task of comparing the code entered to a valid code list. This is a very likely method of
verification because the system only requires a small number of codes to be active at a time.
Thus, forging a code would be blocked by the verification of the code, and this path is not
viable in this system.
Attack 14
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but does
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
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• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
Most email or other systems have filters that will catch a lot of phishing attempts.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 5.875
Attack 15
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
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There is no information in the documentation for Covid Alert on how the one-time verifi-
cation codes are created. It does however state that they are random. There is information in
the documentation that the code is verified when entered [22]. Such verification appears to be
a simple task of comparing the code entered to a valid code list. Thus, forging a code would be
blocked by the verification of the code, and this path is not viable in this system.
Attack 16
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
Though the documentation states that a one-time code will be removed from the list of valid
codes as soon as it is used [22]. Thus, this attack is not technically being modeled as a replay
attack, as the code will not be used twice. This attack will be modeled as an attacker getting
their hands on a one time code some other way such as bribing a patient.
• Access: 5. This attack does not require the attacker to have higher access to the system
or the app but it does require them to have access to someone who has tested positive.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. This attack could require a computer but does not have to.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 8.5
– Planning: 10. There are very few steps that required by this attack. The attacker
just has to convince someone to hand over their one time code.
– Human: 7. The attacker needs a person willing to give them their one-time code.
Thus it requires two people.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
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• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 7. The only point at which an attacker might be detected would be if the
person that they took the one-time code from informed an authority. Difficult to gauge if
that would occur or not.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 6.438
Attack 17
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
In the documentation for the Covid Alert app it is noted that while typically the IP address
tied to a server request is deleted if an incorrect one-time code is entered it is held for a sixty
minutes. Then after eight incorrect tries within the sizty minute window the IP address receives
an IP ban for sixty minutes [22]. According to an individual testing the system it is not eight
but fifty incorrect attempts that result in an IP ban[72]. Though this opens the opportunity for
a brute force attack there is still the issue of the one-time code being a 10-12 digit pin. If it
is only numerical then that is 1012 or 1 trillion possibilities. Due to differences in speed of
languages and computers it is difficult to give a specific amount of time that brute forcing all of
those codes would require however it is safe to say it would be over an hour and less than ten
hours [18]. The list of valid one-time codes is changing as users use the ones that have been
handed out. Thus though the target is not a single pin that needs to be found there are changes
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being made as it is being searched for. However only the specific IP of the device that sent the
invalid one-time code is banned. If after every 50 tries the attacker were to request a new IP
from their router or use a VPN service that allows them to change their IP this ban could be
circumvented. Which is the attack model being used here.
• Access: 10. The attacker is only using the user interface.
• Knowledge: 10. A brute force attack is novice level, even with the additional work
around for the IP ban.
• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. A computer would be required to create the code to try all of the
possible one-time pins.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this entire attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10 Minimal components, the steps are straight forwards this is a simple
attack.
– Human: 10 One person is all that is required to perform this attack.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 1 The system does monitor for this, though the banned IP is supposed to
be deleted once the ban is over it would potentially not take the administrators long to
recognize that someone was attempting this.
• Damage: 2
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– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 6.313
8.2.2 Singapore TraceTogether App
Attack 1
your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and locations with
other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a user’s ID
through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
• Access: 1 For the TraceTogether centralized Bluetooth system the only way to know
another user’s ID would be to somehow access the list on the secure server, or to access
the user’s ID list. This is a severe limitation to an attacker taking advantage of this
vulnerability. There is nothing in the documentation that indicates the collection of GPS
data when a phone makes a BLE handshake/exchange is prevented. The contact list on
the device is claimed to be “secured” without a clear definition of what that entails. It is
likely at the least under the usual protections of any app data, that is other apps cannot
read or write it, though a user with root access could see the information. It is not clear
if this data is encrypted.
• Knowledge: 3 The implementation would require being able to make the GPS logging
code and detect that the device has logged the Bluetooth information. Gaining access to
the IDs would require significant knowledge.
• Complexity: 6
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The analysis can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 5 The attack requires one or two tools, the GPS logger, the access to the
contact list, and the method of collecting the IDs to track. Then the program to
match the ID and every GPS coordinate and map them together. One person could
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do this in more than a month, or a few could do this in about a month. All of these
components have been created before for other attacks (the GPS data attacks of
section 3.2.3) and would need to be put together for this one.
• Effort: 1.5
– Planning: 1 This is high effort because the code has to be placed on many phones
to collect all of the required information. Then the data has to be compiled.
– Human: 2 To effectively cover an area quite a few people would need to be in-
volved. Once the software is on their phone they would not have to necessarily do
anything out of the ordinary however just go through their usual routine.
• Scope: 3 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved whose devices could be accessed to get the IDs would be the ones
targeted.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The contact log information itself is not easy to use, but the GPS data
allows the creation of a map of where someone has been and could then determine
where they live or something about them from that as seen in the attacks discussed
in 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 This would damage trust in the system. There is the potential that a
politically motivated group could use this to single out certain people. Especially if
they can target those that have the virus.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, the code that collects the info
does not need to interfere with the app, just monitor it, though the amount of people
involved would require quite the vow of secrecy. It does involve access to someone’s
phone to retrieve the IDs which would increase the risk of detection.
• Damage: 2.5
– System: 1 The code added to the groups devices would have to be removed but
otherwise the system itself has not truly been touched
8.2. Analysis of the Vulnerability of Contact Tracing Applications 151
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of GPS location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 3.625
Attack 2
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
• Access: 1 For the TraceTogether centralized Bluetooth system the only way to know
another user’s ID would be to somehow access the list on the secure server, or to access
the user’s ID list. This is a severe limitation to an attacker taking advantage of this
vulnerability. The contact list on the device is claimed to be “secured” without a clear
definition of what that entails. It is likely at the least under the usual protections of any
app data, that is other apps cannot read or write it, though a user with root access could
see the information. It is not clear if this data is encrypted.
• Knowledge: 3 A lot of the work seems graduate level to create the code to mimic the
Bluetooth transmissions of the Bluetrace protocol, or you would just need to have the
app on the device that is then sending it through the BLE antennas. Accessing the IDs
is an issue that ups the difficulty because you likely would need root access on another
user’s device. Thus, this is between expert and career individual.
• Complexity: 6.5
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The tracing of IDs can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 6 The creation of the the Bluetooth devices is something that a single person
could do with enough time. Creating enough of them to cover a larger area would
be time consuming, as would the actual setup of the devices in the locations.
• Effort: 6
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– Planning: 5 Medium to low effort, the BLE components need to be set up and
placed in the area. Retrieving the IDs from a victim’s phone would require care.
Though taking them off the server could remove this factor.
– Human: 7 One or two people could do this, setting up the BLE devices might
require two people.
• Scope: 3 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved whose devices could be accessed to get the IDs would be the ones
targeted.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The attack provides information on everywhere an individual has been over
an area covered by the BLE devices. Though this might not be able to be used to
determine where they live there remains information that could be used to identify
them. This was discussed in section 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 Due to the promises of not being able to track people with the app this
would make people wary about downloading the app.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this attack would not be noticed, the only time it could
be would be when an attacker tried to take the ID if the attacker was trying to get it from
the victim’s phone.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 4.188
Attack 3
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
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This app is created using the BlueTrace protocol. This means that the temporary ID that
is broadcast is randomly created through cryptographic processes. The temp IDs are created
by using AES encryption on a random user ID and start/end time. Even if AES was breakable
there is nothing to link the user to the ID unless someone had access to the server information.
Assuming that the health authority is not the threat this attack is not viable here.
Attack 4 and 4.5
4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
Due to this app using the Bluetooth centralized model of BlueTrace there is no server
information for a user to take to determine the contact on their own. An attacker would have to
use the app and wait for it to tell them when a contact was made. However, the Singapore app
does not tell the user when the contact that may have exposed them was. Instead it just tells
them they were exposed within the last 14 days. Thus there is no information for the attacker
to use to determine which person they took a photo of was the one that has the virus.
Attack 5
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
• Access: 10. The access of a regular user is all that is required for this attack.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. The only computer required is the phone itself.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this in less than a month as there are no
extra components required.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10. Very low effort, there are few components or steps.
– Human: 10. One person could perform this alone.
154 Chapter 8. Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
• Scope: 1. Could effect one person that the attacker knows. Then perhaps be used again.
Long term the attacker could use this to effect a few more people.
• Impact: 4.5
– Data: 7. The attacker gains knowledge of whether one person has the virus. This
is protected health data.
– Trust: 2. Though the scope is small, this is the kind of attack that could lower the
trust of some vulnerable communities or people that are unlikely to trust the system
to begin with.
• Detection: 10. It would be almost impossible for the system to catch that this has
occurred.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 7. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 7.375
Attack 6
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
In the documentation for the TraceTogether app there is no information about the type of
security being used on the data in transit between the server and the app. As it is unclear this
analysis will be assuming that the communication is being made using http not https. Thus an
eavesdropping attacker can listen in on the communication.
• Access: 7. The attacker would need to be using a tool that provides them with informa-
tion of what is being sent over the WiFi network. Many are available.
• Knowledge: 9. Almost novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge,
but the attacker would need to be familiar with the tool they are using. There is a lot of
software available that allows attackers to eavesdrop on a WiFi network.
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• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. The monitoring of the network would require a computer.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5. The attacker has to be in the right place with their computer or
a device connected to the same WiFi network to be able to see the information
being passed from the server. The other component is determining who exactly the
message was sent to.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together could perform this exploit.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a small group of people. The targets do not have to
be people that the attacker would know. Anyone on the same WiFi network could receive
an exposure notification at any time.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker gains the information that a user on the WiFi came into
contact with someone with the virus. The attacker would need to determine who it
was on the WiFi network that received the notification.
– Trust: 4. As the authority assures the users that the system is private the ability for
an attacker to learn that someone has received a contact message would lower trust
in the system.
• Detection: 9. It is possible that this would not be noticed, the attack does not need to
interfere with the app, just monitor the communications. The attacker physically being
there would increase the risk of detection.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 4. The data that the attacker has would be private health information about
the user but the attacker has only learned that the user might have the virus and are
being informed to quarantine and get tested.
Average: 6.313
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Attack 7
In the documentation for the TraceTogether app there is no information about the type of se-
curity being used on the data in transit between the server and the app. As it is unclear this
analysis will be assuming that the communication is being made using http not https. Thus an
eavesdropping attacker can listen in on the communication. In the centralized system used by
the TraceTogether app the user needs to upload their contact list to the server in the case of a
positive diagnosis. This is the communication that the eavesdropper would be listening for.
• Access: 7. The attacker would need to be using a tool that provides them with informa-
tion of what is being sent over the WiFi network. Many are available. They would also
need to be in an area the WiFi network can reach, be physically present.
• Knowledge: 9. Almost novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge,
but the attacker would need to be familiar with the tool they are using. There is a lot of
software available that allows attackers to eavesdrop on a WiFi network.
• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. This attack only requires a computer.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5. The attacker needs to be in the right place at the right time to see the
information being sent to that server. If they were able to find a clinic or somewhere
that patients might receive the results of tests then they might increase the chances
of catching this exchange. Such a thing would require a bit of effort to work out.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together could perform this exploit.
• Scope: 4. The attacker is limited by having to be somewhere that an individual would be
uploading this information from. Finding a location that a larger group of people would
do this within would be difficult. Thus the scope is limited.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker gains the information that a user on the WiFi has the virus.
The attacker would need to determine who it was on the WiFi network that received
the notification.
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– Trust: 4. As the authority assures the users that the system is private the ability for
an attacker to learn that someone has the virus would lower trust in the system.
• Detection: 9. It is possible that this would not be noticed, the attack does not need to
interfere with the app, just monitor the communications. The attacker physically being
there would increase the risk of detection.
• Damage: 3
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 6. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.313
Attack 8
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
• Access: 10. The attack requires no system access, it only requires that something be
placed in a physical location.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 9
– Technology: 8. This is possible with a device that would not have to be a computer,
however could require a computer to build. Various devices can already prevent
Bluetooth signals like microwave interference.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 7.5
– Planning: 7. To cover a large area an attacker would need multiple devices, as well
as the placement of the devices to be discreet.
– Human: 8. One or two people working together could create all of the device and
place them in an area.
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• Scope: 6. While not able to target an entire demographic a large area could be covered
where anyone within would not receive any contact logs on their app.
• Impact: 1.5
– Data: 1. The attack does introduce false data on the device, in that the device
thinks that there are no devices close enough for a contact despite this not being the
actual case. However, the data goes no farther than that into the system.
– Trust: 2. This would cause people to ask why even use the app if the signals can
be blocked. Temporarily lowering their trust in the system.
• Detection: 4. This attack would interfere with other Bluetooth devices in the same area,
and potentially other signals such as WiFi. That makes this attack somewhat noticeable
to anyone in the area.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 4. People in that area could have come into contact with the virus and not
received the exposure notifications. A single test once the attack was discovered
would let them know they are in the clear.
Average: 6.25
Attacks 9, 10, 11
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
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The TraceTogether app is based on the centralized Bluetooth system. In this system the
contact logs of sick individuals are uploaded processed by the server to determine the individ-
uals at risk and then those people are informed of that risk. In this system unless an individual
were to have access to the secured server there is no way for them to determine an ID belonging
to a sick individual. Even if the attacker could determine the ID of a sick individual and inject
it into the victim’s contact list the system would never look at it. As only the contacts of sick
individuals are processed. The injected information would just be deleted after 14 days.
Attack 12
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
For the TraceTogether system a user receives the one-time code used to upload their data
via an SMS message. The user provides their phone number to at the testing facility. Thus, this
attack would actually be the attacker asking for the one-time code and if they receive the code
then they know that the user tested positive for COVID-19.
• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but do
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
• Effort: 7
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– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 7
– Data: 10. The attacker would have the health information of the victims
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
Most email or other systems have filters that will catch a lot of phishing attempts.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0. The attack does touch the system.
– User: 7. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.438
Attack 13
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
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There is no information about the process used to create the one-time code for the Trace-
Together system. Neither is there any information about how the code is validated. Due to this
it is not possible to assess in the manner of this thesis how vulnerable the system is to this type
of attack.
Attack 14
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
For the TraceTogether system a user receives the one-time code used to upload their data
via an SMS message. The user provides their phone number to at the testing facility. Thus, this
attack would actually be the attacker asking for the one-time code from the user and pretending
to be the place that the user has to enter the code into.
• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but does
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
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– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
SMS has some protections against spam.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 5.875
Attack 15
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information about the process used to create the one-time code for the Trace-
Together system. Neither is there any information about how the code is validated. Due to this
it is not possible to assess in the manner of this thesis how vulnerable the system is to this type
of attack.
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Attack 16
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
• Access: 5. This attack does not require the attacker to have higher access to the system
or the app but it does require them to have access to someone who has tested positive.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. This attack could require a computer but does not have to.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 8.5
– Planning: 10. There are very few steps that required by this attack. The attacker
just has to convince someone to hand over their one time code.
– Human: 7. The attacker needs a person willing to give them their one-time code.
Thus it requires two people.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 7. The only point at which an attacker might be detected would be if the
person that they took the one-time code from informed an authority. Difficult to gauge if
that would occur or not.
• Damage: 2
164 Chapter 8. Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 6.438
Attack 17
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information in the TraceTogether documentation about the size of the one-time
code required for the user to upload their contact list to the server. Nor whether there are any
protections on the server against this type of attack.
• Access: 10. The attacker is only using the user interface.
• Knowledge: 10. A brute force attack is novice level, even with the additional work
around for the IP ban.
• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. A computer would be required to create the code to try all of the
possible one-time pins.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this entire attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10 Minimal components, the steps are straight forwards this is a simple
attack.
– Human: 10 One person is all that is required to perform this attack.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
• Impact: 4
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– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 7 The system does not necessarily monitor for this, though IP addresses are
logged by any server when a communication is made. If an administrator was looking in
those logs they would see this attack occurring.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 7.063
8.2.3 India Aarogyu Setu
At the time of writing this the only information available about the identifiers that the Aarogya
Setu app uses for its Bluetooth broadcasts is that “All interactions between two devices that
have the Aarogya Setu app installed, and between the device and the Aarogya Setu server are
done using DiD only” [125]. DiD is the Aarogyu Setu term for the anonymous user ID. Since
there is nothing that specifies that the ID is rotated or altered it will be assumed that a single
ID is continuously used.
Attack 1
1. Capture your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and loca-
tions with other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a
user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
• Access: 3 The documentation says the contact list itself is encrypted with AES using the
system keychains which indicates they can be read if the device is rooted. The app does
try to check if the device is rooted but this can be circumvented which is admitted by the
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creators [125]. Also because the broadcast ID of the person does not change that means
that someone only has to access their own devices contact list to gather the ID and then
follow it access the ID on the victim’s device.
• Knowledge: 4 The implementation would require being able to make the GPS logging
code and detect that the device has logged the Bluetooth information. Gaining access to
the IDs would require significant knowledge. However, in this case the device is already
collecting GPS data every 30 seconds, and if someone can access their own contact list
they can access the GPS information as well, lowering the knowledge level required.
• Complexity: 6
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The analysis can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 5 The attack requires one or two tools, the GPS logger, the access to the
contact list, and the method of collecting the IDs to track. Then the program to
match the ID and every GPS coordinate and map them together. One person could
do this in more than a month, or a few could do this in about a month. All of these
components have been created before for other attacks (the GPS data attacks of
section 3.2.3) and would need to be put together for this one.
• Effort: 1.5
– Planning: 1 This is high effort because the code has to be placed on many phones
to collect all of the required information. Then the data has to be compiled.
– Human: 2 To effectively cover an area quite a few people would need to be in-
volved. Once the software is on their phone they would not have to necessarily do
anything out of the ordinary however just go through their usual routine.
• Scope: 4 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved who can recognize someone when they are together and then use their
own contact list to find the victim’s ID to be traced. This allows a greater number of
people to be targeted.
• Impact: 4.5
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– Data: 5 The contact log information itself is not easy to use, but the GPS data
allows the creation of a map of where someone has been and could then determine
where they live or something about them from that as seen in the attacks discussed
in 3.2.3. Having a constant ID increases the ease of creating such a map.
– Trust: 4 This would damage trust in the system. There is the potential that a
politically motivated group could use this to single out certain people. Especially if
they can target those that have the virus.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, the code that collects the info
does not need to interfere with the app, just monitor it, though the amount of people
involved would require quite the vow of secrecy. Though the app does try to detect if the
phone is rooted, it was said that this can be circumvented [125].
• Damage: 2.5
– System: 1 The code added to the groups devices would have to be removed but
otherwise the system itself has not truly been touched
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of GPS location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 4.188
Attack 2
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
• Access: 3 The documentation says the contact list itself is encrypted with AES using the
system keychains which indicates they can be read if the device is rooted. The app does
try to check if the device is rooted but this can be circumvented which is admitted by the
creators [125]. Also because the broadcast ID of the person does not change that means
that someone only has to access their own devices contact list to gather the ID and then
follow it access the ID on the victim’s device.
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• Knowledge: 4 A lot of the work seems graduate level to create the code to mimic the
Bluetooth transmissions of the Bluetrace protocol, or you would just need to have the
app on the device that is then sending it through the BLE antennas. Accessing the IDs is
an issue that ups the difficulty because you would need root access on your device. Thus,
this is between a career individual.
• Complexity: 6.5
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The tracing of IDs can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 6 The creation of the the Bluetooth devices is something that a single person
could do with enough time. Creating enough of them to cover a larger area would
be time consuming, as would the actual setup of the devices in the locations.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5 Medium to low effort, the BLE components need to be set up and
placed in the area. Retrieving the IDs from a victim’s phone would require care.
Though taking them off the server could remove this factor.
– Human: 7 One or two people could do this, setting up the BLE devices might
require two people.
• Scope: 4 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved who can recognize someone when they are together and then use their
own contact list to find the victim’s ID to be traced. This allows a greater number of
people to be targeted.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The attack provides information on everywhere an individual has been over
an area covered by the BLE devices. Though this might not be able to be used to
determine where they live there remains information that could be used to identify
them. This was discussed in section 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 Due to the promises of not being able to track people with the app this
would make people wary about downloading the app.
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• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, the code that collects the info
does not need to interfere with the app, just monitor it, though the amount of people
involved would require quite the vow of secrecy. Though the app does try to detect if the
phone is rooted, it was said that this can be circumvented [125].
• Damage: 2
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 4.688
Attack 3
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
The only thing known about the DiD is what is claimed. It is created to be an anonymous,
randomized unique device identity number. If we assume this to be the case (which we are
assuming) then there is nothing to break as reversing the process will give nothing that the
attack could use.
Attack 4
4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
The Aarogyu Setu app is a centralized Bluetooth system similar to that of Singapore’s
TraceTogether app. However the Aarogyu Setu app has added functionality that Tracetogether
does not. One of the added features is that the app informs the user of the health status of
people they have previously come into contact with. The app informs a user directly what the
status of someone they were near at a specific time in the previous days is. The system uses
green, yellow, or red to indicate low risk, potential for exposure, and sick. Thus this attack can
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be implemented using a camera and matching to the contact made at the same time as the time
stamp without building any other tools.
• Access: 10 The information given to the user through the app means that an attacker
only needs regular user access to the system
• Knowledge: 10 This does not require any field specific knowledge
• Complexity: 9.5
– Technology: 9 An exploit would require the additional component of a camera,
though modern phones have cameras in them.
– Build: 10 One person can easily build this attack as all that is required is setting up
the camera and device in the same location
• Effort: 9
– Planning: 8 Low, the only components are the camera and device with the app
installed, then identifying the individual
– Human: 10 One person of this knowledge level would be able to create this and
then go place it somewhere
• Scope: 5 Affects a small group, as many people as an attacker could get to walk through
a specific area.
• Impact: 5.5
– Data: 4 The attacker has gained information about who is actually sick, which is
private health information, but they need to identify the people in the photo.
– Trust: 7 This could damage trust as the attack provides an attacker with the photo
of someone who is sick, and it is very easy for an attacker to implement.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this attack would not be noticed, the only time it could
be would be if someone noticed the camera or if an attacker did something public to
determine someone’s identity.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
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– User: 7 Someone has now had their privacy about health data stolen from them,
which is private data that has many protections for a reason see section 2.2 for
examples of why this data is protected.
Average: 7.563
Attack 4.5
• 4.5 Everything is the same as attack 4 except the attack is a company/organization that
already has security cameras in their facility and is just adding the BLE receivers to the
building
• Access: 10 The information given to the user through the app means that an attacker
only needs regular user access to the system
• Knowledge: 10 This does not require any field specific knowledge
• Complexity: 9
– Technology: 8 An exploit such as this would require a computer to setup the BLE
devices. It certainly would require one to operate the security system.
– Build: 10 One person can easily build this attack as all that is required is setting up
the BLE devices and using the security cameras
• Effort: 9
– Planning: 8 The exploit would require the creation of many BLE devices, since
they are all the same however that is not a limiting difficulty. Matching the
– Human: 10 one person could likely create this and then set it up within the building
• Scope: 6 This wouldn’t be a whole demographic, but would affect a large amount of
people that are in that building or on company campus
• Impact: 8
– Data: 8. They can use their own personnel files which likely have a photo for
building identification purposes to identify the person, and it is even easier for them
to determine that person’s status with the app telling them.
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– Trust: 8 The issue is that if they are taking this data in this manner then while
people may not find out about it for a long time when they do it will be a big hit
to the trust in a future system like this. Especially because they are just using the
system as is
• Detection: 10 The system has little to no way of detecting this. Even the victims would
likely not notice anything as the security cameras were already there.
• Damage: 5
– System: 0 They didn’t touch the system
– User: 10 They would have this information for a long time, they could use it in
unexpected and interesting ways that could effect people for a long time without
them even knowing it.
Average: 8.375
Attack 5
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
• Access: 10. The access of a regular user is all that is required for this attack.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. The only computer required is the phone itself.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this in less than a month as there are no
extra components required.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10. Very low effort, there are few components or steps.
– Human: 10. One person could perform this alone.
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• Scope: 5. The app’s functionality allowing users to see the status of a contact made at a
specific time the attacker does not have to turn the device on and off only when around a
specific person. The attacker would just have to make note of the time they were alone
with their target. Thus, the scope of the attack is larger as an attacker could perform this
to more than one person at a time. They could even use it against someone they are not
close to.
• Impact: 7
– Data: 7. The attacker gains knowledge of whether someone has the virus. This is
protected health data.
– Trust: 7. The scope is large for such a simple attack. Combined with the ease of
performing it with the functionality of this app this would damage the trust in the
system. This is a users health information being broadcast to anyone that was near
enough to them.
• Detection: 10. It would be almost impossible for the system to catch that this has
occurred.
• Damage: 3
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 6. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 8.125
Attack 6 and 7
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
7. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See IDs being
sent from user to server indicating Covid+ status→ Determine that person has the virus
→ Break privacy
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In the documentation for the Aarogyu Setu app it is detailed that the communications with
the server are encrypted and secured [125]. Breaking HTTPS or Secure TLS is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Thus it is not possible for an attacker to eavesdrop on the communications
as required by both of these avenues of vulnerability. It is unknown if the servers that the app
communicate with are different depending on the kind of communication. Such a thing could
open up the opportunity for this type of attack.
Attack 8
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
• Access: 10. The attack requires no system access, it only requires that something be
placed in a physical location.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 9
– Technology: 8. This is possible with a device that would not have to be a computer,
however could require a computer to build. Various devices can already prevent
Bluetooth signals like microwave interference.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 7.5
– Planning: 7. To cover a large area an attacker would need multiple devices, as well
as the placement of the devices to be discreet.
– Human: 8. One or two people working together could create all of the device and
place them in an area.
• Scope: 6. While not able to target an entire demographic a large area could be covered
where anyone within would not receive any contact logs on their app.
• Impact: 1.5
– Data: 1. The attack does introduce false data on the device, in that the device
thinks that there are no devices close enough for a contact despite this not being the
actual case. However, the data goes no farther than that into the system.
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– Trust: 2. This would cause people to ask why even use the app if the signals can
be blocked. Temporarily lowering their trust in the system.
• Detection: 4. This attack would interfere with other Bluetooth devices in the same area,
and potentially other signals such as WiFi. That makes this attack somewhat noticeable
to anyone in the area.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 4. People in that area could have come into contact with the virus and not
received the exposure notifications. A single test once the attack was discovered
would let them know they are in the clear.
Average: 6.25
Attack 9, 10, 11
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
The Aarogyu Setu app is based on the centralized Bluetooth system. In this system the con-
tact logs of sick individuals are uploaded processed by the server to determine the individuals
at risk and then those people are informed of that risk. In this system unless an individual were
to have access to the secured server there is no way for them to determine an ID belonging to
a sick individual. Even if the attacker could determine the ID of a sick individual and inject
it into the victim’s contact list the system would never look at it. As only the contacts of sick
individuals are processed. The injected information would just be deleted after 14 days.
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Attack 12-17
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
In the Aarogyu Setu app system the user does not authenticate or consent to the upload
of information. Once the user is using the system they have given their consent. As such
the information from their phone is uploaded without them performing an action or entering a
code. The health authority server that holds the test results passes information to the back-end
server of the app which flags the user and pulls the data from their phone onto the server when
the phone next connects. Thus, due to the nature of this system attacks 12-17 are not avenues
that an attacker could use to try and attack the system.
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8.2.4 Iceland Rakning C-19
Attacks 1-5
1. Capture your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and loca-
tions with other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a
user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
In this system there is nothing being publicly broadcast. Since there are no IDs being
broadcast there is nothing for an attacker to receive and trace as a victim moves. All the system
does is store the GPS location data of the user periodically. Thus none of these five potential
vulnerabilities apply to this system of tracing.
Attack 6 and 7
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
7. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See IDs being
sent from user to server indicating Covid+ status→ Determine that person has the virus
→ Break privacy
In the documentation for the Rakning C-19 app it is detailed that the communications with
the server are encrypted and secured [123]. Breaking HTTPS or Secure TLS is beyond the
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scope of this thesis. Thus it will be considered not possible for an attacker to eavesdrop on
the communications as required by both of these avenues of vulnerability. It is unknown if the
servers that the app communicate with are different depending on the purpose of communica-
tion. Such a thing could open up the opportunity for this type of attack.
Attack 8
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
Due to the nature of the Rakning C-19 system there is no Bluetooth signal to block. The
system only stores the GPS location data of the device periodically. Thus, there is no avenue
of attack by blocking the signal with this model of contact tracing.
Attacks 9, 10, 11
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
The Rakning C-19 system is GPS based. Therefore this system does not compare contacts
of individuals at all. To perform this attack an attacker would have to access all of the GPS
logs of the app and add in a new GPS log while removing the real one that was recorded over
the same time period as the false one. However due to the nature of the system there is no
practical way for an attacker to know where a COVID-19 positive patient was at a specific time
to create the false GPS trail around. Thus, these attacks are not considered possible avenues of
vulnerability for this app.
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Attack 12-17
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
For the Rakning C-19 system the documentation says that the location information is up-
loaded to the server if the contact tracing team believes that it is required for contact tracing
[123]. At this time it is unclear what exactly results in a user being flagged for data upload.
Thus, due to the nature of this system attacks 12-14 are not avenues that an attacker could use
to try and attack the system.
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8.2.5 France TousAntiCovid
Attack 1
1. Capture your own GPS location when recording a contact→ Pool contact lists and loca-
tions with other users into master list→ Access a user’s list of their own IDs→ Trace a
user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→ Break privacy
• Access: 1 For the TousAntiCovid centralized Bluetooth system the only way to know
another user’s ID would be to somehow access the list on the secure server, or to access
the user’s ID list. This is a severe limitation to an attacker taking advantage of this
vulnerability. There is nothing in the documentation that indicates the collection of GPS
data when a phone makes a BLE handshake/exchange is prevented. The contact list on
the device is claimed to be “secured” without a clear definition of what that entails. It is
likely at the least under the usual protections of any app data, that is other apps cannot
read or write it, though a user with root access could see the information. It is not clear
if this data is encrypted.
• Knowledge: 3 The implementation would require being able to make the GPS logging
code and detect that the device has logged the Bluetooth information. Gaining access to
the IDs would require significant knowledge.
• Complexity: 6
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The analysis can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 5 The attack requires one or two tools, the GPS logger, the access to the
contact list, and the method of collecting the IDs to track. Then the program to
match the ID and every GPS coordinate and map them together. One person could
do this in more than a month, or a few could do this in about a month. All of these
components have been created before for other attacks (the GPS data attacks of
section 3.2.3) and would need to be put together for this one.
• Effort: 1.5
– Planning: 1 This is high effort because the code has to be placed on many phones
to collect all of the required information. Then the data has to be compiled.
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– Human: 2 To effectively cover an area quite a few people would need to be in-
volved. Once the software is on their phone they would not have to necessarily do
anything out of the ordinary however just go through their usual routine.
• Scope: 3 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved whose devices could be accessed to get the IDs would be the ones
targeted.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4 The contact log information itself is not easy to use, but the GPS data
allows the creation of a map of where someone has been and could then determine
where they live or something about them from that as seen in the attacks discussed
in 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 This would damage trust in the system. There is the potential that a
politically motivated group could use this to single out certain people. Especially if
they can target those that have the virus.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this would not be noticed, the code that collects the info
does not need to interfere with the app, just monitor it, though the amount of people
involved would require quite the vow of secrecy. It does involve access to someone’s
phone to retrieve the IDs which would increase the risk of detection.
• Damage: 2.5
– System: 1 The code added to the groups devices would have to be removed but
otherwise the system itself has not truly been touched
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. This leads back to
the dangers of GPS location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 3.625
Attack 2
2. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages→ Access a user’s list of their own
IDs→ Trace a user’s ID through the areas covered→ Link an id to a definite location→
Break privacy
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• Access: 1 For the TousAntiCovid centralized Bluetooth system the only way to know
another user’s ID would be to somehow access the list on the secure server, or to access
the user’s ID list. This is a severe limitation to an attacker taking advantage of this
vulnerability. There is nothing in the documentation that indicates the collection of GPS
data when a phone makes a BLE handshake/exchange is prevented. The contact list on
the device is claimed to be “secured” without a clear definition of what that entails. It is
likely at the least under the usual protections of any app data, that is other apps cannot
read or write it, though a user with root access could see the information. It is not clear
if this data is encrypted.
• Knowledge: 3 The implementation would require being able to make the GPS logging
code and detect that the device has logged the Bluetooth information. Gaining access to
the IDs would require significant knowledge.
• Complexity: 6.5
– Technology: 7 The tools required for the exploit would require a standard computer
to create. The tracing of IDs can be done on a consumer computer.
– Build: 6 The creation of the the Bluetooth devices is something that a single person
could do with enough time. Creating enough of them to cover a larger area would
be time consuming, as would the actual setup of the devices in the locations.
• Effort: 6
– Planning: 5 Medium to low effort, the BLE components need to be set up and
placed in the area. Retrieving the IDs from a victim’s phone would require care.
Though taking them off the server could remove this factor.
– Human: 7 One or two people could do this, setting up the BLE devices might
require two people.
• Scope: 3 This would affect the group IDs could be identified for. People close to any
of those involved whose devices could be accessed to get the IDs would be the ones
targeted.
• Impact: 4
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– Data: 4 The attack provides information on everywhere an individual has been over
an area covered by the BLE devices. Though this might not be able to be used to
determine where they live there remains information that could be used to identify
them. This was discussed in section 3.2.3.
– Trust: 4 Due to the promises of not being able to track people with the app this
would make people wary about downloading the app.
• Detection: 8 It is possible that this attack would not be noticed, the only time it could
be would be when an attacker tried to take the ID if the attacker was trying to get it from
the victim’s phone.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0 Nothing directly damaging to the system has been done.
– User: 4 The damage solely from this vulnerability would not be permanent, but
harmful to someone’s privacy as they would have been tracked. Depending on the
attacker’s goal there could be a large effect felt. This leads back to the dangers of
location data discussed in section 2.2.
Average: 4.188
Attack 3
3. Setup BLE antennas to pick up Bluetooth messages → Capture messages being sent
between user devices→ Break the encryption on the transmitted ID→ Link an ID to a
person→ Break privacy
This app is created using the ROBERT protocol. As such the Temporary IDs are created
using a block cipher that uses the server key and encrypts the permanent identifier for the
user’s app. The specific block cipher used is left up to the developer. However, breaking any
encryption scheme currently considered secure is beyond the scope of this thesis. As well even
if it was breakable there is nothing to link the user to their user ID unless an attacker had access
to the server information. Assuming that the health authority is not the threat this attack is not
viable here
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Attack 4 and 4.5
4. Setup device and camera in specific public location (doorway) → Record time and ID
received→ Read list of positive IDs, compare to received IDs→ Connect positive ID to
timestamp and photo→ Link an ID to a person→ Break Privacy
Due to this app using the Bluetooth centralized model of ROBERT there is no server infor-
mation for a user to take to determine a contact on their own. An attacker would have to use
the app and wait for it to tell them when a contact was made. However, the TousAntiCovid app
does not tell the user when the contact that may have exposed them was. Instead it just tells
them they were exposed within the last 14 days. Thus, there is no information for the attacker
to use to determine which person they took a photo of was the one that has the virus.
Attack 5
5. Attacker only turns on their device at specific times to capture a specific person’s ID→
Wait to receive contact notice→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
The ROBERT protocol actually has check on the server side to prevent this type of attack.
When the app makes a request of its exposure status the system checks a flag for how recent
the last request was and if that request returned a positive result. If the app made the request
too recently then the system does not provide it a response, the same occurs if the server had
returned the request with the result that it had been exposed. This means that in order to
perform this attack multiple times a user would have to prove that the previous exposure had
not resulted in them contracting the illness.
• Access: 10. The access of a regular user is all that is required for this attack.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. The only computer required is the phone itself.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this in less than a month as there are no
extra components required.
• Effort: 10
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– Planning: 10. Very low effort, there are few components or steps.
– Human: 10. One person could perform this alone.
• Scope: 1. Could effect one person that the attacker knows.
• Impact: 4.5
– Data: 7. The attacker gains knowledge of whether one person has the virus. This
is protected health data.
– Trust: 2. Though the scope is small, this is the kind of attack that could lower the
trust of some vulnerable communities or people that are unlikely to trust the system
to begin with.
• Detection: 4. The system does actively try to prevent this attack from occurring multiple
times. However the first time it was used the system would not catch it.
• Damage: 3
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 6. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.563
Attack 6 and 7
6. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See the contact
message being sent to users→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break privacy
7. Access a WiFi network→ Capture messages between app and server→ See IDs being
sent from user to server indicating Covid+ status→ Determine that person has the virus
→ Break privacy
In the documentation for the TousAntiCovid app it is detailed that the communications with
the server are encrypted and secured [158]. Breaking HTTPS or Secure TLS is beyond the
scope of this thesis. Thus it is not possible for an attacker to eavesdrop on the communications
as required by both of these avenues of vulnerability. It is unknown if the servers that the app
communicate with are different depending on the kind of communication. Such a thing could
open up the opportunity for this type of attack.
186 Chapter 8. Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
Attack 8
8. Create a device to jam/flood the Bluetooth signals→ Suppress contact messages (by not
allowing phones to collect contacts)→ Inject false information into the system
• Access: 10. The attack requires no system access, it only requires that something be
placed in a physical location.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 9
– Technology: 8. This is possible with a device that would not have to be a computer,
however could require a computer to build. Various devices can already prevent
Bluetooth signals like microwave interference.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 7.5
– Planning: 7. To cover a large area an attacker would need multiple devices, as well
as the placement of the devices to be discreet.
– Human: 8. One or two people working together could create all of the device and
place them in an area.
• Scope: 6. While not able to target an entire demographic a large area could be covered
where anyone within would not receive any contact logs on their app.
• Impact: 1.5
– Data: 1. The attack does introduce false data on the device, in that the device
thinks that there are no devices close enough for a contact despite this not being the
actual case. However, the data goes no farther than that into the system.
– Trust: 2. This would cause people to ask why even use the app if the signals can
be blocked. Temporarily lowering their trust in the system.
• Detection: 4. This attack would interfere with other Bluetooth devices in the same area,
and potentially other signals such as WiFi. That makes this attack somewhat noticeable
to anyone in the area.
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• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack does not touch the system.
– User: 4. People in that area could have come into contact with the virus and not
received the exposure notifications. A single test once the attack was discovered
would let them know they are in the clear.
Average: 6.25
Attack 9, 10, 11
9. Learn 1 positive ID (from online list, etc)→ Gain access to other device’s contact list→
Inject ID into device contact list→ Inject false information into the system
10. Learn 1 positive ID → Setup Bluetooth spoofer to broadcast ID like a user device, and
place in a busy public area → Introduce false positives as user devices log the positive
contact→ Inject false information into the system
11. Learn 1 positive ID → Inject fake contact using ID into your device’s contact list →
Upload your information to the server → Introduce false positives → Introduce false
information into the system
The TousAntiCovid app is based on the centralized Bluetooth system. In this system the
contact logs of sick individuals are uploaded processed by the server to determine the individ-
uals at risk and then those people are informed of that risk. In this system unless an individual
were to have access to the secured server there is no way for them to determine an ID belonging
to a sick individual. Even if the attacker could determine the ID of a sick individual and inject
it into the victim’s contact list the system would never look at it. As only the contacts of sick
individuals are processed. The injected information would just be deleted after 14 days.
Attack 12
12. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Determine that person has the virus→ Break Privacy
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For the TousAntiCovid system a user receives the one-time code used to upload their data
either directly from their doctor, through a website that requires authentication of their identity,
or the mail. Thus, this attack would actually be the attacker asking for the one-time code and
if they receive the code then they know that the user tested positive for COVID-19.
• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but do
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 7
– Data: 10. The attacker would have the health information of the victims
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– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
Most email or other systems have filters that will catch a lot of phishing attempts.
• Damage: 3.5
– System: 0. The attack does touch the system.
– User: 7. The personal damage is the health data that has been stolen. This data
cannot be altered, it is a part of someone’s medical history.
Average: 6.438
Attack 13
13. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Break the encryption or security of code→ Forge a code→ Upload false information
using code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information about the process used to create the one-time code for the TousAn-
tiCovid system. Neither is there any information about how the code is validated. Due to this
it is not possible to assess in the manner of this thesis how vulnerable the system is to this type
of attack.
Attack 14
14. Create a fake webportal for test results, send phishing message with url, user logs into
fake site, attacker steals login and accesses real portal and gets upload code/test results
→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
For the TousAntiCovid system a user receives the one-time code used to upload their data
either directly from their doctor, through a website that requires authentication of their identity,
or the mail. Thus, this attack would actually be the attacker asking for the one-time code and
if they receive the code then they know that the user tested positive for COVID-19.
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• Access: 9. The attacker does not need to have access to the system or the app but does
need access to someone’s information. This would have to be a medical professional for
the attacker to gain access to a test result. Or if a patient provides their one-time code
this would be confirmation to the attacker that the victim tested positive
• Knowledge: 7. A phishing bot is a novice level tool. The creation of the fake site would
require some more specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 7
– Technology: 7. The fake website requires a computer to setup, the phishing bot
requires a computer to operate.
– Build: 7. With how common phishing attacks have become there is a lot of infor-
mation online on how to make them. It would take a month to setup the website.
• Effort: 7
– Planning: 7. Low effort, there are a couple of components required. Setting up
the website and entering the information given into the real one would be the most
intensive aspect.
– Human: 7. One or two people working together would be able to implement this
attack.
• Scope: 4. Assuming that the system only allows that a health care professional see their
patient’s information then the group that the attacker would have information on is small.
Alternatively the attacker would be able to target a small set of the patients who fall for
the phishing attack.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. Though phishing attacks are com-
mon enough that most people are aware they can occur people would be wary of
the system after this attack.
• Detection: 7. In some cases phishing is detected very early, sometimes it takes longer.
Most email or other systems have filters that will catch a lot of phishing attempts.
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• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 5.875
Attack 15
15. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Break the encryption or security of the
code→ Forge a code→Upload false information using code→ Introduce false positives
→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information about the process used to create the one-time code for the TousAn-
tiCovid system. Neither is there any information about how the code is validated. Due to this
it is not possible to assess in the manner of this thesis how vulnerable the system is to this type
of attack.
Attack 16
16. Get an upload code from the health authorities→ Replay a code→ Upload false infor-
mation using the code→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the
system
• Access: 5. This attack does not require the attacker to have higher access to the system
or the app but it does require them to have access to someone who has tested positive.
• Knowledge: 10. Novice level, this does not require any field specific knowledge.
• Complexity: 10
– Technology: 10. This attack could require a computer but does not have to.
– Build: 10. One person could create this attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 8.5
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– Planning: 10. There are very few steps that required by this attack. The attacker
just has to convince someone to hand over their one time code.
– Human: 7. The attacker needs a person willing to give them their one-time code.
Thus it requires two people.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 7. The only point at which an attacker might be detected would be if the
person that they took the one-time code from informed an authority. Difficult to gauge if
that would occur or not.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a
COVID test, one-time actions in response to the attack
Average: 6.438
Attack 17
17. Brute force an upload code→ Replay a code→ Upload false information using the code
→ Introduce false positives→ Introduce false information to the system
There is no information in the TraceTogether documentation about the size of the one-time
code required for the user to upload their contact list to the server. Nor whether there are any
protections on the server against this type of attack.
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• Access: 10. The attacker is only using the user interface.
• Knowledge: 10. A brute force attack is novice level, even with the additional work
around for the IP ban.
• Complexity: 8.5
– Technology: 7. A computer would be required to create the code to try all of the
possible one-time pins.
– Build: 10. A single person could create this entire attack in less than a month.
• Effort: 10
– Planning: 10 Minimal components, the steps are straight forwards this is a simple
attack.
– Human: 10 One person is all that is required to perform this attack.
• Scope: 5. The attacker could target a large number of people by placing the device they
intend to use the one-time code on somewhere with heavy foot traffic. This way a large
number of people will be notified of an exposure.
• Impact: 4
– Data: 4. The attacker has introduced false data to the system that will be deleted
after 15 days
– Trust: 4. This would lower trust in the system. The ease with which a person could
force a group of people into quarantine would make users wary.
• Detection: 7 The system does not necessarily monitor for this, though IP addresses are
logged by any server when a communication is made. If an administrator was looking in
those logs they would see this attack occurring.
• Damage: 2
– System: 0. The attack do touch the system, but the data is automatically deleted
after a time and no action is required
– User: 4. The user will have been asked to quarantine for 14 days and to get a




































































































1 2 3 7 5 1 2 4 4 4 8 1 4 3.875
2 2 3 7 6 5 7 4 4 4 8 0 4 4.438
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 4 7 7 7 7 7 5 4 4 8 0 7 5.688
4.5 4 7 7 7 7 10 6 7 7 10 0 10 6.813
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 7 2 10 0 6 7.313
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7 7 7 7 10 5 7 4 4 4 9 0 6 6.063
8 10 10 8 10 7 8 6 1 2 4 0 4 6.25
9 1 2 7 4 4 10 1 1 1 8 0 4 3.438
10 4 4 7 7 6 7 6 1 3 8 0 4 4.938
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12 9 7 7 7 7 7 4 10 4 7 0 7 6.438
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 9 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 7 0 4 5.875
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 5 10 10 10 10 7 5 4 4 7 0 4 6.438
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7 7 9 7 10 5 7 4 4 4 9 0 6 6.313
8 10 10 8 10 7 8 6 1 2 4 0 4 6.25
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 9 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 7 0 4 5.875
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 5 10 10 10 10 7 5 4 4 7 0 4 6.438



































































































1 3 4 7 5 1 2 4 5 4 8 1 4 4.188
2 3 4 7 6 5 7 4 4 4 8 0 4 4.688
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 10 10 9 10 8 10 5 4 7 8 0 7 7.563
4.5 10 10 8 10 8 10 6 8 8 10 0 10 8.375
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 7 7 10 0 6 8.125
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8 10 10 8 10 7 8 6 1 2 4 0 4 6.25
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 - - - - - - - - - - - - -















































































































1 1 3 7 5 1 2 3 4 4 8 1 4 3.625
2 1 3 7 6 5 7 3 4 4 8 0 4 4.188
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4.5 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 7 2 4 0 6 6.563
6 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
8 10 10 8 10 7 8 6 1 2 4 0 4 6.25
9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
12 9 7 7 7 6 7 4 10 4 6 0 7 6.25
13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 9 7 7 7 6 7 4 4 4 6 0 5 5.75
15 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
16 5 10 10 10 10 7 5 4 4 7 0 4 6.438
17 10 10 7 10 10 10 5 4 4 7 0 4 7.063
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8.2.6 Summary of Application Vulnerability
None of the suggested attacks laid out in the attack tree as it turns out are viable against the
Icelandic Rakning C-19 app. Thus, there is no table summarizing the vulnerability of the app
as it would be blank.
8.2.7 Vulnerability Ranking of Selected Applications
Now that the vulnerability of the applications has been assessed against the proposed attack
vectors the applications are ranked. This ranking corresponds to how serious a vulnerability in
the system is. Green indicates that nothing of serious concern was discovered. Yellow means
that there are some concerning areas in the security of the system. Red indicates that critical
security flaws are present in the system. As described in the 7.3 section this initial ranking is
performed the same as the initial ranking performed when creating the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) [47]. The ranking is done by the reviewer based on the assessment
against the rubric. Then the rankings are used to determine the define the acceptable numeric
ranges for each severity level.
Initial Ranking of Contact Tracing Applications
• Canada Covid Alert - Yellow
• Singapore TraceTogether - Yellow
• Iceland Rakning C-19 - Green
• India Aarogya Setu - Red
• France TousAntiCovid - Yellow
Iceland’s Rakning C-19 application is ranked as green because of the lack of vulnerability.
When the proposed attack tree was run against the system of the Rakning C-19 application
none of the proposed potential vulnerabilities were found to be a viable option against the
system. This is due to the nature of GPS logging. The system is quite secure against these
types of attacks. Thus, the application receives a ranking of Green.
8.2. Analysis of the Vulnerability of Contact Tracing Applications 199
India’s Aarogya Setu application is ranked as red because of the nature of the vulnerabilities
found. When the proposed attack tree was run against the system of the Aarogya Setu applica-
tion two of the vulnerabilities received a totalled average of higher than 8. The functionalities
within the system leave opportunities for attackers to take advantage and maliciously target
users. Allowing the users to see how many individuals near them currently, in a specific area,
or that have been near them have symptoms or the virus is a dangerous amount of information
to be publishing.
Canada’s Covid Alert application is ranked as yellow because while many of the proposed
vulnerabilities have the potential to be exploited within the system the highest has a totalled
average of 7.3. This is vulnerability is concerning but not necessarily a critical issue with the
system. Thus, the application receives a ranking of Yellow.
Singapore’s TraceTogether application is ranked as yellow because similarly to the Covid
Alert app while there are vulnerabilities that have the potential to be exploited and two with
average totals of 7 these are only concerning. The application has some areas that are of
concern though not necessarily a critical vulnerability in the system. Thus, the application
receives a ranking of Yellow.
France’s TousAntiCovid application is ranked as yellow because while many of the pro-
posed vulnerabilities have the potential to be exploited within the system the highest has a
totalled average of 7.06. This is vulnerability is concerning but not necessarily a critical issue
with the system. Thus, the application receives a ranking of Yellow.
Creating Ranges for Each Severity Level required reviewing the results of the vulnerability
assessment and determining the method best used to differentiate between the rankings. It was
decided that while the attack tree is thorough there is the potential that future vulnerabilities
in the systems will be proposed. Thus, the attack tree here cannot be considered to cover
the entire breadth of the vulnerability field. Due to this consideration looking at the number
of vulnerabilities a system has is not as useful a metric as looking at the severity of any one
vulnerability that the system has. In this way, if a vulnerability were to be found that was
critical the security ranking of an app would drop into the red regardless of where it was before
or whether there are any other vulnerabilities in the system.
200 Chapter 8. Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
This creates a ranking system based on the highest average total of a vulnerability proposed
against the system and scored using the rubric of this thesis. It is as follows:
• Green: 0 - 3.9
• Yellow: 4 - 7.9
• Red: 8 - 10
8.3 Summary of Assessment of Contact Tracing Applications
The assessments of privacy and security were performed and used to determine the ranges for
the severity level metrics. This is detailed in the previous pages of this chapter. Here is a
summary of the results. Table 8.7 contains the numerical ranges for the privacy rankings of the
applications. These numerical values are determined by comparing the contact tracing system
to the privacy principles laid out in section 7.2.2. Such a review was performed in section 8.1.
Table 8.8 contains the numerical ranges for the security rankings of the applications. These
numerical values are determined for each application by assessing how severe a vulnerability
is based on the rubric of section 7.3.1. Such assessments were performed for each application
and all proposed attacks in section 8.2. A summary of the results of the privacy and security
reviews of the 5 selected application is in table 8.9.
Table 8.7: Contact Tracing Application Privacy Scoring
Ranking Privacy Score
Good 8 - 10
Medium 5 - 7.5
Low 0 - 4.5
Table 8.8: Contact Tracing Application Security Scoring
Ranking Highest Severity of a Vulnerability
Good 0 - 3.9
Medium 4 - 7.9
Low 8 - 10
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Table 8.9: Contact Tracing Application Security and Privacy Scoring
Ranking Privacy Score Vulnerability Score
Covid Alert 8.5 7.313
TraceTogether 5.5 7.375
Rakning C-19 6.5 0
Aarogya Setu 4 8.375
TousAntiCovid 5.5 7.063
Chapter 9
Discussion, Future Work, and Conclusions
Contact tracing is a topic that within a single year went from completely unknown to the general
public to being regularly discussed on the nightly news. Contact tracing along with many other
things has been pushed into the consciousness of the public due to the circumstances of a
global pandemic. Many of those other things will slowly fade back out of the public eye once
a vaccine is created and enough of the populace is inoculated to create herd immunity. That
does not mean that contact tracing will not continue. Like disinfection procedures and personal
protective equipment, contact tracing is one of the modern tools the medical field uses to crack
down on virus spread. It is the means of catching the virus early. When there is an outbreak in
the future of another virus it will be used again to try and prevent that virus from becoming a
global pandemic. And whether contact tracing is used in a single area, an entire country, or the
whole world it should be private and secure.
Through this thesis, we have attempted to create a tool that can be used to hold these sys-
tems to a standard of practice. A method to look at them and determine whether the good they
can do through their function is belittled by the harm they could do through their function-
ing. By holding them under the microscope the trust that is necessary in the public for contact
tracing to work can be created.
There are many potential ways that a system can be used that is unintended by the creator.
Just as there are many ways that a creator can use a system that is unintended by those that
permitted them to create it. What can seem to be a small amount of data over time can become
a vast database that could be used to create powerful predictive models. Knowing how small
privacy concessions today will impact the future is a next to impossible endeavour. This is why




This assessment method is the first in creating a method to assess the security and privacy of
digital contact tracing. The CVSS was used as the basis for the methodology. The develop-
ment of the CVSS did not occur in a singular fashion it has released new versions as through
experience of applying the system reveals limitations in the current version. CVSS version 3
has many differences in scoring from version 2. This assessment is also empirically derived
and it is likely that as it is used there will be areas of possible improvement to it that will be
discovered.
Though the attack tree has many novel attacks, like any other it cannot be proven to be
complete. Other attacks could exist that were not laid out in this thesis. For the purpose of
creating a security assessment methodology, this limitation was addressed in how the security
level was determined based on the severity of a single vulnerability against the system. Future
vulnerabilities discovered should be scored using the created method to determine if an app’s
security is impacted by the discovery of the new vulnerability.
9.2 Future Work
This work like many before it is not intended to be written in stone. Instead, it is intended as
a step towards a method of assessing the many digital contact tracing systems that are being
released. Improvements can be made to expand upon this work and create a system to assess
the security and privacy of this type of software. The CVSS is currently on version 3.1, and
Rome was not made in a day.
• Expand the Privacy Review: one area of future work would be to get a multilingual
team of privacy reviewers to monitor the documentation of the apps being developed and
deployed and keep an up to date publicly available review of their privacy.
• Expand the Security Review: a major undertaking would be to take the security review
further. A larger number of apps being reviewed through the lens of a larger number of
attacks would improve our understanding of the shortcomings of these systems.
– Comparing more apps: a review of the state of security across the entire or a
statistically significant amount of the field of these apps could be performed. By
doing this information about the state of security in the entire ecosystem could be
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reviewed. A ranking of the apps could be done to see how they compare to each
other. Such a thing could be used to guide policy as countries look to adopt different
systems.
– Comparing more attacks: expanding the attack tree would improve the security
review. The 18 vulnerability paths are not the only possible ways that these systems
could be attacked. Potential new vulnerabilities could be presented against the
systems and marked along with others to determine how severe they are. This
would provide more information to developers on what they need to protect the
system from.
– Diving Deeper Into the Apps: if the apps were tested against the vulnerabilities
further by probing their implementation that would assist developers in improving
their security. As well as policymakers in the decisions they make about what apps
to implement. This would by no means require, nor would it be recommended to,
actually build an exploit to run against the system. This would be a further analysis
of the implementation to see where the vulnerabilities could be found.
• Fine Tune the Score Calculations: jumping off from the expansion of both the reviews,
when the reviews are expanded it would create more information to guide the equations
used for score calculations. There are different ways that the scores could be further
fine-tuned. This could involve a weighted average, which would require coefficients to
be carefully determined. There is also the potential to multiply some metrics together
or otherwise have them affect one another. For instance, in the vulnerability score scope
and user damage could relate to each other as the number of people that have to deal
with the damage could be viewed as making the vulnerability worse. Or the knowledge
level could impact the build complexity as it affects who could be designing the system,
complex for a novice might not be the same as complex for an expert.
• Assess Breadth and Depth: The privacy assessment metric currently uses the breadth
of the privacy principles. That is, how the app does along all of them determines how
private the app is. Using the depth approach a serious enough breach of any one principle
could determine the privacy of the app. Oppositely in the security metric, a serious
enough vulnerability results in the app being considered insecure rather than many less
concerning vulnerabilities. The choices to perform the assessment in this manner are that
the privacy principles did not contain any information on what would be a serious breach
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of each principle. Thus, creating a level of privacy breach for each principle could be a
future endeavor. The security reasoning was that the attack tree developed in this work
is thorough but more vulnerabilities could exist. Thus, considering it as a whole was less
important than determining how vulnerable the system was to any one path. However,
a secondary method of viewing the system by looking at how many avenues of attack
there are against a system could lead to valuable insights into the security of the system.
9.3 Final Remarks
In the middle of a health crisis with people’s lives at risk and the potential for the exponential
spread of the virus, solutions can seem necessary and worth the risk. That does not mean they
are. It is important that even in times of crisis the principles that we claim to hold still matter.
We do not create principles for the times when decisions are easy, but when they are difficult.
In this work, five apps have been reviewed and compared directly from a field of over
fifty-five representing different countries. There are more systems out there than that and they
should all be held to some standards of privacy and security. This work attempts to build a
tool to provide the public with a meaningful and systematic way of reviewing the apps that
are being touted to protect them. The world of innovation does not take steps backward. And
privacy is not easily repaired once it is broken. Waiting until after the pandemic to determine
what should have been accepted is to have waited too long. By making a metric of comparing
contact tracing apps now we take a step to giving the public the tools they need to protect their
privacy. An important tool in safeguarding the public in the digital age.
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2020. Available at https://erouska.cz/en/podminky-pouzivani.
[125] National Informatics Center of India. Aarogya setu faq’s. Aarogya Setu, 2020. Available
at https://aarogyasetu.gov.in/faq/.
[126] Government of Russia. Contact tracer is a covid-19 risk tracking application. contact-
tracer.ru, 2020. Available at https://contacttracer.ru/app#rec178736030.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 215
[127] Government of Singapore. Blue trace protocol. bluetrace.io, 2020. Available at https:
//bluetrace.io/.
[128] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. A framework for the government of
canada to assess privacy-impactful initiatives in response to covid-19. Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Apr 2020.
[129] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Privacy review of the covid alert expo-
sure notification application. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Jul 2020.
[130] City of Toronto. Partner notification responsibility for health profes-
sionals. toronto.ca, Mar 2020. Available at https://www.toronto.ca/
community-people/health-wellness-care/information-for-healthcare-professionals/
sexual-health-info-for-health-professionals/partner-notification/.
[131] World Health Organization. Timeline: Who’s covid-19 response. who.int, Jul 2020.
[132] Sharon Otterman. N.y.c. hired 3,000 workers for contact tracing. it’s off to a slow start.
The New York Times, Jun 2020.
[133] Vijay Pandurangan. On taxis and rainbows. Medium, Jun 2014. Available at https:
//tech.vijayp.ca/of-taxis-and-rainbows-f6bc289679a1.
[134] The Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic. On the data trail: How detailed
information about you gets into the hands of organizations with whom you have no
relationship. Apr 2006.
[135] V. Primault, S. Ben Mokhtar, C. Lauradoux, and L. Brunie. Time distortion anonymiza-
tion for the publication of mobility data with high utility. In 2015 IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA, volume 1, pages 539–546, Aug 2015.
[136] Mishaal Rahman. Here are the countries using google and apple’s covid-19 contact
tracing api. xda, Aug 2020.
[137] Eric Rescorla. Looking at designs for covid-19 contact tracing apps. The Mozilla Blog,
Apr 2020.
[138] Luc Rocher, Julien M. Hendrickx, and Yves-Alexandre De Montjoye. Estimating the
success of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using generative models. Nature
Communications, 10(1), 2019.
[139] Shrivastava Saurabh and Shrivastava Prateek. Role of contact tracing in containing the
2014 ebola outbreak: a review. African health sciences, Mar 2017.
[140] B. Schneier. Schneier on security. Blog, Dec 1999.
[141] NHS Scotland. Privacy notice for the protect scotland app. protect.scot, 2020. Available
at https://protect.scot/privacy-policy-app.
216 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[142] Ananda G Shankar, Kulsum Janmohamed, Babatunde Olowokure, Gillian E Smith, An-
gela H Hogan, Valerie De Souza, Anders Wallensten, Isabel Oliver, Oliver Blatchford,
Paul Cleary, and et al. Contact tracing for influenza a(h1n1)pdm09 virus-infected pas-
senger on international flight. National Library of Medicine.
[143] Ian Sherr. Apple listens to some siri recordings to make it better. CNET, Jul 2019.
[144] Tom Simonite. Who’s listening when you talk to your google assistant? Wired, Jul
2019.
[145] Liz Sly. U.s. soldiers are revealing sensitive and dangerous information by jogging. The
Washington Post, Jan 2018.
[146] C. Song, Z. Qu, N. Blumm, and A.-L. Barabasi. Limits of predictability in human
mobility. Science, 327(5968):1018–1021, 2010.
[147] Jessica Su, Ansh Shukla, Sharad Goel, and Arvind Narayanan. De-anonymizing web
browsing data with social networks. In Proceedings of the 26th International Conference
on World Wide Web, WWW ’17, pages 1261–1269, Republic and Canton of Geneva,
Switzerland, 2017. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee.
[148] L Sweeney, M Von Loewenfeldt, and M Perry. Saying it’s anonymous doesn’t make it
so: Re-identifications of “anonymized” law school data. Technology Science, 11 2018.
[149] L. Sweeney, J. S. Yoo, L. Perovich, K. E. Boronow, P. Brown, and J. G. Brody. Re-
identification risks in hipaa safe harbor data: A study of data from one environmental
health study. Technology science, 2017.
[150] Latanya Sweeney. Simple demographics often identify people uniquely. Carnegia Mel-
lon University, 2000.
[151] LATANYA SWEENEY. k-anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International
Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems, 10(05):557–570,
2002.
[152] Latanya Sweeney. Patient Identifiability in Pharmaceutical Marketing Data. Carnegie
Mellon University, Jan 2011.
[153] Latanya Sweeney. Matching known patients to health records in washington state data.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013.
[154] Latanya Sweeney, Akua Abu, and Julia Winn. Identifying participants in the personal
genome project by name. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013.
[155] Nazanin Takbiri, Amir Houmansadr, Dennis L. Goeckel, and Hossein Pishro-Nik. Lim-
its of location privacy under anonymization and obfuscation. 2017 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2017.
[156] Nazanin Takbiri, Amir Houmansadr, Dennis L. Goeckel, and Hossein Pishro-Nik. Pri-
vacy against statistical matching: Inter-user correlation. CoRR, abs/1805.01296, 2018.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 217
[157] Vanessa Teague, Chris Culnane, Eleanor McMurtry, and Robert Merkel. Tracing the
challenges of covidsafe. GitHub, Apr 2020.
[158] PRIVATICS team Inria and Fraunhofer AISEC. Robert-proximity-tracing/documents.
ROBERT: ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing, May 2020.
[159] Nora Von Thenen, Erman Ayday, and A Ercument Cicek. Re-identification of
individuals in genomic data-sharing beacons via allele inference. Bioinformatics,
35(3):365–371, 2018.
[160] Brian Thompson and Danfeng Yao. The union-split algorithm and cluster-based
anonymization of social networks. In Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium
on Information, Computer, and Communications Security, ASIACCS ’09, pages 218–
227, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[161] Anthony Tockar. Riding with the stars: Passenger privacy in the nyc taxicab dataset.
Riding with the Stars: Passenger Privacy in the NYC Taxicab Dataset –, Sep 2014.
[162] Carmela Troncoso, Mathias Payer, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Marcel Salathé, James Larus,
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Appendix A
Resources For Assessing Contact Tracing Applications
Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Australia COVIDSafe
Government Website: https://www.health.gov.au/resources/apps-and-tools/covidsafe-app
Background on CovidSafe: https://covidsafe.gov.au/background.html#privacy-security
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Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Audits: https://erouska.cz/audit-kod
Source Code: https://github.com/covid19cz





Impact Assessment: https://smittestop.dk/uploads/konsekvensanalyse vedr databeskyttelse.pdf
Personal Data Statement: https://smittestop.dk/databeskyttelse/






iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/app/id1523594087




Open source code: https://minka.gob.ec/asi-ecuador
Estonia Hoia
Google App store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=ee.tehik.hoia
iOS App store: https://apps.apple.com/app/id1515441601
Government Website: https://hoia.me/en/
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iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511279125






iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/fj/app/carefiji/id1513752467#?platform=ipad
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Google App store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.rki.coronawarnapp







GH Covid-19 Tracker App
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.moc.gh&hl=en CA




Gibraltar Beat Covid Gibraltar
Google App store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.gha.covid.tracker






Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Company Website: https://in-telligent.com/apps/alerta-guate/
Company Privacy Policy: https://in-telligent.com/application-privacy-policy-2/
Hungary VirusRadar












Google App store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=nic.goi.aarogyasetu&hl=en CA
iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/in/app/aarogyasetu/id1505825357
Government Website: https://aarogyasetu.gov.in/
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Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.covidtracker.hse





Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.hamagen








Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Italy Immuni
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=it.ministerodellasalute.immuni






Google app Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jp.go.mhlw.covid19radar
iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/jp/app/covid-19-contact-app/id1516764458?l=en
Source code: https://github.com/Covid-19Radar/Covid19Radar
FAQ: https:
//www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/kenkou iryou/covid19 qa kanrenkigyou 00009.html
Privacy Policy: https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/english pp 00032.html
Jordan
AMAN App - Jordan
Google app store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jo.gov.moh.aman&hl=en CA
iOS app store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/aman-aman-jo-jordan-covid-19/id1511595289





About the app: https://amanapp.jo/en/page/8/Privacy#mainTitle
Kazakhstan
eGov bizbirgemiz mobile app
iOS: https://apps.apple.com/ai/app/egov-mobile/id1476128386











































Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Privacy Policy: https://egov.kz/cms/en/articles/privacy policy eGov bizbirgemiz
Kuwait Shlonik
Google App store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.healthcarekw.app&hl=en
iOS app store: https:
//apps.apple.com/za/app/shlonik-%D8%B4%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86%D9%83/id1503978984
Video of Registration: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26aX1bArMow
BBC article: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-53052395
Latvia Apturi Covid
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=lv.spkc.gov.apturicovid











Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=nl.rijksoverheid.en





Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Source Code: https://github.com/minvws
New Zealand NZ COVID Tracer
Google App Store:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=nz.govt.health.covidtracer&hl=en CA






North Macedonia Stop Korona!
Google App Store:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=mk.gov.koronavirus.stop&hl=en CA
iOS App Store: https://apps.apple.com/mk/app/stopkorona!/id1506641869
Government Website: https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/
Privacy Policy: https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/privacy-policy
Northern Ireland StopCOVID NI
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=net.hscni.covidtracker
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Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pl.gov.mc.protegosafe






Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=fct.inesctec.stayaway






Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.moi.covid19&hl=en
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Russia Contact Tracer Government Website: https://contacttracer.ru/app#rec178736030
Saudia Arabia Tabaud
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sa.gov.nic.tabaud





Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=gov.scot.covidtracker











































Table A.1: Resources for used while assessing contact tracing apps
Country and Application Resources Used
Government Website: https://protect.scot/
How it Works: https://protect.scot/how-it-works
Privacy Notice: https://protect.scot/privacy-policy-app
Data Use: https://protect.scot/how-we-use-your-data
Terms and Conditions: https://protect.scot/terms-and-conditions
Singapore TraceTogether
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sg.gov.tech.bluetrace








how to upload your tracetogether data (english).pdf
Slovenia #OstaniZdrav






COVID Alert South Africa
Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=za.gov.health.covidconnect
iOS App Store: https://apps.apple.com/app/apple-store/id1524618326?mt=8
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Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=es.gob.radarcovid







Google App Store: SwitzerlandSwissCovidapp
iOS App Store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/swisscovid/id1509275381








Security Assessment: https://www.melani.admin.ch/SwissCovid en
UK NHS COVID-19
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About Data and Privacy Statement: https://covid19.nhs.uk/privacy-and-data.html
Privacy Notice:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-covid-19-app-privacy-information
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Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=gov.azdhs.covidwatch.android











Google App Store: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.proudcrowd.exposure
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